test claim in California

2014(Wood v. Elling Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 353, 365, fn. 9 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 696 , 572 P.2d 755 ].) The test for this requirement is that if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, it will produce an unjust or inequitable result.

2014(Wood v. Elling Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 353, 365, fn. 9 .) The test for this requirement looks to whether an unjust or inequitable result would follow if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.

2020Code, § 17551, subd. (a); Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 837 (Lucia Mar).) The Commission points out that Los Rios Community College District filed a test claim in 2000 relating to Education Code former section 76300 and its implementing regulations (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, former 16 §§ 58500-58508) and the Commission approved reimbursement of some costs associated with Education Code former section 76300 and former regulations 58501, 58502 and 58503.3 But the Commission does not assert that it approved the claimants’ request for reimbursement of Education Code

2020Code, § 17551, subd. (a); Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 837 (Lucia Mar).) The Commission points out that Los Rios Community College District filed a test claim in 2000 relating to Education Code former section 76300 and its implementing regulations (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, former 16 §§ 58500-58508) and the Commission approved reimbursement of some costs associated with Education Code former section 76300 and former regulations 58501, 58502 and 58503.3 But the Commission does not assert that it approved the claimants’ request for reimbursement of Education Code

2014(Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 , 702 P.2d 601 ].)” (Misik, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073 .) C.

2014(Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300 .) D’Arco testified that, as of the date of the debtor examination, Sayrahan owned no assets whatsoever.

2020(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 482, fn. 2 .) V Finally, the Community Colleges contend the Commission failed to address the test claim relating to repeatable courses and minimum requirements for Associate in Arts degrees.

2020(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 482, fn. 2 .) V Finally, the Community Colleges contend the Commission failed to address the test claim relating to repeatable courses and minimum requirements for Associate in Arts degrees.

2019Connell v. Superior Court Connell involved a test claim brought by Santa Margarita to seek subvention for a statewide regulation requiring the water districts to increase water purity for reclaimed wastewater when used for certain types of irrigation. ( Connell, supra , 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 .) The state Board of Control (now Commission on State Mandates) found the regulation constituted a reimbursable state mandate. ( Id. at p. 387, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 .) The trial court affirmed the Board's decision, from which the State Controller and State Treasurer appealed. ( Id. a

2019Connell v. Superior Court Connell involved a test claim brought by Santa Margarita to seek subvention for a statewide regulation requiring the water districts to increase water purity for reclaimed wastewater when used for certain types of irrigation. ( Connell, supra , 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 .) The state Board of Control (now Commission on State Mandates) found the regulation constituted a reimbursable state mandate. ( Id. at p. 387, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 .) The trial court affirmed the Board's decision, from which the State Controller and State Treasurer appealed. ( Id. a

2015(See Nguyen, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 193 [“If the trier of fact determines the crimes have different intents and motives, multiple punishments are appropriate.

2014(See People v. Nguyen, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 193 [“If the trier of fact determines the crimes have different intents and motives, multiple punishments are appropriate.

2013(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .)5 The Attorney General responds that the record does not support a conclusion of any "complete" denial of assistance of counsel, nor a denial of any such assistance at a "critical stage of the proceedings," so that a harmless error standard properly applies. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. 162, 166 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [whether it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result, absent the error].) Thus, the Attorney General claims that the conditional exam evidence mainly pertained to char

1997As defendant concedes, the test of whether the error was prejudicial is that of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]: whether it is reasonably probable that, in the absence of the error, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.

2023Code, § 17551.)” (San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859, 872 (SDUSD).) An initial reimbursement claim filed by a local government or school district is known as a test claim.

2020(San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859, 878 .) The requirements in a test claim regulation or statute are new if they did not exist prior to the enactment of the test claim regulation or statute.

2016(Amylou R. v. County of Riverside (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 13 1205, 1210-1211 [police officers investigating crime immune from liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress]; Kayfetz v. State of California (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 491, 497 [collecting cases].) "The test of immunity is not the timing of the offending conduct but whether there is a causal relationship between the act and the prosecution process.

2013(See Paterson v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1405 [for purposes of this immunity provision, investigations are deemed to be part of judicial and administrative proceedings]; Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1500 [the test of immunity is not the timing of the act but whether there is a causal relationship between the act and the prosecution process].) The immunity thus applies to his claims for malicious prosecution 7 (Tur, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 ), intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at

2016Code, §§ 17525, 17551.) It also established ―a test- claim procedure to expeditiously resolve disputes affecting multiple agencies.‖ (Kinlaw v. State of California (1991) 54 Cal.3d 326, 331 (Kinlaw).) The first reimbursement claim filed with the Commission is called a test claim.

