Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
19 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Waitegreen2 sentences2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that ―[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.‖ Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ). 2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ). | 4 | 10 |
State v. Riouxgreen2 sentences2012Moreover, “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I.2005) (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I.1998)). 2008Moreover, as we have previously elucidated: “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility *311 * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I.1998); see also Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 . | 3 | 7 |
State v. Sylviagreen2 sentences2012Moreover, “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I.2005) (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I.1998)). 2008With respect to that assessment, this Court has previously stated that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I.2003). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hullgreen2 sentences2005Additionally, “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 (citing State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I.2000)). 2003See State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1251 (R.I.1996) (per curiam)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2017The deference that we accord to the credibility assessments of the nisi prius court at a probation violation hearing “is premised upon our realization that, we lack the same vantage point as the presiding judge, and we are unable to assess the witness’ demeanor, tone of voice, and body language.” Washington, 42 A.3d at 1271 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gromkiewiczgreen1 sentence2017And we are ever mindful that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” State v. Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d 45, 49 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2011We “will not ‘second-guess’ supportable credibility assessments of a hearing justice in a probation-revocation hearing.” State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I.2009) (quoting State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 1229 (R.I.2009)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2011We “will not ‘second-guess’ supportable credibility assessments of a hearing justice in a probation-revocation hearing.” State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I.2009) (quoting State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 1229 (R.I.2009)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Riveragreen1 sentence2007We note, however, that, unlike Gautier , defendant was a passenger and not in control of the vehicle, and we also note that the incident report prepared by Officer Kantorski states that defendant was arrested “without incident.” 3 Although credibility determinations are “uniquely the function of the hearing justice” at a probation-violation hearing, State v. Rivera, 873 A.2d 115, 118 (R.I.2005), in the present case, the hearing justice did not articulate his assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Summerourgreen1 sentence2007“It is well established that ‘[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.’” State v. Summerour, 850 A.2d 948, 951 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I.2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Martone v. Lensinkgreen2 sentences2007See Martone v. Lensink, 207 Conn. 296 , 541 A.2d 488, 492 (1988) (stating that the purpose of the ex parte provision in the Connecticut APA is “to preclude litigious facts reaching the deciding minds without getting into the record.”) (quoting Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. § 13 at 426 comment (1981)). 2007See Martone v. Lensink, 207 Conn. 296 , 541 A.2d 488, 492 (1988) (stating that the purpose of the ex parte provision in the Connecticut APA is “to preclude litigious facts reaching the deciding minds without getting into the record.”) (quoting Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. § 13 at 426 comment (1981)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sikhaolouanglathgreen1 sentence2005Furthermore, this Court has stated that: “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” Rioux, 708 A.2d at 898 (citing State v. Gilroy, 688 A.2d 858 , 859 (R.I.1997); State v. Sikhaolouanglath, 683 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I. 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sparksgreen1 sentence2003See State v. Hull, 754 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1251 (R.I.1996) (per curiam)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Christodal
green
2 sentences2011Accordingly, “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id. (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ). 2009On appeal from a finding of a probation violation, this Court’s review is limited to “whether the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in assessing the credibility of the witnesses or in finding such a violation.” Christodal, 946 A.2d at 816 . | 2 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Seamans
green
2 sentences2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that ―[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.‖ Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ). 2013In conducting this task, we remain mindful that “[assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id. at 49 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Janes
green
1 sentence2007Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Janes , 586 A.2d 536 , 537 (R.I. 1991). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Gilroy
green
1 sentence2005Furthermore, this Court has stated that: “When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” Rioux, 708 A.2d at 898 (citing State v. Gilroy, 688 A.2d 858 , 859 (R.I.1997); State v. Sikhaolouanglath, 683 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I. 1996)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Znosko
green
2 sentences2003“Assessing the credibility of a witness in a probation violation hearing is a function of the hearing justice, not this Court.” Id. 2003“When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility, * * * and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred.” Id. (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I. 1998)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
CENTER RLTY. CORP. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Warwick
green
2 sentences1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg 1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Buckminster v. Zoning B. of R. of Pawt
neutral
2 sentences1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg 1968Reference is directly made to our statement in Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R.I. 76, 80 , 189 A.2d 347, 350 , "This court has recognized that the function of special exceptions is to alleviate the burden of use restrictions on land that cannot be related reasonably to the public interest" and also to Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 401 , 33 A.2d 199, 202 , wherein this court, in referring to the provisions of the enabling act authorizing special exceptions, said: "This mandatory requirement of the statute is in the nature of a safety valve which the leg | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.