10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2014Compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , with Willits, 96 Ariz. at 191 , 393 P.2d at 279 . ¶ 12 Bad faith can be difficult to prove, while the “tendency to exonerate” standard is more easily satisfied. 2014Compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , with Willits, 96 Ariz. at 191 , 393 P.2d at 279 . ¶ 12 Bad faith can be difficult to prove, while the “tendency to exonerate” standard is more easily satisfied. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Willitsgreen2 sentences2014Compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , with Willits, 96 Ariz. at 191 , 393 P.2d at 279 . ¶ 12 Bad faith can be difficult to prove, while the “tendency to exonerate” standard is more easily satisfied. 2014Compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , with Willits, 96 Ariz. at 191 , 393 P.2d at 279 . ¶ 12 Bad faith can be difficult to prove, while the “tendency to exonerate” standard is more easily satisfied. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guillengreen2 sentences2013Generally, to be voluntary, “[c]onsent must ‘not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.’” State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314 , 317 ¶ 11, 223 P.3d 658, 661 (2010) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ). 2013Generally, to be voluntary, “[c]onsent must ‘not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.’” State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314 , 317 ¶ 11, 223 P.3d 658, 661 (2010) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brooksgreen2 sentences1991The Arizona Constitution provides that “[n]o cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done.” Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 27; see also State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 474 , 445 P.2d 831, 833 (1968) (the test is whether error was so prejudicial to defendant’s rights as to require reversal); Shaughnessy v. State, 43 Ariz. 445, 449 , 32 P.2d 337, 341 (1934) (technicalities in plead *331 ings or proceedings that do not prejudice defendant’s rights should be ignored). 1991The Arizona Constitution provides that “[n]o cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done.” Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 27; see also State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 474 , 445 P.2d 831, 833 (1968) (the test is whether error was so prejudicial to defendant’s rights as to require reversal); Shaughnessy v. State, 43 Ariz. 445, 449 , 32 P.2d 337, 341 (1934) (technicalities in plead *331 ings or proceedings that do not prejudice defendant’s rights should be ignored). | 1 | 1 |
Shaughnessy v. Stategreen2 sentences1991The Arizona Constitution provides that “[n]o cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done.” Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 27; see also State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 474 , 445 P.2d 831, 833 (1968) (the test is whether error was so prejudicial to defendant’s rights as to require reversal); Shaughnessy v. State, 43 Ariz. 445, 449 , 32 P.2d 337, 341 (1934) (technicalities in plead *331 ings or proceedings that do not prejudice defendant’s rights should be ignored). 1991The Arizona Constitution provides that “[n]o cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done.” Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 27; see also State v. Brooks, 103 Ariz. 472, 474 , 445 P.2d 831, 833 (1968) (the test is whether error was so prejudicial to defendant’s rights as to require reversal); Shaughnessy v. State, 43 Ariz. 445, 449 , 32 P.2d 337, 341 (1934) (technicalities in plead *331 ings or proceedings that do not prejudice defendant’s rights should be ignored). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Manngreen2 sentences1989Later, in State v. Mann, 117 Ariz. 517, 519 , 573 P.2d 917, 919 (App. 1977), the court stated that, in situations where the prosecution has made reference to defendant being aware of the Miranda rights, the test for error is whether the remarks called the jury's attention to the fact the defendant has not testified in his own behalf. 1989Later, in State v. Mann, 117 Ariz. 517, 519 , 573 P.2d 917, 919 (App. 1977), the court stated that, in situations where the prosecution has made reference to defendant being aware of the Miranda rights, the test for error is whether the remarks called the jury's attention to the fact the defendant has not testified in his own behalf. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Galbraithgreen2 sentences1977In these situations the prosecutor’s comments are ambiguous, and the test of error is this: “Error is committed only if the prosecutor’s statement will call the jury’s attention to the fact that the defendant has not testified in his own behalf.” State v. Galbraith, 114 Ariz. 174, 178 , 559 P.2d 1089, 1093 (App.1976), accord, State v. Davis, 115 Ariz. 3 , 562 P.2d 1370 (App. 1977). 1977In these situations the prosecutor’s comments are ambiguous, and the test of error is this: “Error is committed only if the prosecutor’s statement will call the jury’s attention to the fact that the defendant has not testified in his own behalf.” State v. Galbraith, 114 Ariz. 174, 178 , 559 P.2d 1089, 1093 (App.1976), accord, State v. Davis, 115 Ariz. 3 , 562 P.2d 1370 (App. