22 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2018I would submit, if we need to know, at the outset, that the jurors understand and accept the simpler Zehr principles, then we should explain, right up front, what the all-important reasonable doubt standard means. ¶ 91 In In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004), this court made clear that standards of proof are indeed consequential: “ ‘The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclus 2018I would submit, if we need to know, at the outset, that the jurors understand and accept the simpler Zehr principles, then we should explain, right up front, what the all-important reasonable doubt standard means. ¶ 91 In In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004), this court made clear that standards of proof are indeed consequential: “ ‘The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclus | 5 | 6 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2017I would submit, if we need to know, at the outset, that the jurors understand and accept the simpler Zehr principles, then we should explain, right up front, what the all-important reasonable doubt standard means. ¶ 91 In In re D.T. , 212 Ill.2d 347 , 362, 289 Ill.Dec. 11 , 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004), this court made clear that standards of proof are indeed consequential: " 'The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to " instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have 2017I would submit, if we need to know, at the outset, that the jurors understand and accept the simpler Zehr principles, then we should explain, right up front, what the all-important reasonable doubt standard means. ¶ 91 In In re D.T. , 212 Ill.2d 347 , 362, 289 Ill.Dec. 11 , 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004), this court made clear that standards of proof are indeed consequential: " 'The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to " instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have | 2 | 6 |
In Re DTgreen2 sentences2018I would submit, if we need to know, at the outset, that the jurors understand and accept the simpler Zehr principles, then we should explain, right up front, what the all-important reasonable doubt standard means. ¶ 91 In In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004), this court made clear that standards of proof are indeed consequential: “ ‘The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclus 2017I would submit, if we need to know, at the outset, that the jurors understand and accept the simpler Zehr principles, then we should explain, right up front, what the all-important reasonable doubt standard means. ¶ 91 In In re D.T. , 212 Ill.2d 347 , 362, 289 Ill.Dec. 11 , 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004), this court made clear that standards of proof are indeed consequential: " 'The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to " instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have | 1 | 3 |
Wexler v. Wirtz Corp.green1 sentence2021“The function of the doctrine of standing is to insure that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy.” Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Swain v. Alabamared1 sentence1986Ed. 2d 759, 772 , 85 S. Ct. 824, 835 (the function of the challenge is “not only to eliminate the extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise”). | 1 | 1 |
Spagat v. Mahingreen2 sentences1980See Spagat v. Mahin (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 183 , 277 N.E.2d 834 . 1980See Spagat v. Mahin (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 183 , 277 N.E.2d 834 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wolgemuth
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Saechao (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 522, 531 , 544 N.E.2d 745 ; People v. Wolgemuth (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 154, 166 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 .) The function of the requirement to announce authority and purpose is to notify the person inside of the presence of police and to afford the person an opportunity to respond, so that violence can be averted and privacy protected. 1990(People v. Saechao (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 522, 531 , 544 N.E.2d 745 ; People v. Wolgemuth (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 154, 166 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 .) The function of the requirement to announce authority and purpose is to notify the person inside of the presence of police and to afford the person an opportunity to respond, so that violence can be averted and privacy protected. | 4 | 1978–1990 |
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside
green
2 sentences2009Although the Unites States Supreme Court held that this reason did not “automatically” justify refusing access specifically in the case of fourth amendment suppression hearings or California preliminary hearings, it found that public access to an admissibility hearing posed “ ‘special risks of unfairness,’ ” where publicity could undermine “ ‘the whole purpose of such hearings’ ” which is “ ‘to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence.’ ” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14-15 , 92 L. 2009Although the Unites States Supreme Court held that this reason did not “automatically” justify refusing access specifically in the case of fourth amendment suppression hearings or California preliminary hearings, it found that public access to an admissibility hearing posed “ ‘special risks of unfairness,’ ” where publicity could undermine “ ‘the whole purpose of such hearings’ ” which is “ ‘to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence.’ ” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14-15 , 92 L. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co.
