81 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1925–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foree v. Crown Central Petroleum Corporationgreen2 sentences1984The court in Foree v. Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, 431 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.1968) in its discussion of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction cited the following passage from DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Sec. 19.07 (Hornbook Series 1950), at page 352: The theory seems reasonably clear that the test for applying the principle of primary jurisdiction is not whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts but whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency. 1981The Texas Supreme Court in Foree v. Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, 431 S.W.2d 312, 316 (1968), in its discussion of the “rule”, cited the following passage from Davis in Administrative Law Text, Sec. 19.-07 (Hornbook Series 1950), at 352: “The theory seems reasonably clear that the test for applying the principle of pri *681 mary jurisdiction is not whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts but whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency. | 3 | 4 |
In Re KCPgreen2 sentences2022Father relies on In re K.C.P., in which the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that drug test results were improperly admitted as exhibits under the business- records exception in a termination case because they indicated a lack of trustworthiness where the affidavit contained “no information as to the qualifications of the person or the equipment used, the method of administering the test, and whether the test was a standard one for the particular substance.” In re K.C.P., 142 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.). 2021Any Error in Admitting Drug Test Results Was Rendered Harmless by Substantially Similar Testimony Admitted Without Objection We have previously decided that the drug test results were improperly admitted as exhibits under the business-records exception in a parental-rights termination case because they indicated a lack of trustworthiness where the affidavit contained “no information as to the qualifications of the person or the equipment used, the method of administering the test, and whether the test was a standard one for the particular substance.” In re K.C.P., 142 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App | 3 | 3 |
Perry Homes v. Cullgreen2 sentences2016Explaining further, we observed that the test for waiver in this context is “quite similar” to estoppel, “a defensive theory barring parties from asserting a claim or defense when their representations have induced ‘action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character’ and ‘injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.’ ” Id. at 593 (quoting Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Tex.1997)). 2013The test for waiver is whether the party moving for arbitration “has substantially invoked the judicial process to an opponent’s detriment, the latter term meaning inherent unfairness caused by ‘a party’s attempt to have it both ways by switching between litigation and arbitration.’ ” Id. | 2 | 7 |
Strickland v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See id.; see also Strickland v. State, 784 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, pet. ref‘d) (holding that test results were admissible as business records when witness could testify that tests were standard tests for particular substance, made by person who had personal knowledge of test and test results, and results were recorded in records kept in the usual course of business of laboratory). 2004Strickland, 784 S.W.2d at 553 . | 2 | 5 |
Shell Oil Company and Shell International, E&P, Inc. v. Robert Writtgreen2 sentences2016The privilege may also extend to communications made prior to the start of a judicial proceeding; the test for whether the privilege extends to such a communication “entails both subjective and objective components.” Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. 2015). 2016The privilege may also extend to communications made prior to the start of a judicial proceeding; the test for whether the privilege extends to such a communication “en *7 tails both subjective and objective components.” Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. 2015). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.green2 sentences2012The test for waiver is whether the party moving for arbitration "has substantially invoked the judicial process to an opponent's detriment; the latter term meaning inherent unfairness caused by 'a party's attempt to have it both ways by switching between litigation and arbitration to its own advantage.'" In re Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 258 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 597 (Tex. 2008)). 2011The test for waiver is whether the party moving for arbitration “has substantially invoked the judicial process to an opponent’s detriment, the latter term meaning inherent unfairness caused by ‘a party’s attempt to have it both ways by switching between litigation and arbitration to its own advantage.’” In re Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. , 258 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Perry Homes v. Cull , 258 S.W.3d 580, 597 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied , 129 S. Ct. 952 (2009)). | 2 | 2 |
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Sierragreen2 sentences2007The test in applying this rule "is whether the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion that the agency must have reached in order to justify its action." Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Sierra , 784 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex. 1990). 2007The test in applying this rule "is whether the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion that the agency must have reached in order to justify its action." Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Sierra , 784 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex. 1990). | 2 | 2 |