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Owengreen2 sentences1973The test for whether an instruction on flight is warranted by the evidence was pronounced in State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 411 , 385 P.2d 700, 704 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 378 U.S. 574 , 84 S.Ct. 1932 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1964). 1973The test for whether an instruction on flight is warranted by the evidence was pronounced in State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 411 , 385 P.2d 700, 704 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 378 U.S. 574 , 84 S.Ct. 1932 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
2 sentences2013Generally, to be voluntary, “[c]onsent must ‘not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.’” State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314 , 317 ¶ 11, 223 P.3d 658, 661 (2010) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ). 2013Generally, to be voluntary, “[c]onsent must ‘not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.’” State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314 , 317 ¶ 11, 223 P.3d 658, 661 (2010) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1989State v. Superior Court, (Blake), 149 Ariz. at 279 , 718 P.2d at 181 . 1989State v. Superior Court, (Blake), 149 Ariz. at 279 , 718 P.2d at 181 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1982The court observed that a Nevada statute provided for the survival of a cause of action for personal injuries, and then concluded that “[a] fortiori, an assignment of the proceeds of a personal injury settlement is permissible, ...” 81 Nev. at 365 , 404 P.2d at 12 . 1982The court observed that a Nevada statute provided for the survival of a cause of action for personal injuries, and then concluded that “[a] fortiori, an assignment of the proceeds of a personal injury settlement is permissible, ...” 81 Nev. at 365 , 404 P.2d at 12 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Davis
neutral
2 sentences1977In these situations the prosecutor’s comments are ambiguous, and the test of error is this: “Error is committed only if the prosecutor’s statement will call the jury’s attention to the fact that the defendant has not testified in his own behalf.” State v. Galbraith, 114 Ariz. 174, 178 , 559 P.2d 1089, 1093 (App.1976), accord, State v. Davis, 115 Ariz. 3 , 562 P.2d 1370 (App. 1977). 1977In these situations the prosecutor’s comments are ambiguous, and the test of error is this: “Error is committed only if the prosecutor’s statement will call the jury’s attention to the fact that the defendant has not testified in his own behalf.” State v. Galbraith, 114 Ariz. 174, 178 , 559 P.2d 1089, 1093 (App.1976), accord, State v. Davis, 115 Ariz. 3 , 562 P.2d 1370 (App. 1977). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Etchieson v. Texas
green
2 sentences1973The test for whether an instruction on flight is warranted by the evidence was pronounced in State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 411 , 385 P.2d 700, 704 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 378 U.S. 574 , 84 S.Ct. 1932 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1964). 1973The test for whether an instruction on flight is warranted by the evidence was pronounced in State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 411 , 385 P.2d 700, 704 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 378 U.S. 574 , 84 S.Ct. 1932 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1964). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Owen v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1973The test for whether an instruction on flight is warranted by the evidence was pronounced in State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 411 , 385 P.2d 700, 704 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 378 U.S. 574 , 84 S.Ct. 1932 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1964). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Polan
green
2 sentences1965The test of whether the error was prejudicial enough to require reversal is whether if the error had not been committed, it is probable that the verdict might have been different, State v. Polan, 78 Ariz. 253 , 278 P.2d 432 . 1965The test of whether the error was prejudicial enough to require reversal is whether if the error had not been committed, it is probable that the verdict might have been different, State v. Polan, 78 Ariz. 253 , 278 P.2d 432 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
State v. Chitwood
green
1 sentence1952As to defendant’s contention that Jeremy, the thief, was an accomplice in the commission by defendant of the offense of knowingly receiving stolen goods, we hold *20 that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Jeremy was not an accomplice and we adhere to the test applied and the rule laid down in the earlier cases, our latest expression being State v. Chitwood, 43 Ariz. 161 , 239 P.2d 353 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.