44 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1940–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2017“The function of a standard of proof ... is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Id. (citations omitted). 1999Citing the analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), we noted: In Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418 [ 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 ] (1979), the Court, by unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudi | 2 | 8 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences1998“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). 1998“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). | 2 | 4 |
Dravo Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Dravo Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 246 , 144 A.2d 670 (1958). 6 The function test, as with the grade or class provision generally, makes sense only in a factual context which does not exist today. 1997See, e.g., Dravo Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 246 , 144 A.2d 670 (1958). 6 The function test, as with the grade or class provision generally, makes sense only in a factual context which does not exist today. | 2 | 2 |
In the Interest of: N.A., Appeal of: DHSgreen2 sentences2020Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule his findings if they are supported by competent evidence. ____________________________________________ 3 The trial court opinion does not address the goal change order. - 14 - J-S04017-20 In re N.A., 116 A.3d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2015). 2019Id. | 1 | 2 |
Watkins v. Prudential Insurancegreen2 sentences1981Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497, 500-01 , 173 A. 644, 647 (1934). 1981Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497, 500-01 , 173 A. 644, 647 (1934). | 1 | 2 |
In Re AHgreen1 sentence2023Relying upon [the court’s] unique posture, we will not overrule [its] findings if they are supported by competent evidence. -5- J-S23031-23 In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa.Super. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. EMIGRANT MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC.green1 sentence2021In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 26-27 , 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)). -5- J-A17026-21 We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge because [the court] is in the position to observe and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear before [the court]. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Walker, T.green1 sentence2021We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge because he is in the position to observe and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear 3 See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018) (“[W]here a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case.”). | 1 | 1 |
In the Int. of: K.M.W., Appeal of K.W.R.green1 sentence2021See also In the Int. of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465 , 470 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (Walker applies to children’s fast track cases). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of A.B.green1 sentence2021In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 26-27 , 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)). -5- J-A17026-21 We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge because [the court] is in the position to observe and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear before [the court]. | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2017“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Sanchez, 36 A.3d at 65 (quoting Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 , 116 S.Ct. 1373 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996)). 2017“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Sanchez, 36 A.3d at 65 (quoting Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996)). [J-118-2016] - 72 There are three standards of proof typically used in Pennsylvania jurisprudence: a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.green1 sentence2017A preponderance of the evidence is “‘a more likely than not inquiry,’ supported by the greater weight of the evidence; something a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a decision.” In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 246 (Pa. 2017) (citing Samuel–Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 35 (Pa. 2011); J.S. v. Com., Dep't. of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
In Re: Vencil, N. Appeal of: PA State Policegreen1 sentence2017A preponderance of the evidence is “‘a more likely than not inquiry,’ supported by the greater weight of the evidence; something a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a decision.” In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 246 (Pa. 2017) (citing Samuel–Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 35 (Pa. 2011); J.S. v. Com., Dep't. of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
In Re JCgreen1 sentence2015Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule his findings if they are supported by competent evidence.” In re J.C., 5 A.3d 284, 287-88 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). “[T]he focus of all -8- J-A03035-15 dependency proceedings . . . must be on the safety, permanency, and well- being of the child.” In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa. Super. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
In Re AKgreen1 sentence2015Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule his findings if they are supported by competent evidence.” In re J.C., 5 A.3d 284, 287-88 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). “[T]he focus of all -8- J-A03035-15 dependency proceedings . . . must be on the safety, permanency, and well- being of the child.” In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa. Super. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
In Re MKgreen1 sentence2015Relying on this unique posture, we will not overrule his findings if they are supported by competent evidence." In re M.K., 636 A.2d 198, 201 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1999Thus, while private parties may be interested intensely in a civil dispute over money damages, application of a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard indicates both society’s “minimal concern with the outcome,” and a conclusion that the litigants should “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.” When the State brings a criminal action to deny a defendant liberty or life, however, “the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly 1999Thus, while private parties may be interested intensely in a civil dispute over money damages, application of a "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard indicates both society's "minimal concern with the outcome," and a conclusion that the litigants should "share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion." When the State brings a criminal action to deny a defendant liberty or life, however, "the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly | 1 | 1 |