$18,800 in U.S. Currency v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Id.; $18,800 in U.S. Currency v. State, 961 S.W.2d 257, 266 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); see also Tex.R.App.P. 44.1 ("No judgment may be reversed ... unless ... the error complained of ... probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment....") Testimony revealed that on one occasion, McGee developed a false paranoid belief there was an intruder in the attic of her mother's home. 2000Id.; $18,800 in U.S. Currency v. State, 961 S.W.2d 257, 266 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); see also Tex.R.App.P. 44.1 (“No judgment may be reversed ... unless ... the error complained of ... probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment....”) Testimony revealed that on one occasion, McGee developed a false paranoid belief there was an intruder in the attic of her mother’s home. | 2 | 2 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2007Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 4 . 2007Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 4 . | 1 | 2 |
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co., Bnsf Railway Co., and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Houston, Texas and Daniel Krueger, in His Official Capacity as Director of Public Works and Engineeringgreen1 sentence2024Only when such absolute discretion—free decision-making without any constraints—is granted are ultra vires suits absolutely barred. 9 Houston Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 163 (italics in original). | 1 | 1 |
Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinsongreen1 sentence2016Explaining further, we observed that the test for waiver in this context is “quite similar” to estoppel, “a defensive theory barring parties from asserting a claim or defense when their representations have induced ‘action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character’ and ‘injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.’ ” Id. at 593 (quoting Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Tex.1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green1 sentence2015The Qualifications Gate Rule 702 allows expert testimony in scientific, technical, or other specialized areas provided the ″witness [is] qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.″ The test and standard of review for determining whether an expert is qualified has not changed in the past 34 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (observing that ″there are many different kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise,″ such that the test for admissibility under Rule 702 is necessarily ″a flexible one″ (quoting Daubert v. Merrell D | 1 | 1 |
Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas And Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas v. Newpark Resources, Inc.green1 sentence2015CGG satisfies this test under the analysis set forth in Combs v. Newpark, 422 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichaelgreen1 sentence2015The Qualifications Gate Rule 702 allows expert testimony in scientific, technical, or other specialized areas provided the ″witness [is] qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.″ The test and standard of review for determining whether an expert is qualified has not changed in the past 34 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (observing that ″there are many different kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise,″ such that the test for admissibility under Rule 702 is necessarily ″a flexible one″ (quoting Daubert v. Merrell D | 1 | 1 |
Coplin v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Today, Article 3.01 reads: "All words, ("violate or abuse sexually" need not be defined); phrases, and terms used in this Code are to be Coplin v. State, 585 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. Crim. taken and understood in their usual acceptation in App. 1979) (fiduciary property, commercial common language, except where specially bailee, trustee, guardian, administrator, executor, defined." conservator, receiver, and managing partner need not be defined because they are not essential to Even assuming the test for the exception to the rule prosecution under Penal Code section 32.45, about defining statutor | 1 | 1 |
IND. FOUNDATION, ETC. v. Texas Ind. Acc. Bd.green1 sentence2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
Gardner v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See id.; see also Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 592 (explaining that subsequent misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude remove the taint of remoteness from out-of-date convictions and place them under the rule 609(a) standard). | 1 | 1 |
Kamen v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Kamen v. State, 305 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], 2009, pet. ref’d) (applying nonconstitutional harm analysis to erroneous admission of evidence pertaining to field-sobriety test). | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Neumann v. Shroedergreen1 sentence2010The acts relied on must amount to a denial of liability, or a refusal to pay the loss. 71 Tex. at 10, 8 S.W. at 632. | 1 | 1 |
| Horrocks v. Texas Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garza v. Alviargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holt Atherton Industries, Inc. v. Heinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Choate v. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railway Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kerrville State Hospital v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kavanaugh v. Underwriters Life Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Griggs v. Capitol MacHine Works, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Missouri v. Huntergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Forney v. Memorial Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bridges v. City of Richardsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schneble v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henderson v. Ford Motor Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzales v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weis Paper Mill Co. v. Industrial Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cire v. Cummings
green
2 sentences2008The test under this standard “is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action, but ‘whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.’” Id. 2008The test under this standard “is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action, but ‘whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.’” Id. | 4 | 2006–2008 |
In Re Boehme
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Combs v. Health Care Services Corp.
