21 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
deKoevend v. Board of Education of West End School District RE-2green2 sentences2015The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination that the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (“It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who ‘is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.’” (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119 )); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286–87 (“The function of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh 2015The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination that the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (âIt is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who âis empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.ââ (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119 )); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286â87 (âThe function of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses | 3 | 3 |
National Airlines v. Florida Equipment Co.green2 sentences1961He did none of those things.” Similarly, in National Airlines, Inc. v. Florida Equipment Co. of Miami, 71 So. (2d) 741, 744 (Fla. 1954), the court explained that: “The function of the rule authorizing summary judgments is to avoid the expense and delay of trials when all facts are admitted or when a party is unable to support by any competent evidence a contention of fact. 1961He did none of those things.” Similarly, in National Airlines, Inc. v. Florida Equipment Co. of Miami, 71 So. (2d) 741, 744 (Fla. 1954), the court explained that: “The function of the rule authorizing summary judgments is to avoid the expense and delay of trials when all facts are admitted or when a party is unable to support by any competent evidence a contention of fact. | 2 | 2 |
Campbell v. State, Dept. of Rev., Div. of Motor Veh.green2 sentences1975Campbell v. People, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971). 1975Campbell v. People, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Bohngreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., People v. Bohn, 2015 COA 178, ¶ 18 (“However, the fact of payment by a CVCB is not determinative of whether restitution should be ordered.”), superseded by statute as recognized in Henry, ¶ 20. ¶ 21 Furthermore, we disagree with the proposition that a written objection to a motion for restitution is an adequate substitute for an evidentiary hearing for three reasons. ¶ 22 First, the function of a hearing is broader than what is afforded by an opportunity to file a written objection alone. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dukegreen1 sentence2020“Generally, a hearing contemplates the right to be present, to put forth one’s contentions, and to support those contentions by 11 evidence and argument.” People v. Duke, 36 P.3d 149, 152 (Colo. App. 2001) (citing Westar Holdings Partnership v. Reece, 991 P.2d 328 (Colo. App. 1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Tumentsereg v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2014See id. 119 Although the court of appeals purported to find plain error, it did so in reliance on our now-overruled precedents presuming prejudice and requiring automatic reversal for improperly impairing a defendant's use of peremptory challenges 2 It clearly did not analyze the error in terms of, or make any finding concerning, the impact of the trial court's error on the jury's verdict in this particular case. | 1 | 1 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsongreen2 sentences2009See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 . 2009See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 . | 1 | 1 |
Gerson Realty Inc. v. Casalygreen2 sentences2008See Gerson Realty Inc. v. Casaly, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 875 , 316 N.E.2d 767, 767 (1974) ("The function of a requirement that notice be transmitted by registered mail is to provide a means of resolving disputes as to the fact of delivery of the notice."); of Blue v. Boss, 781 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo.App.1989) (legislative purpose in requiring notice by registered mail is to fix an effective date for the calculation of the statutory deadline; first class mail is sufficient when the parties agree that notice was timely filed). 2008See Gerson Realty Inc. v. Casaly, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 875 , 316 N.E.2d 767, 767 (1974) ("The function of a requirement that notice be transmitted by registered mail is to provide a means of resolving disputes as to the fact of delivery of the notice."); of Blue v. Boss, 781 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo.App.1989) (legislative purpose in requiring notice by registered mail is to fix an effective date for the calculation of the statutory deadline; first class mail is sufficient when the parties agree that notice was timely filed). | 1 | 1 |
Blue v. Bossgreen1 sentence2008See Gerson Realty Inc. v. Casaly, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 875 , 316 N.E.2d 767, 767 (1974) ("The function of a requirement that notice be transmitted by registered mail is to provide a means of resolving disputes as to the fact of delivery of the notice."); of Blue v. Boss, 781 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo.App.1989) (legislative purpose in requiring notice by registered mail is to fix an effective date for the calculation of the statutory deadline; first class mail is sufficient when the parties agree that notice was timely filed). | 1 | 1 |
Chester McCoy v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir.2001) (rejecting claim as procedurally defaulted because defendant did not show cause for his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal). | 1 | 1 |
City & County of Denver v. Board of Assessment Appealsgreen1 sentence2001See City & County of Denver v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 848 P.2d 355, 359 (Colo.1993) (stating that "[the responsibility of apportioning the tax on [the] assessment among the various interest holders rests on the private parties who own these interests"). | 1 | 1 |
Awai v. Kotingreen2 sentences1996See Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332 (Colo.App.1993); Higgs v. District Court, supra . 1996See Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332 (Colo.App.1993); Higgs v. District Court, supra. However, I would conclude that immunity does not confer a license to violate the provisions of C.R.C.P. 11 with impunity. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Finkgreen2 sentences1991See People v. Fink, 41 Colo.App. 47 , 579 P.2d 659 (1978). 1991See People v. Fink, 41 Colo.App. 47 , 579 P.2d 659 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ricci v. Davis
green
2 sentences2015The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination that the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (“It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who ‘is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.’” (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119 )); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286–87 (“The function of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh 2015The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination that the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (âIt is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who âis empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.ââ (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119 )); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286â87 (âThe function of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses | 3 | 1984–2015 |
Wester Holdings Partnership v. Reece
green
1 sentence2020“Generally, a hearing contemplates the right to be present, to put forth one’s contentions, and to support those contentions by 11 evidence and argument.” People v. Duke, 36 P.3d 149, 152 (Colo. App. 2001) (citing Westar Holdings Partnership v. Reece, 991 P.2d 328 (Colo. App. 1999)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education
green
1 sentence2009Maj. op. at 372 (citing Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Foley Custom Homes, Inc. v. Flater
green
1 sentence2004Foley Custom Homes, Inc. v. Flater, supra. In view of the strong public policy favoring the finality of litigation and the security and marketability of titles, see Lobato v. Taylor, supra, and the ability of a claimant to plead alternative claims for relief, see C.R.C.P. 8(e)(2), we decline to read into § 15-11-1106(2) a requirement that the reformation claim be raised in a subsequent proceeding. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Higgs v. DIST. COURT IN AND FOR DOUGLAS CO.
green
2 sentences1996See Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332 (Colo.App.1993); Higgs v. District Court, supra . 1996See Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332 (Colo.App.1993); Higgs v. District Court, supra. However, I would conclude that immunity does not confer a license to violate the provisions of C.R.C.P. 11 with impunity. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1981If the defendant’s eligibility for release is contested, then “the burden of submitting evidence and the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence shall be on the party contesting the report of the chief officer of the institution having custody of the defendant.” Section 16-8-115(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). 18 The United States Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 , noted that the function of a standard of proof is “to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to t | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Addington v. Texas
green
1 sentence1981If the defendant’s eligibility for release is contested, then “the burden of submitting evidence and the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence shall be on the party contesting the report of the chief officer of the institution having custody of the defendant.” Section 16-8-115(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). 18 The United States Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 , noted that the function of a standard of proof is “to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to t | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Chmelka v. Smith
green
2 sentences1971Stewart v. Ress, supra; Chmelka v. Smith, 81 S.D. 40 , 130 N.W.2d 423 . 1971Stewart v. Ress, supra; Chmelka v. Smith, 81 S.D. 40 , 130 N.W.2d 423 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
White v. Hurlbut Grocery Co.
green
1 sentence1937The function of such a presumption, whether created by statute or not, is correctly described and limited in White v. Hurlbut Grocery Co., 62 Colo. 483, 485 , 162 Pac. 1143 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.