function doctrine in Oregon

2023The board cited the primary controlling case that clarified the effect of the presumption, SAIF v. Thompson, 360 Or 155 , Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 448 (2023) 451 379 P3d 494 (2016), and correctly stated the function of the presumption in shifting the burdens of production and per- suasion to employer to rebut the statutory presumption that claimant’s cancer resulted from his employment as a fire- fighter.

2023The board cited the primary controlling case that clarified the effect of the presumption, SAIF v. Thompson, 360 Or 155 , Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 448 (2023) 451 379 P3d 494 (2016), and correctly stated the function of the presumption in shifting the burdens of production and per- suasion to employer to rebut the statutory presumption that claimant’s cancer resulted from his employment as a fire- fighter.

2018"The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [that factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' " Addington , 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358 , 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2018"The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [that factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' " Addington , 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358 , 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

1984Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to ‘examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’ The inquiry ‘must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.’ Sealfon v. United States, 332 US 575 , 68 S Ct 237, 579 , 92 L Ed 180 ,

1984Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to ‘examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’ The inquiry ‘must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.’ Sealfon v. United States, 332 US 575 , 68 S Ct 237, 579 , 92 L Ed 180 ,

1984That standard comports with the function of the doctrine as described by the United States Supreme Court in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 US 436, 443-44 , 90 S Ct 1189 , 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970): “The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.

1984That standard comports with the function of the doctrine as described by the United States Supreme Court in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 US 436, 443-44 , 90 S Ct 1189 , 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970): “The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.

2023The board cited the primary controlling case that clarified the effect of the presumption, SAIF v. Thompson, 360 Or 155 , Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 448 (2023) 451 379 P3d 494 (2016), and correctly stated the function of the presumption in shifting the burdens of production and per- suasion to employer to rebut the statutory presumption that claimant’s cancer resulted from his employment as a fire- fighter.

2023The board cited the primary controlling case that clarified the effect of the presumption, SAIF v. Thompson, 360 Or 155 , Nonprecedential Memo Op: 329 Or App 452 (2023) 455 379 P3d 494 (2016), and correctly stated the function of the presumption in shifting the burdens of production and per- suasion to employer to rebut the statutory presumption that claimant’s cancer resulted from his employment as a fire- fighter.

2021Cuevas, 358 Or at 158 .

2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ).

2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ).

2018"The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [that factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' " Addington , 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358 , 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2018"The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks [that factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' " Addington , 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358 , 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ).

2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ).

2017This is in marked contrast to complexes of self-contained units like apartment or office buildings where the ability to control access to individual units is discrete, and where the use of an individual unit is usually separate from the use of the units around it.” Id.

2002Indeed, the function of the rule in Piwowar is, among other things, to determine the scope of ambiguous or vague acceptances such as “sore back,” Piwowar, 305 Or at 496 ; “low back pain,” Freightliner Corp., 163 Or App at 194 ; and “low back disability,” Hill, 178 Or App at 141 .

2002Indeed, the function of the rule in Piwowar is, among other things, to determine the scope of ambiguous or vague acceptances such as “sore back,” Piwowar, 305 Or at 496 ; “low back pain,” Freightliner Corp., 163 Or App at 194 ; and “low back disability,” Hill, 178 Or App at 141 .

2002Indeed, the function of the rule in Piwowar is, among other things, to determine the scope of ambiguous or vague acceptances such as “sore back,” Piwowar, 305 Or at 496 ; “low back pain,” Freightliner Corp., 163 Or App at 194 ; and “low back disability,” Hill, 178 Or App at 141 .

1992Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1977); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 US 134 , 94 S Ct 1633 , 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974).

1992Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1977); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 US 134 , 94 S Ct 1633 , 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974).

1992Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1977); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 US 134 , 94 S Ct 1633 , 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974).

1992Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1977); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 US 134 , 94 S Ct 1633 , 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974).

1986We drew the attention of counsel to Powell v. Moore, 228 Or 255, 269 , 364 P2d 1094 (1961), in which this court held that it is permissible to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.

1986We drew the attention of counsel to Powell v. Moore, 228 Or 255, 269 , 364 P2d 1094 (1961), in which this court held that it is permissible to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.

1914Or; by indulging a pleasing figure of speech, as did Justice Lamm in Mockowik, v. Kansas City, 196 Mo. 550 ( 94 S. W. 256 ): “Presumptions may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts.” If this question was one of first impression in this state, we would feel obliged to give unto it serious consideration, but, in deference to the statute which says a presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts (Section 795, L.

1914Or; by indulging a pleasing figure of speech, as did Justice Lamm in Mockowik, v. Kansas City, 196 Mo. 550 ( 94 S. W. 256 ): “Presumptions may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts.” If this question was one of first impression in this state, we would feel obliged to give unto it serious consideration, but, in deference to the statute which says a presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts (Section 795, L.