green
2 sentences2014We cannot ignore a statute’s unambiguous language unless its meaning is so unreasonable that it “would lead to absurd results.” Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 629 ; see, e.g., Anto-nin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 234 (2012) (explaining that courts can ignore a statute’s unambiguous meaning only if that meaning “would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve”). 2014We cannot ignore a statute’s unambiguous language unless its meaning is so unreasonable that it “would lead to absurd results.” Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 629 ; see, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 234 (2012) (explaining that courts can ignore a statute’s 3 unambiguous meaning only if that meaning “would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve”). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Philpot v. State
green
2 sentences2012See id.; Philpot, 897 S.W.2d at 852 ; see also TEX. 1997Id. at 852 . | 2 | 1997–2012 |
Scottish Union & National Insurance v. Clancy
green
2 sentences2010The acts relied on must amount to a denial of liability, or a refusal to pay the loss. 71 Tex. at 10 ; 8 S.W. at 632 . 2010The acts relied on must amount to a denial of liability, or a refusal to pay the loss. 71 Tex. at 10 ; 8 S.W. at 632 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Wadewitz v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences2008Cf. id. [20] Although the dissent states that Chief Gardner's testimony that Green proceeded with due regard "comes close to creating a fact issue," due regard forms no part of the test for immunity or liability. 2008Cf. id. [20] Although the dissent states that Chief Gardner = s testimony that Green proceeded with due regard A comes close to creating a fact issue, @ due regard forms no part of the test for immunity or liability. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Bradford v. Arhelger
green
2 sentences1963However, in Ross v. Whiteside, 356 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.Civ.App., 1962 — no writ hist.) the court stated: “The test or rule announced in the Little Rock case was qualified by our Supreme Court in Bradford v. Arhelger, [161] Tex. [427], 340 S.W.2d 772 , but the qualification was not such as to affect the application of the rule stated to the instant case.” We find the same to be true here, and an application of the Little Rock test or rule eliminates any irreconcilable conflict in the jury’s findings on the two issues of “emergency” and “unavoidable accident” and supports a judgment for appellees. 1963However, in Ross v. Whiteside, 356 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.Civ.App., 1962no writ hist.) the court stated: "The test or rule announced in the Little Rock case was qualified by our Supreme Court in Bradford v. Arhelger, [161] Tex. [427], 340 S.W.2d 772 , but the qualification was not such as to affect the application of the rule stated to the instant case." We find the same to be true here, and an application of the Little Rock test or rule eliminates any irreconcilable conflict in the jury's findings on the two issues of "emergency" and "unavoidable accident" and supports a judgment for appellees. | 2 | 1962–1963 |
in Re Nationwide Insurance Company of America
green
1 sentence2024It is “a defensive theory barring parties from asserting a claim or defense when their representations have induced ‘action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character’ and ‘injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.’” Id. at 714 (quoting Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 593 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Middleton v. State
green
2 sentences2015If one Page 6 125 S.W.3d 450, *457 ; 2003 Tex. Crim. 2015If one Page 6 125 S.W.3d 450, *457 ; 2003 Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Schafler v. Spear
green
1 sentence2011The test for waiver is whether the party moving for arbitration “has substantially invoked the judicial process to an opponent’s detriment, the latter term meaning inherent unfairness caused by ‘a party’s attempt to have it both ways by switching between litigation and arbitration to its own advantage.’” In re Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. , 258 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Perry Homes v. Cull , 258 S.W.3d 580, 597 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied , 129 S. Ct. 952 (2009)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ellis County State Bank v. Keever green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Sorokolit v. Rhodes green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| American Pawn and Jewelry, Inc. v. Kayal green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Cate v. Dover Corp. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| R.K. v. Ramirez green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Daley v. Frank green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Aquamarine Operators, Inc. v. Downer green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Turnbull Cone Baking Co. v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Ex Parte Ybarra green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Kokernot v. Gilstrap green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Sanders v. Harder green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Armijo v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Kolb v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Shults v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Robinson v. Harkins & Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Glover v. National Insurance Underwriters green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Taylor v. Kentucky green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Cool v. United States green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Henderson v. Kibbe green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Cupp v. Naughten green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Sandstrom v. Montana green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Jordan v. State Board of Insurance green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Key Western Life Insurance v. State Board of Insurance green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Briscoe v. Bright's Adm'r neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Turner v. Lewie green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Travelers Indemnity Company v. Jarrett green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc. red | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Ross v. Whiteside green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Little Rock Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Dunn green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.