function hearing (Rhode Island) · Go Syfert
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function hearing in Rhode Island

19 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Waitegreen
ri · 2003 · cited in 10 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2004–2013
2 sentences

2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that ―[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.‖ Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ).

2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ).

410
State v. Riouxgreen
ri · 1998 · cited in 7 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2012
2 sentences

2012Moreover, “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I.2005) (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I.1998)).

2008Moreover, as we have previously elucidated: “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility *311 * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I.1998); see also Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 .

37
State v. Sylviagreen
ri · 2005 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2008–2012
2 sentences

2012Moreover, “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I.2005) (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I.1998)).

2008With respect to that assessment, this Court has previously stated that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I.2003).

22
State v. Hullgreen
ri · 2000 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2005
2 sentences

2005Additionally, “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 (citing State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I.2000)).

2003See State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1251 (R.I.1996) (per curiam)).

22
State v. Washingtongreen
ri · 2012 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017The deference that we accord to the credibility assessments of the nisi prius court at a probation violation hearing “is premised upon our realization that, we lack the same vantage point as the presiding judge, and we are unable to assess the witness’ demeanor, tone of voice, and body language.” Washington, 42 A.3d at 1271 (internal quotation marks omitted).

11
State v. Gromkiewiczgreen
ri · 2012 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017And we are ever mindful that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” State v. Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d 45, 49 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

11
State v. Jacksongreen
ri · 2009 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011We “will not ‘second-guess’ supportable credibility assessments of a hearing justice in a probation-revocation hearing.” State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I.2009) (quoting State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 1229 (R.I.2009)).

11
State v. Jonesgreen
ri · 2009 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011We “will not ‘second-guess’ supportable credibility assessments of a hearing justice in a probation-revocation hearing.” State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I.2009) (quoting State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 1229 (R.I.2009)).

11
State v. Riveragreen
ri · 2005 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007We note, however, that, unlike Gautier , defendant was a passenger and not in control of the vehicle, and we also note that the incident report prepared by Officer Kantorski states that defendant was arrested “without incident.” 3 Although credibility determinations are “uniquely the function of the hearing justice” at a probation-violation hearing, State v. Rivera, 873 A.2d 115, 118 (R.I.2005), in the present case, the hearing justice did not articulate his assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.

11
State v. Summerourgreen
ri · 2004 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007“It is well established that ‘[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.’” State v. Summerour, 850 A.2d 948, 951 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I.2003)).

11
Martone v. Lensinkgreen
conn · 1988 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See Martone v. Lensink, 207 Conn. 296 , 541 A.2d 488, 492 (1988) (stating that the purpose of the ex parte provision in the Connecticut APA is “to preclude litigious facts reaching the deciding minds without getting into the record.”) (quoting Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. § 13 at 426 comment (1981)).

2007See Martone v. Lensink, 207 Conn. 296 , 541 A.2d 488, 492 (1988) (stating that the purpose of the ex parte provision in the Connecticut APA is “to preclude litigious facts reaching the deciding minds without getting into the record.”) (quoting Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. § 13 at 426 comment (1981)).

11
State v. Sikhaolouanglathgreen
ri · 1996 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005Furthermore, this Court has stated that: “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” Rioux, 708 A.2d at 898 (citing State v. Gilroy, 688 A.2d 858 , 859 (R.I.1997); State v. Sikhaolouanglath, 683 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I. 1996)).

11
State v. Sparksgreen
ri · 1995 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003See State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1251 (R.I.1996) (per curiam)).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Christodal green
ri · 2008
2 sentences

2011Accordingly, “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id. (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ).

2009On appeal from a finding of a probation violation, this Court’s review is limited to “whether the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in assessing the credibility of the witnesses or in finding such a violation.” Christodal, 946 A.2d at 816 .

22009–2011
State v. Seamans green
ri · 2007
2 sentences

2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that ―[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.‖ Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ).

2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ).

12013–2013
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Janes green
ri · 1991
1 sentence

2007Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Janes , 586 A.2d 536 , 537 (R.I. 1991).

12007–2007
State v. Gilroy green
ri · 1997
1 sentence

2005Furthermore, this Court has stated that: “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” Rioux, 708 A.2d at 898 (citing State v. Gilroy, 688 A.2d 858 , 859 (R.I.1997); State v. Sikhaolouanglath, 683 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I. 1996)).

12005–2005
State v. Znosko green
ri · 2000
2 sentences

2003“Assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id.

2003“When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” Id. (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I. 1998)).

12003–2003
CENTER RLTY. CORP. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Warwick green
ri · 1963
2 sentences

1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg

1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg

11968–1968
Buckminster v. Zoning B. of R. of Pawt neutral
ri · 1943
2 sentences

1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg

1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg

11968–1968

Where else courts name it

LA 327 (1906–2026) CA 58 (1973–2026) TX 52 (1965–2026) PA 43 (1940–2021) MO 33 (1909–2019) CT 31 (1988–2012) WA 25 (1942–2023) TN 24 (1971–2019) MD 24 (1973–2024) IL 22 (1978–2026) MA 22 (1978–2026) CO 21 (1937–2020) NY 21 (1896–2026) RI 19 (1968–2017) OR 18 (1914–2025) FL 17 (1955–2018) IN 17 (1916–2016) OH 15 (1947–2026) GA 13 (1907–2026) MI 11 (1978–2023) HI 10 (1981–2025) NJ 9 (1979–2025) WI 8 (1995–2021) VA 8 (1937–2025) AL 8 (1873–2013) IA 8 (1928–2019) NM 8 (1984–2021) OK 8 (1941–2015) AZ 7 (1953–2026) NC 7 (1939–1981) VT 6 (1925–2026) MS 6 (1982–1999) WY 6 (1977–2020) NE 5 (1994–2019) ND 5 (1986–2018) SD 5 (1967–2006) DC 4 (1990–2022) UT 4 (1993–2024) MN 4 (1978–2016) SC 4 (1984–1997) MT 4 (1974–2009) KS 4 (1909–2015) KY 4 (1990–2019) NH 4 (1977–2011) ME 4 (2018–2025) ID 4 (1986–1995) NV 2 (2020–2020) WV 2 (1996–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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