test error in Florida

1996Insubstantial differences or variation from approved techniques and actual testing procedures in any individual case do not render the test nor test results invalid. § 316.1934(3), Fla.Stat. (1993); Ridgeway v. State, 514 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

1988Finally, § 316.1934(3) F.S. provides that a chemical analysis of a person’s breath must have been performed only “substantially in accordance with the methods approved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.” The Statute further provides that any insubstantial differences between the approved techniques and actual procedures “shall not render the test or test results invalid.” In Ridgeway v State, 514 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), no inspection of the breathalyzer machine was made in May of 1986.

1993The test or standard set forth in North Carolina v. Pearce asks whether the sentence has been enhanced after a successful appeal, and whether such enhancement was “motivated by actual vindictiveness toward the defendant for having exercised guaranteed rights.” Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984).

1993The test or standard set forth in North Carolina v. Pearce asks whether the sentence has been enhanced after a successful appeal, and whether such enhancement was “motivated by actual vindictiveness toward the defendant for having exercised guaranteed rights.” Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984).

2015After explaining the elements of a claim brought under section 1983, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “the first two elements of the test for a claim of the denial of due process are easily established here.” J.R II, 736 F.3d at 965 .

2015The Eleventh Circuit then addressed whether section “393.il provides constitutionally adequate process” regarding review of involuntary admission orders.' Id.

2011The court in State v. Tamulonis, 39 So.3d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), stated that the right to privacy protected by Article I, Section 23, of the Florida Constitution is not absolute; and the test for a violation of this right comes from Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.1985): The Florida Supreme Court has adopted a test to assess the claim of an article I, section 23 privacy 'violation: First, courts must determine whether the individual possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information or subject at issue.

2011The court in State v. Tamulonis, 39 So.3d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), stated that the right to privacy protected by Article I, Section 23, of the Florida Constitution is not absolute; and the test for a violation of this right comes from Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985): The Florida Supreme Court has adopted a test to assess the claim of an article I, section 23 privacy violation: First, courts must determine whether the individual possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information or subject at issue.

2008Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 , 109 S.Ct. 2875 .

2008Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 , 109 S.Ct. 2875 .

2006Although the "would-have-been-imposed" harmless error test is proper for rule 3.850 motions, State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111 (Fla.2005), and rule 3.800(b)(2) motions, Jones v. State, 901 So.2d 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), we do not believe the test should apply to rule 3.800(a) motions.

1995In Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1992), the Florida Supreme Court fashioned a limited exclusionary rule for violations of these scientific withdrawal and testing procedures of the implied consent statutes.

1994The test for violation of the federal law is: (1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the laws;" (2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 , 103 S.Ct. 815 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D.

1994The test for violation of the federal law is: (1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the laws;" (2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 , 103 S.Ct. 815 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D.

1994The test for violation of the federal law is: (1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the laws;" (2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 , 103 S.Ct. 815 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D.

1994The test for violation of the federal law is: (1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the laws;" (2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 , 103 S.Ct. 815 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D.

1994The test for violation of the federal law is: (1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the laws;" (2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 , 103 S.Ct. 815 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D.

1994The test for violation of the federal law is: (1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the laws;" (2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 , 103 S.Ct. 815 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D.

1994The test for violation of the federal law is: (1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the laws;" (2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 , 103 S.Ct. 815 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D.

1991Coppolino v State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied. 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

1991Coppolino v State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied. 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

1988American Pacific Whaling Co. v. Kristensen, 9 Cir., 93 F.2d 17 .

1985While this test is not a rule of law, it is an effective tool in deciding the question of unconscionability, Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So.2d 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and this court has held that there must be a coalescing of the two elements, procedural and substantive unconscionability, before a case for unconscionability is made out.

1975Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So.2d 288 (3 D.C.A.

1966Representative of this trend are: Glouser v. United States, C.A.Iowa 1961, 296 F.2d 853 , cert. den. 369 U.S. 825 , 82 S.Ct. 840 , 7 L.Ed.2d 789 , where the test of availability of Section 2255 was whether defendant had been "deprived of substance of fair trial"; United States v. Gaitan, D.C.Colo. 1960, 189 F. Supp. 674 , aff. 295 F.2d 277 , cert. den. 369 U.S. 857 , 82 S.Ct. 939 , 8 L.Ed.2d 15 , where the test was whether the error was "of such grave character as to have deprived defendant of a fair trial"; Simmons v. United States, C.A.N.J. 1962, 302 F.2d 71 , where it was such as to have de

1966Representative of this trend are: Glouser v. United States, C.A.Iowa 1961, 296 F.2d 853 , cert. den. 369 U.S. 825 , 82 S.Ct. 840 , 7 L.Ed.2d 789 , where the test of availability of Section 2255 was whether defendant had been "deprived of substance of fair trial"; United States v. Gaitan, D.C.Colo. 1960, 189 F. Supp. 674 , aff. 295 F.2d 277 , cert. den. 369 U.S. 857 , 82 S.Ct. 939 , 8 L.Ed.2d 15 , where the test was whether the error was "of such grave character as to have deprived defendant of a fair trial"; Simmons v. United States, C.A.N.J. 1962, 302 F.2d 71 , where it was such as to have de