1997According to the state, in Kinlaw, supra, 54 Cal.3d 326 , we “unequivocally held that the orderly determination of [unfunded] mandate questions demands that only one claim on any particular alleged mandate be entertained by the courts at any given time.” Thus, if a test claim is pending, “other potential claims must be held in abeyance . . . .” Applying this principle, the state asserts that, since “the test claim litigation was pending” in the Los Angeles action when San Diego filed its cross-complaint seeking mandamus relief, “the superior court lacked jurisdiction from the outset, and the r

2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [ 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ] [if improper restriction of cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause, the test is whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 47 [same].) Contrary to Gossett’s contention, the exclusion of limited impeachment evidence does not infringe a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [ 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ] [if improper restriction of cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause, the test is whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 47 [same].) Contrary to Gossett’s contention, the exclusion of limited impeachment evidence does not infringe a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [ 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ] [if improper restriction of cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause, the test is whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 47 [same].) Contrary to Gossett’s contention, the exclusion of limited impeachment evidence does not infringe a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

2013(People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 47 .) As stated in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 , “the prejudicial effect of the error on the trial as a whole depends on a multitude of factors, including the cumulative nature of the lost information, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, the degree of evidence corroborating the witness, and the overall strength of the prosecution case.” (Id. at p. 751, fn. 2, citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 .) In this case, there was no other restriction placed on cross-examination of the victims, and the information a

2002There, the Court of Appeal rejected the claim that Penal Code section 987.9, which required counties to provide indigent criminal defendants with certain defense funds, imposed an unfunded state mandate. ( County of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 814, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304 .) Los Angeles County filed the test claim after the State, which had enacted appropriations between 1977 and 1990 to reimburse counties for their costs under that statute, made no appropriation for the 1990-1991 fiscal year. ( Id. at pp. 812-813, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304 .) In rejecting the claim, the Court of Appeal held there was no st

2002There, the Court of Appeal rejected the claim that Penal Code section 987.9, which required counties to provide indigent criminal defendants with certain defense funds, imposed an unfunded state mandate. ( County of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 814, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304 .) Los Angeles County filed the test claim after the State, which had enacted appropriations between 1977 and 1990 to reimburse counties for their costs under that statute, made no appropriation for the 1990-1991 fiscal year. ( Id. at pp. 812-813, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304 .) In rejecting the claim, the Court of Appeal held there was no st

1960As Justice White pointed out in Frazier v. Moffatt, 108 Cal.App.2d 379 , at page 386 [ 239 P.2d 123 ] : “. . . the test of immunity from a civil suit for damages on the part of a judicial officer is not whether he committed an error of judgment in acting as he did, but the question of judicial immunity must be determined on the basis of whether the act in question was within the general scope of the officer’s judicial powers and whether he acted in an honest belief that he was legally warranted *593 in doing it.” Again, Platz v. Marion, 35 Cal.App. 241 [ 169 P. 697 ], held that if a justice of

1960As Justice White pointed out in Frazier v. Moffatt, 108 Cal.App.2d 379 , at page 386 [ 239 P.2d 123 ] : “. . . the test of immunity from a civil suit for damages on the part of a judicial officer is not whether he committed an error of judgment in acting as he did, but the question of judicial immunity must be determined on the basis of whether the act in question was within the general scope of the officer’s judicial powers and whether he acted in an honest belief that he was legally warranted *593 in doing it.” Again, Platz v. Marion, 35 Cal.App. 241 [ 169 P. 697 ], held that if a justice of

2025Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 [looking to conduct is appropriate in assessing waiver].) 9 In ruling that the Act adopts the generally applicable definition of waiver, Quach abolished the arbitration-specific definition of waiver most clearly articulated in St.

2024(Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 582.) The Ninth Circuit, for example, has described the test for waiver of the right to arbitrate as requiring that “the party asserting waiver . . . . demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right.” (Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 1011, 1015 (Armstrong).) Whether the party acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate does not involve a “ ‘concrete test,’ ” but rather an examination of “ ‘the totality of the parties’ actions’ ” to determine “wh

2024(Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 582.) The Ninth Circuit, for example, has described the test for waiver of the right to arbitrate as requiring that “the party asserting waiver . . . . demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right.” (Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 1011, 1015 (Armstrong).) Whether the party acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate does not involve a “ ‘concrete test,’ ” but rather an examination of “ ‘the totality of the parties’ actions’ ” to determine “wh