test test in New Mexico

2012Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 35 ; Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 13 , 810 P.2d 1223, 1233 (1991) (stating that the test for violation of double jeopardy has two parts: first, determination of “whether the conduct underlying the offenses is unitary, i.e., whether the same conduct violates both statutesf, and, if so, determination of] whether the [Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses” through two different statutes addressing the same unitary conduct). {21} Jacobs involved an analysis of whether there was sufficient evidence supporting a kidnapping conviction.

2012Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 35 ; Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 13 , 810 P.2d 1223, 1233 (1991) (stating that the test for violation of double jeopardy has two parts: first, determination of “whether the conduct underlying the offenses is unitary, i.e., whether the same conduct violates both statutesf, and, if so, determination of] whether the [Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses” through two different statutes addressing the same unitary conduct). {21} Jacobs involved an analysis of whether there was sufficient evidence supporting a kidnapping conviction.

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994Transp., 438 S.E.2d 246 , 248 (S.C.1993); South Dakota, Peterson v. State, 261 N.W.2d 405, 410-11 (S.D.1977); Utah, Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984); Wisconsin, State v. Greene, No. 92-1811-CR, 1992 WL 464063 , at *1-2, [ 173 Wis.2d 308 , 498 N.W.2d 914 (table) ] (Wis.Ct.App.

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994Transp., 438 S.E.2d 246 , 248 (S.C.1993); South Dakota, Peterson v. State, 261 N.W.2d 405, 410-11 (S.D.1977); Utah, Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984); Wisconsin, State v. Greene, No. 92-1811-CR, 1992 WL 464063 , at *1-2, [ 173 Wis.2d 308 , 498 N.W.2d 914 (table) ] (Wis.Ct.App.

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1994App.1992) ("[W]here an individual requests and is denied reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer, revocation is not unequivocal and cannot be upheld."); Montana, Johnson, 711 P.2d at 817-18 ; Nebraska, Hoyle, 343 N.W.2d at 734 ; but see Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556, 558 (1979) (not expressly overruled by Hoyle , permitting a delay, stating that "[t]here would appear to be no reason to invoke the sanction of the implied consent law for refusal to submit to a test where a test was in fact performed and the tes

1978Test for Stating Claim The test for whether a claim has been stated has been set forth by this Court in Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 592 , 417 P.2d 71, 72 (1966): In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted we assume as true all facts well pleaded. * * * A further applicable rule is that the motion to dismiss a complaint should be granted only if it appears that upon no [state of] facts provable under the complaint could plaintiff recover or be entitled to relief.

1978Test for Stating Claim The test for whether a claim has been stated has been set forth by this Court in Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 592 , 417 P.2d 71, 72 (1966): In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted we assume as true all facts well pleaded. * * * A further applicable rule is that the motion to dismiss a complaint should be granted only if it appears that upon no [state of] facts provable under the complaint could plaintiff recover or be entitled to relief.