7 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. v. WASILLA, LLCgreen1 sentence2020See Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. v. Wasilla, LLC, 182 P.3d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 2008) (“To prove an implied waiver of a legal right, there must be direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right, or acts amounting to an estoppel by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver.” (quoting Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978))); cf. Chilkoot Lumber Co. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc., 252 P.3d 1011 , 1016 n.13 (Alaska 2011) (noting that “collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel are quite distinct doctrines,” and raising one does not prese | 1 | 1 |
Milne v. Andersongreen1 sentence2020See Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. v. Wasilla, LLC, 182 P.3d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 2008) (“To prove an implied waiver of a legal right, there must be direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right, or acts amounting to an estoppel by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver.” (quoting Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978))); cf. Chilkoot Lumber Co. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc., 252 P.3d 1011 , 1016 n.13 (Alaska 2011) (noting that “collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel are quite distinct doctrines,” and raising one does not prese | 1 | 1 |
Cameron v. Stategreen2 sentences2017This is referred to as the “discovery rule.” See Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362, 1365-66 (Alaska 1991) (explaining Alaska’s formulation of the discovery rule). 12 See Cameron, 822 P.2d at 1366 . 13 Ranes & Shine, LLC v. MacDonald Miller Alaska, Inc., 355 P.3d 503, 509 (Alaska 2015). -5- 7171 which a statute of limitations commences when “there exist uncontroverted facts that determine when a reasonable person should have” begun an inquiry to protect her rights.14 In order to succeed in her suit against OCS, Reasner must prove that OCS acted negligently.15 Reasner argues that a reasonable pers 2017This is referred to as the “discovery rule.” See Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362, 1365-66 (Alaska 1991) (explaining Alaska’s formulation of the discovery rule). 12 See Cameron, 822 P.2d at 1366 . 13 Ranes & Shine, LLC v. MacDonald Miller Alaska, Inc., 355 P.3d 503, 509 (Alaska 2015). -5- 7171 which a statute of limitations commences when “there exist uncontroverted facts that determine when a reasonable person should have” begun an inquiry to protect her rights.14 In order to succeed in her suit against OCS, Reasner must prove that OCS acted negligently.15 Reasner argues that a reasonable pers | 1 | 1 |
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stilesgreen1 sentence2017In Alaska the statute of limitations begins to run on the date “when a reasonable person has enough information to alert that person that he or she has a potential cause of action or should begin an inquiry to protect his or her rights.”11 The test for inquiry notice focuses on when a plaintiff has sufficient information to prompt an inquiry, not on when she has specific information establishing each element of her cause of action.12 Determining that date requires a “fact-intensive” analysis.13 We have therefore cautioned that summary judgment should only be used to resolve the time at 10 AS 0 | 1 | 1 |
Ranes & Shine, LLC v. MacDonald Miller Alaska, Inc.green1 sentence2017This is referred to as the “discovery rule.” See Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362, 1365-66 (Alaska 1991) (explaining Alaska’s formulation of the discovery rule). 12 See Cameron, 822 P.2d at 1366 . 13 Ranes & Shine, LLC v. MacDonald Miller Alaska, Inc., 355 P.3d 503, 509 (Alaska 2015). -5- 7171 which a statute of limitations commences when “there exist uncontroverted facts that determine when a reasonable person should have” begun an inquiry to protect her rights.14 In order to succeed in her suit against OCS, Reasner must prove that OCS acted negligently.15 Reasner argues that a reasonable pers | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chilkoot Lumber Co. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020See Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. v. Wasilla, LLC, 182 P.3d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 2008) (“To prove an implied waiver of a legal right, there must be direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right, or acts amounting to an estoppel by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver.” (quoting Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978))); cf. Chilkoot Lumber Co. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc., 252 P.3d 1011 , 1016 n.13 (Alaska 2011) (noting that “collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel are quite distinct doctrines,” and raising one does not prese | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bendix Corp. v. Adams
green
2 sentences1991Id. at 31 . 1991Id. at 31 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1985Conway argues that the waiver he signed on June 26 did not "completely” waive his speedy trial rights because it could not meet the test for a waiver of a constitutional right, i.e., an intentional relinquishment of a known right, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed 1461, 1466 (1938). 1985Conway argues that the waiver he signed on June 26 did not "completely” waive his speedy trial rights because it could not meet the test for a waiver of a constitutional right, i.e., an intentional relinquishment of a known right, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed 1461, 1466 (1938). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1985In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court discussed waiver of the constitutional right to speedy trial. 1985In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court discussed waiver of the constitutional right to speedy trial. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Reynolds v. Sims
green
2 sentences1983See Casper, Apportionment and The Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1382 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 536 , reh’g denied, 379 U.S. 870 , 85 S.Ct. 12 , 13 L.Ed.2d 76 (1964). 1983See Casper, Apportionment and The Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1382 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 536 , reh’g denied, 379 U.S. 870 , 85 S.Ct. 12 , 13 L.Ed.2d 76 (1964). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ryan v. New York
green
2 sentences1983See Casper, Apportionment and The Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1382 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 536 , reh’g denied, 379 U.S. 870 , 85 S.Ct. 12 , 13 L.Ed.2d 76 (1964). 1983See Casper, Apportionment and The Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 536 , reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870 , 85 S.Ct. 12 , 13 L.Ed.2d 76 (1964). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Union Oil Co. of California v. Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence1978In Union Oil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 560 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1977), we set out the test for the standard of judicial review of an administrative agency action. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Escobedo v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1970We need not explore such problems as whether the "in custody" test of Miranda displaces the "focus" test of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), or whether the two tests can be regarded as alternatives to some extent. [4] For it is plain to us that this case falls within an important exception stated by the court in its opinion in Miranda . 1970We need not explore such problems as whether the "in custody" test of Miranda displaces the "focus" test of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), or whether the two tests can be regarded as alternatives to some extent. [4] For it is plain to us that this case falls within an important exception stated by the court in its opinion in Miranda . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1970The test of when warnings must be given under Miranda is whether the accused has been "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning." 384 U.S. at 478 , 86 S.Ct. at 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 726 . 1970The test of when warnings must be given under Miranda is whether the accused has been "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning." 384 U.S. at 478 , 86 S.Ct. at 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 726 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.