test defense in New Jersey

2026"The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether [they] met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness." Nash, 212 N.J. at 543 .

2026"The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether he [or she] met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness." Nash, 212 N.J. at 543 .

2022In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we apply a strong presumption that defense counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . "[C]omplaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy of representation by counsel." State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 54 (1987) (quoting State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013) ("The test is not whether defense counsel could have done

2020Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54 (quoting State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)); see also Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013) ("The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether he met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness.").

2026To satisfy the second Strickland/Fritz prong, "[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2025To satisfy the second Strickland/Fritz prong, "[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2022"The test of whether an error is harmless," however, "depends upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust verdict." State v. Burton, 309 N.J.

2019"The test of whether an error is harmless depends upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust verdict." State v. Burton, 309 N.J.

2025"The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether [they] met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness." Nash, 212 N.J. at 543 (citing Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 ).

2025"The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether [they] met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness." Nash, 212 N.J. at 543 (citing Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 ).

2021The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. [Bankston, 63 N.J. at 273 (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 (1971)).] "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).

2019The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973).

2020The test is whether the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004) (quoting R. 2:10-2).

2017The test is whether the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004) (quoting R. 2:10-2).

2022In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we apply a strong presumption that defense counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . "[C]omplaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy of representation by counsel." State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 54 (1987) (quoting State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013) ("The test is not whether defense counsel could have done

2019A-3841-17T1 4 significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . "[C]omplaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54 (1987) (quoting State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013) ("The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether he [or she] met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness.").

2021The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. [Bankston, 63 N.J. at 273 (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 (1971)).] "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).

2003The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.” State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 , 307 A.2d 65 (1973) (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971)).

2026Under the "'second, and far more difficult, prong of the' Strickland standard," State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538 , 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, A-4084-23 9 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2026Under the "'second, and far more difficult, prong of the' Strickland standard," State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538 , 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, A-4084-23 9 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2025"The failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990).

2024See A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Rsch. & Eng'g Co., 428 N.J.

2021The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. [Bankston, 63 N.J. at 273 (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 (1971)).] "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).

2020Attorneys are afforded "broad latitude in summation[s]." Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431 (2006) (quoting Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J.

2018Therefore, a defendant cannot simply make "bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.

2017See State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 349-50 (2012) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 133 S. Ct. 1454 , 185 L.

2017See State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 349-50 (2012) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 133 S. Ct. 1454 , 185 L.

2017See State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 349-50 (2012) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 133 S. Ct. 1454 , 185 L.

2014Moreover, the duty to exercise reasonable care will vary, depending upon the circumstances of the specific case, Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 260 (1992), and must be considered "with reference to the type of service the attorney undertakes to perform." St.

2014Pius X House of Retreats v. Diocese of Camden, 88 N.J. 571, 588 (1982); see State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013) ("The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether he met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness.").

2004In State v. J.G., 261 N.J.Super. 409, 421 , 619 A. 2d 232, 238 (App.Div. 1993), we held that if disclosure of material protected by the victim-counselor privilege, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.15, "is wrongfully or erroneously made by the counselor, evidence of the disclosed material is inadmissible." Although we questioned "whether our courts would adopt the strict approach and conclude that the [attorney-client] privilege is automatically waived by reason of an inadvertent disclosure[,]" id. at 420 , 619 A. 2d at 238 , we reached no conclusion regarding the test for waiver of any privilege other than

2004In State v. J.G., 261 N.J.Super. 409, 421 , 619 A. 2d 232, 238 (App.Div. 1993), we held that if disclosure of material protected by the victim-counselor privilege, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.15, "is wrongfully or erroneously made by the counselor, evidence of the disclosed material is inadmissible." Although we questioned "whether our courts would adopt the strict approach and conclude that the [attorney-client] privilege is automatically waived by reason of an inadvertent disclosure[,]" id. at 420 , 619 A. 2d at 238 , we reached no conclusion regarding the test for waiver of any privilege other than