green
2 sentences2006In Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co, 397 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2005), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to follow Swift and, instead, followed Sequoia Orange, finding the two-part test the appropriate standard of review for a government motion to dismiss a qui tam action. 2006In Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2005), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to follow Swift and, instead, followed Sequoia Orange, finding the two-part test the appropriate standard of review for a government motion to dismiss a qui tam action. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Swift, Susan v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Noting the presumption that the executive is acting rationally and in good faith, Swift found the government's discretion to dismiss an action is, generally, committed to the government's absolute discretion and "the function of a hearing [on the relator's objections to the executive's decision to dismiss] * * * is simply to give the relator a formal opportunity to convince the government not to end the case." Swift, 318 F.3d at 253 . 2006Noting the presumption that the executive is acting rationally and in good faith, Swift found the government’s discretion to dismiss an action is, generally, committed to the government’s absolute discretion and “the function of a hearing [on the relator’s objections to the executive’s decision to dismiss] *** is simply to give the relator a formal opportunity to convince the government not to end the case.” Swift, 318 F.3d at 253 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Baker v. Carr
green
1 sentence2026The Court stated: “Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual need f | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Moore v. The Grafton Township Board of Trustees
green
1 sentence2026The function of the doctrine “is to ensure that the judiciary does not exercise the powers of another branch of government.” Id. ¶ 52 In Baker, the United States Supreme Court identified six characteristics of cases that are inappropriate for judicial review under the political-question doctrine. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Rowe v. Raoul
green
1 sentence2025Simply put, the General Assembly’s enactment of the Act “dismantled and rebuilt Illinois’s statutory framework for the pretrial release of criminal defendants.” Rowe, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 . - 12 - proof are concerned with the quantum and quality of proof that must be presented in order to prevail on an issue.’ [Citation.] As the United States Supreme Court explained: ‘The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in th | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Board of Trustees v. McKinley
green
1 sentence2023“It [is] the function of the hearing officer to determine whether the tenured employee’s violations constituted cause for discharge ***.” McKinley, 160 Ill. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2003The minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process clause "reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 . *150 Thus, under this factor, we must balance the rights of the child versus the rights of the parent to determine who should shoulder the risk of error at the best interest hearing. 2003The minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process clause "reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 . *150 Thus, under this factor, we must balance the rights of the child versus the rights of the parent to determine who should shoulder the risk of error at the best interest hearing. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Saechao
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Saechao (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 522, 531 , 544 N.E.2d 745 ; People v. Wolgemuth (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 154, 166 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 .) The function of the requirement to announce authority and purpose is to notify the person inside of the presence of police and to afford the person an opportunity to respond, so that violence can be averted and privacy protected. 1990(People v. Saechao (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 522, 531 , 544 N.E.2d 745 ; People v. Wolgemuth (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 154, 166 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 .) The function of the requirement to announce authority and purpose is to notify the person inside of the presence of police and to afford the person an opportunity to respond, so that violence can be averted and privacy protected. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Christenson v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners
green
2 sentences1987App. 3d 420, 424 , 500 N.E.2d 951 .) It was the function of the hearing officer to determine whether the tenured employee’s violations constituted cause for discharge (e.g., Christenson v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1980), 83 Ill. 1987App. 3d 472, 476 , 404 N.E.2d 339 , appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 590 ), subject to judicial review. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Burgett v. City of Collinsville Board of Fire & Police Commissioners
neutral
1 sentence1987App. 3d 420, 424 , 500 N.E.2d 951 .) It was the function of the hearing officer to determine whether the tenured employee’s violations constituted cause for discharge (e.g., Christenson v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1980), 83 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Pfeffer v. Lebanon Land Development Corp.
green
1 sentence1984App. 3d 186, 190 , 360 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 .) Plaintiffs argue that this distinction limits the function of an exception in a deed to announcing a prior severance of an interest. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.