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8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2023These three factors are often called the “Jones factors” because they date back to Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); they have since been codified in Utah Code section 30-3- 5(10)(a)(i)–(iii), and they remain the first three factors of a “multi- factor inquiry” that governs a court’s alimony determination. 2015Urtax Cope § 80-8-5(8)(a). 195 The first three factors are a codification of our analysis in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), and are often referred to as the Jones factors. | 2 | 3 |
Kirk v. Andersongreen2 sentences2026Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60 , ¶¶ 43–46, 321 P.3d 1054 (declining to consider a theory for imposing a duty where the appellant did not specifically present it to the district court). 20231023-CA 7 2026 UT App 66 Rosser v. Elite Craft Homes See Kirk v. Anderson, 2021 UT 41, ¶¶ 18, 20 , 496 P.3d 66 (assuming that the first three factors weighed in favor of recognizing a duty but nevertheless concluding that no duty existed because “the fifth Jeffs factor” “carrie[d] the day in determining that a duty d[id] not exist”). 2026Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60 , ¶¶ 43–46, 321 P.3d 1054 (declining to consider a theory for imposing a duty where the appellant did not specifically present it to the district court). 20231023-CA 7 2026 UT App 16 Rosser v. Elite Craft Homes 2021 UT 41, ¶¶ 18, 20 (assuming that the first three factors weighed in favor of recognizing a duty but nevertheless concluding that no duty existed because “the fifth Jeffs factor” “carrie[d] the day in determining that a duty d[id] not exist”). | 1 | 2 |
Miner v. Minergreen1 sentence2023See Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶ 16 . ¶14 “A party seeking alimony bears the burden of demonstrating to the court that the Jones factors support an award of alimony.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 95, 459 P.3d 276 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Flowersgreen1 sentence2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garzagreen1 sentence2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nelson Cristiano Machado, Jr.green1 sentence2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hintzegreen1 sentence2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vargasgreen2 sentences2009However, "these factors are not exclusive," Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 43 , 52 P.3d 1210 , nor are they necessarily determinative, see, e.g., Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 39 , 106 P.3d 734 (determining close-up color photograph of a child victim's injured anus was *1238 not gruesome); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶¶ 53, 56 , 20 P.3d 271 (ruling photographs were not gruesome even though "[eJach of the first three factors [was] met"). 2009However, "these factors are not exclusive," Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 43 , 52 P.3d 1210 , nor are they necessarily determinative, see, e.g., Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 39 , 106 P.3d 734 (determining close-up color photograph of a child victim's injured anus was *1238 not gruesome); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶¶ 53, 56 , 20 P.3d 271 (ruling photographs were not gruesome even though "[eJach of the first three factors [was] met"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Penagreen1 sentence2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brakegreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . 2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Virgingreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . 2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . | 1 | 1 |
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L AUTO, INC.green2 sentences2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . 2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Superior Property Management Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60 , ¶¶ 43–46, 321 P.3d 1054 (declining to consider a theory for imposing a duty where the appellant did not specifically present it to the district court). 20231023-CA 7 2026 UT App 16 Rosser v. Elite Craft Homes 2021 UT 41, ¶¶ 18, 20 (assuming that the first three factors weighed in favor of recognizing a duty but nevertheless concluding that no duty existed because “the fifth Jeffs factor” “carrie[d] the day in determining that a duty d[id] not exist”). 2026Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60 , ¶¶ 43–46, 321 P.3d 1054 (declining to consider a theory for imposing a duty where the appellant did not specifically present it to the district court). 20231023-CA 7 2026 UT App 16 Rosser v. Elite Craft Homes 2021 UT 41, ¶¶ 18, 20 (assuming that the first three factors weighed in favor of recognizing a duty but nevertheless concluding that no duty existed because “the fifth Jeffs factor” “carrie[d] the day in determining that a duty d[id] not exist”). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Rosser v. Elite Craft Homes
green
1 sentence2026Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60 , ¶¶ 43–46, 321 P.3d 1054 (declining to consider a theory for imposing a duty where the appellant did not specifically present it to the district court). 20231023-CA 7 2026 UT App 16 Rosser v. Elite Craft Homes 2021 UT 41, ¶¶ 18, 20 (assuming that the first three factors weighed in favor of recognizing a duty but nevertheless concluding that no duty existed because “the fifth Jeffs factor” “carrie[d] the day in determining that a duty d[id] not exist”). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10847911
green
1 sentence2026Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60 , ¶¶ 43–46, 321 P.3d 1054 (declining to consider a theory for imposing a duty where the appellant did not specifically present it to the district court). 20231023-CA 7 2026 UT App 66 Rosser v. Elite Craft Homes See Kirk v. Anderson, 2021 UT 41, ¶¶ 18, 20 , 496 P.3d 66 (assuming that the first three factors weighed in favor of recognizing a duty but nevertheless concluding that no duty existed because “the fifth Jeffs factor” “carrie[d] the day in determining that a duty d[id] not exist”). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bradley Ross Fairbourn v. The State of Wyoming
green
2 sentences2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors 2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Bluff
green
2 sentences2009However, "these factors are not exclusive," Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 43 , 52 P.3d 1210 , nor are they necessarily determinative, see, e.g., Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 39 , 106 P.3d 734 (determining close-up color photograph of a child victim's injured anus was *1238 not gruesome); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶¶ 53, 56 , 20 P.3d 271 (ruling photographs were not gruesome even though "[eJach of the first three factors [was] met"). 2009However, "these factors are not exclusive," Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 43 , 52 P.3d 1210 , nor are they necessarily determinative, see, e.g., Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 39 , 106 P.3d 734 (determining close-up color photograph of a child victim's injured anus was *1238 not gruesome); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶¶ 53, 56 , 20 P.3d 271 (ruling photographs were not gruesome even though "[eJach of the first three factors [was] met"). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Calliham
green
2 sentences2009Rather, they are merely some of the factors to be considered when deciding the ultimate question-'"whether the photographs have a tendency to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, ¶ 39 , 57 P.3d 220 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶ 53 , 20 P.3d 271 ("We must consider these factors in light of the rationale behind them."). 2009Rather, they are merely some of the factors to be considered when deciding the ultimate question-'"whether the photographs have a tendency to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, ¶ 39 , 57 P.3d 220 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶ 53 , 20 P.3d 271 ("We must consider these factors in light of the rationale behind them."). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Gulbransen
green
2 sentences2009However, "these factors are not exclusive," Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 43 , 52 P.3d 1210 , nor are they necessarily determinative, see, e.g., Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 39 , 106 P.3d 734 (determining close-up color photograph of a child victim's injured anus was *1238 not gruesome); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶¶ 53, 56 , 20 P.3d 271 (ruling photographs were not gruesome even though "[eJach of the first three factors [was] met"). 2009However, "these factors are not exclusive," Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 43 , 52 P.3d 1210 , nor are they necessarily determinative, see, e.g., Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 39 , 106 P.3d 734 (determining close-up color photograph of a child victim's injured anus was *1238 not gruesome); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶¶ 53, 56 , 20 P.3d 271 (ruling photographs were not gruesome even though "[eJach of the first three factors [was] met"). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.