test analysis in Connecticut

2018If the action existed at common law and involved a legal remedy, the right to a jury trial exists, and the legislature may not curtail that right either directly or indirectly." Id., at 375-76 , 559 A.2d 701 .

2000This test requires an inquiry as to whether the course [sic] of action has roots in the common law, and if so, whether the remedy involved was one in law or in equity." Skinner v. Angliker , 211 Conn. 370 , 376 (1989).

1991As to the claim that the Appellant was not able because of his injuries to make a conscious election, the case of Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1 , 7 , appears to hold that this is not a prerequisite to a valid suspension.

1991Section 14-227b (f) C.G.S.; Weber v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 521 , 523 ; Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1 , 6 .

2002"The test of the requirement for the granting of a summary judgment that the moving party be entitled to judgment as a matter of law is resolved by applying to the established facts the same criteria as used in determining whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 56.02 [10], 56.15 [3], and cases cited. `[A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party.' Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation , 321 U.S. 620

2002"The test of the requirement for the granting of a summary judgment that the moving party be entitled to judgment as a matter of law is resolved by applying to the established facts the same criteria as used in determining whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 56.02 [10], 56.15 [3], and cases cited. `[A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party.' Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation , 321 U.S. 620

1991Section 14-227b (f) C.G.S.; Weber v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 521 , 523 ; Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1 , 6 .

1991Section 14-227b (f) C.G.S.; Weber v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 521 , 523 ; Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1 , 6 .

2020In the second case, Aerojet, supra, 17 Cal. 4th 38 , the California Supreme Court adopted the ‘‘all sums’’ approach.

2015We have previously stated that ‘‘[i]n order to establish a prima facie case in a mortgage foreclosure action, the [foreclosing party] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and the mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the note and that any conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage, have been satisfied.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Strong, supra, 149 Conn. App. 392 ; see also U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, 151 Conn. App. 620 , 632, 94 A.3d 1267 (2014); GMAC

2015We have previously stated that ‘‘[i]n order to establish a prima facie case in a mortgage foreclosure action, the [foreclosing party] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and the mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the note and that any conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage, have been satisfied.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Strong, supra, 149 Conn. App. 392 ; see also U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, 151 Conn. App. 620 , 632, 94 A.3d 1267 (2014); GMAC

2011The parties to the appeal in this case principally disagree about the applicability of the second prong of Curdo to the trial court’s award of pendente lite litigation fees. 2 In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ace American Reinsurance Co., 279 Conn. 220 , 901 A.2d 1164 (2006), our Supreme Corut recently restated the test that governs our inquiry. “[U]nder the second prong of the Curdo test, the party seeking to appeal must establish that the trial corut’s order threatens the preservation of a right already secured and that the right will be irretrievably lost and the party irreparably ha

2011The parties to the appeal in this case principally disagree about the applicability of the second prong of Curdo to the trial court’s award of pendente lite litigation fees. 2 In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ace American Reinsurance Co., 279 Conn. 220 , 901 A.2d 1164 (2006), our Supreme Corut recently restated the test that governs our inquiry. “[U]nder the second prong of the Curdo test, the party seeking to appeal must establish that the trial corut’s order threatens the preservation of a right already secured and that the right will be irretrievably lost and the party irreparably ha

2009In deciding that abrogation of discretionary act immunity under the “imminent harm” exception was inappropriate, the court reasoned that the mere fact that the police officer had contact with the operator of the vehicle before the fatal collision did not create a clear and unequivocal duty to act to prevent that collision. 10 Id., 156 . *279 Similarly, in Evon v. Andrews, supra, 211 Conn. 505 -508, this court relied on the “identifiability” and “immi-nency” requirements of the test for the exception to the governmental immunity doctrine to conclude that municipal officers could not be liable f

2008The test is whether the warnings given are, in light of the particular facts and the totality of the circumstances, sufficiently proximate in time and place to custodial status to serve as protection from the coercive pressures that can be brought to bear upon a suspect in the context of custodial interrogation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232, 247-48 , 487 A.2d 532 (1985).

2008The test is whether the warnings given are, in light of the particular facts and the totality of the circumstances, sufficiently proximate in time and place to custodial status to serve as protection from the coercive pressures that can be brought to bear upon a suspect in the context of custodial interrogation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232, 247-48 , 487 A.2d 532 (1985).

2002This test requires an inquiry as to whether the cause of action has roots in the common law, and if so, whether the remedy involved was one in law or equity." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. , 227 Conn. 175 , 182 , 629 A.2d 1116 (1993).

2002This test requires an inquiry as to whether the cause of action has roots in the common law, and if so, whether the remedy involved was one in law or equity." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. , 227 Conn. 175 , 182 , 629 A.2d 1116 (1993).

2001The test in applying the exception is set forth in Loisel v. Rowe, CT Page 15941-ir 233 Conn. 370 , 382 (1995): Our cases reveal that for an otherwise moot question to qualify for review under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception, it must meet three requirements.

2000"Consequently, statutory actions established since the adoption of the Constitution of 1818 ordinarily fall outside the scope of the provision, `unless, perhaps, the new remedy constitutes a "modification of existing remedies, so vital as to unduly limit and violate the right of trial by jury."'" [citations omitted] Bishop v. Kelly , 206 Conn. 608 , 618 (1988) In Associated Investment Co. Ltd.

2000"The test is . . . [not whether the cause of action is statutory, but] whether the issue raised in the action is substantially of the same nature or is such an issue as prior to 1818 would have been triable to a jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, CT Page 14985-j 216 Conn. 40 , 51 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159 , 164-65 , 120 A.2d 546 (1956).

