first three factors in Connecticut

2009The Appellate Court of Illinois, fourth district, relied on the first three factors in *170 People ex rel Dept. of Corrections v. Fort, 352 Ill.App.3d 309, 314 , 287 Ill.Dec. 443 , 815 N.E.2d 1246 (2004).

2009The Appellate Court of Illinois, fourth district, relied on the first three factors in *170 People ex rel Dept. of Corrections v. Fort, 352 Ill.App.3d 309, 314 , 287 Ill.Dec. 443 , 815 N.E.2d 1246 (2004).

2008Particularly, the petitioner claims that the court made “a decision on the petitioner’s appellate delay claim having considered only one of the four Barker factors before evidence was introduced on all the factors, and then the court precluded that evidence from being introduced.” The petitioner relies on Gaines v. Manson, supra, 194 Conn. 510 , to provide support for his claim that *322 he should have been permitted to offer evidence of appellate delay because the delay itself is prejudicial.

2007See, e.g., State v. Ancona, 256 Conn. 214, 218-20 , 772 A.2d 571 (2001) (per curiam) (trial court properly consolidated cases for trial because crimes charged were discrete and easily distinguishable, did not involve brutal or shocking conduct, trial was not unduly lengthy or complex and jury properly was instructed to consider each case separately); State v. Delgado, 243 Conn. 523, 533-37 , 707 A.2d 1 (1998) (same); see also State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722 -24.

2007See, e.g., State v. Ancona, 256 Conn. 214, 218-20 , 772 A.2d 571 (2001) (per curiam) (trial court properly consolidated cases for trial because crimes charged were discrete and easily distinguishable, did not involve brutal or shocking conduct, trial was not unduly lengthy or complex and jury properly was instructed to consider each case separately); State v. Delgado, 243 Conn. 523, 533-37 , 707 A.2d 1 (1998) (same); see also State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722 -24.

1996Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort — the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S., at 78 — are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent." Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U.S. 575 -76; see also Thompson v. Thompson, supra, 484 U.S. 179 ("As guides to discerning that intent, we have relied on the four factors set out in Cort v. Ash . . . along with other tools of statutory construction." (Emphasis added.)); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 , 94 n. 31, 101 S.Ct. 1571 , 67 L.E

1996Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort — the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S., at 78 — are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent." Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U.S. 575 -76; see also Thompson v. Thompson, supra, 484 U.S. 179 ("As guides to discerning that intent, we have relied on the four factors set out in Cort v. Ash . . . along with other tools of statutory construction." (Emphasis added.)); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 , 94 n. 31, 101 S.Ct. 1571 , 67 L.E

1996Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort — the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S., at 78 — are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent." Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U.S. 575 -76; see also Thompson v. Thompson, supra, 484 U.S. 179 ("As guides to discerning that intent, we have relied on the four factors set out in Cort v. Ash . . . along with other tools of statutory construction." (Emphasis added.)); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 , 94 n. 31, 101 S.Ct. 1571 , 67 L.E

1996Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort — the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S., at 78 — are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent." Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U.S. 575 -76; see also Thompson v. Thompson, supra, 484 U.S. 179 ("As guides to discerning that intent, we have relied on the four factors set out in Cort v. Ash . . . along with other tools of statutory construction." (Emphasis added.)); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 , 94 n. 31, 101 S.Ct. 1571 , 67 L.E

1993State v. L’Heureux, 166 Conn. 312, 320 , 348 A.2d 578 (1974); State v. Foshay, supra, 16 .

1993State v. L’Heureux, 166 Conn. 312, 320 , 348 A.2d 578 (1974); State v. Foshay, supra, 16 .

1987The Halpern court reaffirmed the controlling factors, stating: “ ‘Declarations as to the location of ancient boundaries are hearsay, and are not admissible in evidence unless it appears (1) that the declarant is dead, (2) that he would be qualified as a witness to testify if present, and especially that he had peculiar means of knowing the boundary, (3) that the statement was made before the controversy in suit arose, and (4) that he had no interest to misrepresent the truth in making the declaration.’ Mentz v. Greenwich, 118 Conn. 137, 144 , 171 A. 10 [1934]; Borden v. Westport, 105 Conn. 139

1987The Halpern court reaffirmed the controlling factors, stating: “ ‘Declarations as to the location of ancient boundaries are hearsay, and are not admissible in evidence unless it appears (1) that the declarant is dead, (2) that he would be qualified as a witness to testify if present, and especially that he had peculiar means of knowing the boundary, (3) that the statement was made before the controversy in suit arose, and (4) that he had no interest to misrepresent the truth in making the declaration.’ Mentz v. Greenwich, 118 Conn. 137, 144 , 171 A. 10 [1934]; Borden v. Westport, 105 Conn. 139

1987The Halpern court reaffirmed the controlling factors, stating: “ ‘Declarations as to the location of ancient boundaries are hearsay, and are not admissible in evidence unless it appears (1) that the declarant is dead, (2) that he would be qualified as a witness to testify if present, and especially that he had peculiar means of knowing the boundary, (3) that the statement was made before the controversy in suit arose, and (4) that he had no interest to misrepresent the truth in making the declaration.’ Mentz v. Greenwich, 118 Conn. 137, 144 , 171 A. 10 [1934]; Borden v. Westport, 105 Conn. 139

1987The Halpern court reaffirmed the controlling factors, stating: “ ‘Declarations as to the location of ancient boundaries are hearsay, and are not admissible in evidence unless it appears (1) that the declarant is dead, (2) that he would be qualified as a witness to testify if present, and especially that he had peculiar means of knowing the boundary, (3) that the statement was made before the controversy in suit arose, and (4) that he had no interest to misrepresent the truth in making the declaration.’ Mentz v. Greenwich, 118 Conn. 137, 144 , 171 A. 10 [1934]; Borden v. Westport, 105 Conn. 139

1987The Halpern court reaffirmed the controlling factors, stating: “ ‘Declarations as to the location of ancient boundaries are hearsay, and are not admissible in evidence unless it appears (1) that the declarant is dead, (2) that he would be qualified as a witness to testify if present, and especially that he had peculiar means of knowing the boundary, (3) that the statement was made before the controversy in suit arose, and (4) that he had no interest to misrepresent the truth in making the declaration.’ Mentz v. Greenwich, 118 Conn. 137, 144 , 171 A. 10 [1934]; Borden v. Westport, 105 Conn. 139