Renne v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen2 sentences1997In Renne v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 499 Pa. 299, 305 , 453 A.2d 318, 321 (1982), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the function test could lead to arbitrary and sometimes harsh results. 1997In Renne v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 499 Pa. 299, 305 , 453 A.2d 318, 321 (1982), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the function test could lead to arbitrary and sometimes harsh results. | 1 | 1 |
| San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Kunkle
green
2 sentences1993In Re Interest of Black, 273 Pa.Super. 536 , 417 A.2d 1178 (1980); In Re Kunkle, 265 Pa.Super. 605 , 402 A.2d 1037 (1979). 1993In Re Interest of Black, 273 Pa.Super. 536 , 417 A.2d 1178 (1980); In Re Kunkle, 265 Pa.Super. 605 , 402 A.2d 1037 (1979). | 6 | 1983–1993 |
In the Interest of Black
green
2 sentences1993In Re Interest of Black, 273 Pa.Super. 536 , 417 A.2d 1178 (1980); In Re Kunkle, 265 Pa.Super. 605 , 402 A.2d 1037 (1979). 1993In Re Interest of Black, 273 Pa.Super. 536 , 417 A.2d 1178 (1980); In Re Kunkle, 265 Pa.Super. 605 , 402 A.2d 1037 (1979). | 6 | 1983–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Maldonado
green
2 sentences2014In Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 576 Pa. 101 , 838 A.2d 710 (2003), our Supreme Court addressed what standard of proof is required to give a person the right to be heard in a “reasonable manner.” It stated that the appropriate standard of proof required in a proceeding goes to the risk that the party would suffer: Briefly, the function of a standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder as to the level of confidence that society believes he should have in the correctness of his conclusion; furthermore, different standards of proof reflect differences in how society believes the risk of error sho 2014In Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 576 Pa. 101 , 838 A.2d 710 (2003), our Supreme Court addressed what standard of proof is required to give a person the right to be heard in a “reasonable manner.” It stated that the appropriate standard of proof required in a proceeding goes to the risk that the party would suffer: Briefly, the function of a standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder as to the level of confidence that society believes he should have in the correctness of his conclusion; furthermore, different standards of proof reflect differences in how society believes the risk of error sho | 3 | 2006–2014 |
In Re Green
green
2 sentences1982In re Green, 486 Pa. 613 , 406 A.2d 1370 (1979), and we will not usurp this function of the hearing court. 1982In re Green, 486 Pa. 613 , 406 A.2d 1370 (1979), and we will not usurp this function of the hearing court. | 3 | 1981–1982 |
In Re EP
green
2 sentences2008In re E.P., 841 A.2d 128 (Pa.Super.2003). 2008In re E.P., 841 A.2d 128 (Pa.Super.2003). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences1999Citing the analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), we noted: In Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418 [ 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 ] (1979), the Court, by unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudi 1999Citing the analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), we noted: In Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418 [ 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 ] (1979), the Court, by unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudi | 2 | 1985–1999 |
Waugh v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1974Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166 , 146 A. 2d 297 (1958). 1974Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166 , 146 A. 2d 297 (1958). | 2 | 1970–1974 |
In the Interest of R.J.T.
green
1 sentence2021In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 26-27 , 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)). -5- J-A17026-21 We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge because [the court] is in the position to observe and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear before [the court]. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Jones
green
2 sentences2017“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Sanchez, 36 A.3d at 65 (quoting Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 , 116 S.Ct. 1373 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996)). 2017“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Sanchez, 36 A.3d at 65 (quoting Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996)). [J-118-2016] - 72 There are three standards of proof typically used in Pennsylvania jurisprudence: a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education
red
2 sentences1992Moreover, even the use of the function test has been criticized as "archaic and artificial,” Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877 (1973), and "obsolete,” Northampton. 1992Moreover, even the use of the function test has been criticized as "archaic and artificial,” Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877 (1973), and "obsolete,” Northampton. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co.
green
2 sentences1992In the recent opinion of Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 531 Pa. 500 , 614 A.2d 218 (1992), in note 4, the Supreme Court opined: In Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Education, this Court expressly overruled the judicially created doctrine of governmental immunity and the granting of that immunity based on “the distinction between tortious conduct arising out of [the] exercise of a governmental function." ... 1992In the recent opinion of Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 531 Pa. 500 , 614 A.2d 218 (1992), in note 4, the Supreme Court opined: In Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Education, this Court expressly overruled the judicially created doctrine of governmental immunity and the granting of that immunity based on “the distinction between tortious conduct arising out of [the] exercise of a governmental function." ... | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Yandrich v. Radic
green
1 sentence1989Id. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| In Re Frank W.D. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Unemployment Compensation Board of Review of the Commonwealth v. National Valve & Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Adoption of S. H. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| MacKey v. Montrym green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Greenwood v. Kadoich green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Foerst v. Rotkis green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Kardos v. Morris green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Dible's Estate green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Commonwealth ex rel. Carlini v. Burke green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Neely v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.