2000"The test is . . . [not whether the cause of action is statutory, but] whether the issue raised in the action is substantially of the same nature or is such an issue as prior to 1818 would have been triable to a jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, CT Page 14985-j 216 Conn. 40 , 51 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159 , 164-65 , 120 A.2d 546 (1956).

2000The party must not only have been in ignorance, but must also have had no reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge." Cadle Co. v. Ginsburg, 51 Conn. App. 392 , 404 , 721 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 963 , 724 A.2d 1125 (1999).

2000The party must not only have been in ignorance, but must also have had no reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge." Cadle Co. v. Ginsburg, 51 Conn. App. 392 , 404 , 721 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 963 , 724 A.2d 1125 (1999).

2000The party must not only have been in ignorance, but must also have had no reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge." Cadle Co. v. Ginsburg, 51 Conn. App. 392 , 404 , 721 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 963 , 724 A.2d 1125 (1999).

2000The party must not only have been in ignorance, but must also have had no reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge." Cadle Co. v. Ginsburg, 51 Conn. App. 392 , 404 , 721 A.2d 1246 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 963 , 724 A.2d 1125 (1999).

2000The Ostrowski Court adopted a multi-factor analysis for assessing what activities fall within a corporation's line of business previously referenced in Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207 , 224-25 , 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).

2000The Ostrowski Court adopted a multi-factor analysis for assessing what activities fall within a corporation's line of business previously referenced in Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207 , 224-25 , 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).

2000This test requires an analysis of whether the opportunity is "closely associated with the existing and prospective activities of the corporation." Rosenblum v. Judson Engineering Corp., 99 N.H. 267 , 273 , 109 A.2d 558 (1954).

2000This test requires an analysis of whether the opportunity is "closely associated with the existing and prospective activities of the corporation." Rosenblum v. Judson Engineering Corp., 99 N.H. 267 , 273 , 109 A.2d 558 (1954).

2000"The test is . . . [not whether the cause of action is statutory, but] whether the issue raised in the action is substantially of the same nature or is such an issue as prior to 1818 would have been triable to a jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, CT Page 14985-j 216 Conn. 40 , 51 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159 , 164-65 , 120 A.2d 546 (1956).

2000"The test is . . . [not whether the cause of action is statutory, but] whether the issue raised in the action is substantially of the same nature or is such an issue as prior to 1818 would have been triable to a jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, CT Page 14985-j 216 Conn. 40 , 51 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159 , 164-65 , 120 A.2d 546 (1956).

1995"The test of the requirement for the granting of a summary judgment that the moving party be entitled to judgment as a matter of law is resolved by applying to the established facts the same criteria as used in determining whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheridan v. Board of Education, 20 Conn. App. 231 , 239 , 565 A.2d 878 (1989); see also Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 229 Conn. 105 .

1995"The test of the requirement for the granting of a summary judgment that the moving party be entitled to judgment as a matter of law is resolved by applying to the established facts the same criteria as used in determining whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheridan v. Board of Education, 20 Conn. App. 231 , 239 , 565 A.2d 878 (1989); see also Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 229 Conn. 105 .

1995The defendant also relies on Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S. Ct. 2801 , 125 L.

1995The defendant also relies on Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S. Ct. 2801 , 125 L.

1993In a case that involves both legal and equitable claims, “ ‘whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims.’ ” Texaco, Inc. v. Golart, 206 Conn. 454,458-59 , 538 A.2d 1017 (1988). “ ‘[W]here the essential right asserted is equitable in its nature and damages are sought in lieu of equitable relief or as supplemental to it in order to make that relief complete, the whole action is one in equity and there is no right to a jury trial.’ ” Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 220 , 355 A.2d 110 (1974).

1993In a case that involves both legal and equitable claims, “ ‘whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims.’ ” Texaco, Inc. v. Golart, 206 Conn. 454,458-59 , 538 A.2d 1017 (1988). “ ‘[W]here the essential right asserted is equitable in its nature and damages are sought in lieu of equitable relief or as supplemental to it in order to make that relief complete, the whole action is one in equity and there is no right to a jury trial.’ ” Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 220 , 355 A.2d 110 (1974).

1993In a case that involves both legal and equitable claims, “ ‘whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims.’ ” Texaco, Inc. v. Golart, 206 Conn. 454,458-59 , 538 A.2d 1017 (1988). “ ‘[W]here the essential right asserted is equitable in its nature and damages are sought in lieu of equitable relief or as supplemental to it in order to make that relief complete, the whole action is one in equity and there is no right to a jury trial.’ ” Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 220 , 355 A.2d 110 (1974).

1993In a case that involves both legal and equitable claims, “ ‘whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims.’ ” Texaco, Inc. v. Golart, 206 Conn. 454,458-59 , 538 A.2d 1017 (1988). “ ‘[W]here the essential right asserted is equitable in its nature and damages are sought in lieu of equitable relief or as supplemental to it in order to make that relief complete, the whole action is one in equity and there is no right to a jury trial.’ ” Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 220 , 355 A.2d 110 (1974).

1991Id.

1990The test or standard applied to the constitutional requirement for medical care is set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 104 (1976): "We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'. . .proscribed by the eighth amendment." The Supreme Court emphasized that "[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id.

1990The test or standard applied to the constitutional requirement for medical care is set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 104 (1976): "We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'. . .proscribed by the eighth amendment." The Supreme Court emphasized that "[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id.