function standard in Georgia

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 754-755 (II) (102 SC 1388, 71 LE2d 599) (1982).

2013The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. . . . [I]n any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants. 6 (Citations a

1989“The function of the requirement that the specific grounds be stated ‘is to assure that the trial court has an adequate basis for its decision.’ [Cit.]” Grabowski v. Radiology Assoc., 181 Ga. App. 298, 300 ( 352 SE2d 185 ) (1986).

1989“The function of the requirement that the specific grounds be stated ‘is to assure that the trial court has an adequate basis for its decision.’ [Cit.]” Grabowski v. Radiology Assoc., 181 Ga. App. 298, 300 ( 352 SE2d 185 ) (1986).

2026“The function of the requirement that the specific grounds be stated is to assure that the trial court has an adequate basis for its decision.” S. Land Title v. N. Ga. Title, 270 Ga. App. 4, 7 (2) ( 606 SE2d 43 ) (2004) (citation modified).

2026“The function of the requirement that the specific grounds be stated is to assure that the trial court has an adequate basis for its decision.” S. Land Title v. N. Ga. Title, 270 Ga. App. 4, 7 (2) ( 606 SE2d 43 ) (2004) (citation modified).

2019By allowing the out-of-time remedy to be applied on direct appeal, our post-conviction jurisprudence has, as Justice Fletcher 44 observed 27 years ago, created a “tangle of procedural rules” that is both “confusing” and “incredible.” Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (Fletcher, J., concurring specially).

2019By allowing the out-of-time remedy to be applied on direct appeal, our post-conviction jurisprudence has, as Justice Fletcher 44 observed 27 years ago, created a “tangle of procedural rules” that is both “confusing” and “incredible.” Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (Fletcher, J., concurring specially).

2017Thus, the function of the hearing officer in this case more closely resembles the faculty hearing committee in Laskar,5 and the liquor license review board in What It Is, Inc. v. Jackson.6 In Laskar, a university’s faculty handbook authorized a faculty 5 320 Ga. App. at 418-19 . 6 146 Ga. App. 574, 574-575 ( 246 SE2d 693 ) (1978) receded from on other grounds by, Mack II, 227 Ga. App. at 309 (1). 5 hearing committee to conduct a hearing and investigate charges against a professor. 320 Ga. App. at 415 .

2017Thus, the function of the hearing officer in this case more closely resembles the faculty hearing committee in Laskar,5 and the liquor license review board in What It Is, Inc. v. Jackson.6 In Laskar, a university’s faculty handbook authorized a faculty 5 320 Ga. App. at 418-19 . 6 146 Ga. App. 574, 574-575 ( 246 SE2d 693 ) (1978) receded from on other grounds by, Mack II, 227 Ga. App. at 309 (1). 5 hearing committee to conduct a hearing and investigate charges against a professor. 320 Ga. App. at 415 .

2017Thus, the function of the hearing officer in this case more closely resembles the faculty hearing committee in Laskar,5 and the liquor license review board in What It Is, Inc. v. Jackson.6 In Laskar, a university’s faculty handbook authorized a faculty 5 320 Ga. App. at 418-19 . 6 146 Ga. App. 574, 574-575 ( 246 SE2d 693 ) (1978) receded from on other grounds by, Mack II, 227 Ga. App. at 309 (1). 5 hearing committee to conduct a hearing and investigate charges against a professor. 320 Ga. App. at 415 .

1997In Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1467 (11th Cir.) (1993), the Eleventh Circuit discussed the importance of a standard of proof: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. [Cits.] That ration

1997In Devier v. Zant, 3 F3d 1445, 1467 (11th Cir. 1993), the Eleventh Circuit discussed the importance of a standard of proof: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. [Cits.] That rationale

1997See Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 1673 , 80 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ("the prejudicial effect of a Sandstrom instruction is largely a function of the defense asserted at trial.") [19] Davis, supra. But see Trenor, 252 Ga. at 265-66 , 313 S.E.2d 482 (where the defense asserted is a lack of intent to kill, a Sandstrom instruction requires reversal). [20] There is some discrepancy in the case law as to whether the proper inquiry on this point is overwhelming evidence of guilt, or overwhelming evidence of intent and malice.

1997See Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 1673 , 80 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ("the prejudicial effect of a Sandstrom instruction is largely a function of the defense asserted at trial.") [19] Davis, supra. But see Trenor, 252 Ga. at 265-66 , 313 S.E.2d 482 (where the defense asserted is a lack of intent to kill, a Sandstrom instruction requires reversal). [20] There is some discrepancy in the case law as to whether the proper inquiry on this point is overwhelming evidence of guilt, or overwhelming evidence of intent and malice.

1997See Davis, 752 F.2d at 1521 n.10 and accompanying text.

1997However, as Justice Smith noted in his dissent in Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 816 , 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983), "[a] relatively high standard of proof is necessary because of the questionable relevancy of other crimes evidence and its devastating effect on a defendant's case." In addition, "preponderance of the evidence" is particularly inappropriate for an evidentiary standard in a criminal case because the word "preponderance" is basically a word of comparison, referring to superior numbers or weight.

1997However, as Justice Smith noted in his dissent in Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 816 , 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983), "[a] relatively high standard of proof is necessary because of the questionable relevancy of other crimes evidence and its devastating effect on a defendant's case." In addition, "preponderance of the evidence" is particularly inappropriate for an evidentiary standard in a criminal case because the word "preponderance" is basically a word of comparison, referring to superior numbers or weight.

1997See Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 1673 , 80 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ("the prejudicial effect of a Sandstrom instruction is largely a function of the defense asserted at trial.") [19] Davis, supra. But see Trenor, 252 Ga. at 265-66 , 313 S.E.2d 482 (where the defense asserted is a lack of intent to kill, a Sandstrom instruction requires reversal). [20] There is some discrepancy in the case law as to whether the proper inquiry on this point is overwhelming evidence of guilt, or overwhelming evidence of intent and malice.

1997See Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 1673 , 80 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ("the prejudicial effect of a Sandstrom instruction is largely a function of the defense asserted at trial.") [19] Davis, supra. But see Trenor, 252 Ga. at 265-66 , 313 S.E.2d 482 (where the defense asserted is a lack of intent to kill, a Sandstrom instruction requires reversal). [20] There is some discrepancy in the case law as to whether the proper inquiry on this point is overwhelming evidence of guilt, or overwhelming evidence of intent and malice.

1997See Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 1673 , 80 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ("the prejudicial effect of a Sandstrom instruction is largely a function of the defense asserted at trial.") [19] Davis, supra. But see Trenor, 252 Ga. at 265-66 , 313 S.E.2d 482 (where the defense asserted is a lack of intent to kill, a Sandstrom instruction requires reversal). [20] There is some discrepancy in the case law as to whether the proper inquiry on this point is overwhelming evidence of guilt, or overwhelming evidence of intent and malice.

1997See Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 1673 , 80 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ("the prejudicial effect of a Sandstrom instruction is largely a function of the defense asserted at trial.") [19] Davis, supra. But see Trenor, 252 Ga. at 265-66 , 313 S.E.2d 482 (where the defense asserted is a lack of intent to kill, a Sandstrom instruction requires reversal). [20] There is some discrepancy in the case law as to whether the proper inquiry on this point is overwhelming evidence of guilt, or overwhelming evidence of intent and malice.