20 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1896–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences1986"In Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), the Court, by a unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: 'The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” ’ Id., at 423 , quoting In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).” Justice Harlan prefaced those remarks by stating: "the choice of the standard * * 1986"In Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), the Court, by a unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: 'The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” ’ Id., at 423 , quoting In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).” Justice Harlan prefaced those remarks by stating: "the choice of the standard * * | 5 | 7 |
Matter of Business Statistics Organization v. Josephgreen2 sentences2026However, despite petitioner's insistence that the Tribunal eschewed a primary function analysis, it is clear from its determination that it engaged in its functional equivalent by thoroughly assessing whether the license provided to petitioner's clients to use the VMS "is incidental to the services rendered" ( Matter of Mendoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v Taylor , 272 NY 275, 279 [1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205 [1937]; Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib 2026However, despite petitioner's insistence that the Tribunal eschewed a primary function analysis, it is clear from its determination that it engaged in its functional equivalent by thoroughly assessing whether the license provided to petitioner's clients to use the VMS "is incidental to the services rendered" ( Matter of Mendoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v Taylor , 272 NY 275, 279 [1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205 [1937]; Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib | 3 | 3 |
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2026However, despite petitioner's insistence that the Tribunal eschewed a primary function analysis, it is clear from its determination that it engaged in its functional equivalent by thoroughly assessing whether the license provided to petitioner's clients to use the VMS "is incidental to the services rendered" ( Matter of Mendoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v Taylor , 272 NY 275, 279 [1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205 [1937]; Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib 2026However, despite petitioner's insistence that the Tribunal eschewed a primary function analysis, it is clear from its determination that it engaged in its functional equivalent by thoroughly assessing whether the license provided to petitioner's clients to use the VMS "is incidental to the services rendered" ( Matter of Mendoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v Taylor , 272 NY 275, 279 [1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205 [1937]; Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib | 3 | 3 |
People ex rel. Foremost Studio, Inc. v. Gravesgreen2 sentences2024Foremost Studio, Inc. v Graves , 246 App Div 130, 131 [3d Dept 1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205-206 [1937]; People ex rel. 2024Foremost Studio, Inc. v Graves , 246 App Div 130, 131 [3d Dept 1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205-206 [1937]; People ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2003Standard for Determining Actual Innocence The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact-finder “concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks . . . should [be had] in the correctness of [the] factual conclusion [ ]” (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 367 [1995]; Matter of Storar, 52 NY2d 363, 379 [1981]; see also Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 [1979]; Schlup, 513 US at 325 ). 2001It further observed, citing Addington v Texas ( 441 US 418, 423 ): “The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact-finding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication” (Santosky v Kramer, at 754-755 [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 5 |
Mendoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2026However, despite petitioner's insistence that the Tribunal eschewed a primary function analysis, it is clear from its determination that it engaged in its functional equivalent by thoroughly assessing whether the license provided to petitioner's clients to use the VMS "is incidental to the services rendered" ( Matter of Mendoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v Taylor , 272 NY 275, 279 [1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205 [1937]; Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib 2026However, despite petitioner's insistence that the Tribunal eschewed a primary function analysis, it is clear from its determination that it engaged in its functional equivalent by thoroughly assessing whether the license provided to petitioner's clients to use the VMS "is incidental to the services rendered" ( Matter of Mendoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v Taylor , 272 NY 275, 279 [1936]; see Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph , 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York , 276 NY 198, 205 [1937]; Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Dynamic Logic, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2026As noted by the Tribunal, its historical use of the primary function test arises in cases that involve the classification, and taxable nature, of certain types of services ( see Tax Law § 1105 [c] [1]), rather than the "mixed bundle" that is present here ( compare Matter of Principal Connections Ltd. , 2004 WL 319283 , *12, 2004 NY Tax LEXIS 23, *31-32 [NY St Div of Tax Appeals DTA No. 818212, Feb. 12, 2004], and Matter of SSOV '81 Ltd[*4]. , 1995 WL 36181 , *7, 1995 NY Tax LEXIS 18, *18 [NY St Div of Tax Appeals DTA Nos. 810966, 810967, Jan. 19, 1995], with Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc 2026As noted by the Tribunal, its historical use of the primary function test arises in cases that involve the classification, and taxable nature, of certain types of services ( see Tax Law § 1105 [c] [1]), rather than the "mixed bundle" that is present here ( compare Matter of Principal Connections Ltd. , 2004 WL 319283 , *12, 2004 NY Tax LEXIS 23, *31-32 [NY St Div of Tax Appeals DTA No. 818212, Feb. 12, 2004], and Matter of SSOV '81 Ltd[*4]. , 1995 WL 36181 , *7, 1995 NY Tax LEXIS 18, *18 [NY St Div of Tax Appeals DTA Nos. 810966, 810967, Jan. 19, 1995], with Matter of Strata Skin Sciences, Inc | 1 | 1 |
MATTER OF MILLER v. DeBuonogreen1 sentence2003In determining the proper standard of proof in any situation, the court must weigh the public and private interests affected and evaluate how the risk of error should be distributed (Matter of Lee TT. v Dowling, 87 NY2d 699, 712 [1996]; see also Matter of Miller v DeBuono, 90 NY2d 783, 792 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
MATTER OF LEE TT. v. Dowlinggreen1 sentence2003In determining the proper standard of proof in any situation, the court must weigh the public and private interests affected and evaluate how the risk of error should be distributed (Matter of Lee TT. v Dowling, 87 NY2d 699, 712 [1996]; see also Matter of Miller v DeBuono, 90 NY2d 783, 792 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Geracigreen1 sentence2003Standard for Determining Actual Innocence The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact-finder “concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks . . . should [be had] in the correctness of [the] factual conclusion [ ]” (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 367 [1995]; Matter of Storar, 52 NY2d 363, 379 [1981]; see also Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 [1979]; Schlup, 513 US at 325 ). | 1 | 1 |
Eichner v. Dillongreen1 sentence2003Standard for Determining Actual Innocence The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact-finder “concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks . . . should [be had] in the correctness of [the] factual conclusion [ ]” (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 367 [1995]; Matter of Storar, 52 NY2d 363, 379 [1981]; see also Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 [1979]; Schlup, 513 US at 325 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Galileo International Partnership v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the Department of Taxation & Finance of the State of New York
neutral
2 sentences2024Partnership v Tax Appeals Trib. of Dept. of Taxation & Fin. of State of N.Y. , 31 AD3d 1072, 1074-1075 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 715 [2006]). 2024Partnership v Tax Appeals Trib. of Dept. of Taxation & Fin. of State of N.Y. , 31 AD3d 1072, 1074-1075 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 715 [2006]). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Schlup v. Delo
red
1 sentence2003Standard for Determining Actual Innocence The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact-finder “concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks . . . should [be had] in the correctness of [the] factual conclusion [ ]” (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 367 [1995]; Matter of Storar, 52 NY2d 363, 379 [1981]; see also Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 [1979]; Schlup, 513 US at 325 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
In re Darryl T.
neutral
1 sentence1999(People v Deary, 212 AD2d 960 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 971 [1995]; Matter of Darryl T., 210 AD2d 120 [1st Dept 1994], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 85 NY2d 954 [1995].) “Interrogation” has been defined as “express questioning * * * [or] words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
In re Darryl T.
neutral
1 sentence1999(People v Deary, 212 AD2d 960 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 971 [1995]; Matter of Darryl T., 210 AD2d 120 [1st Dept 1994], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 85 NY2d 954 [1995].) “Interrogation” has been defined as “express questioning * * * [or] words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Deary
neutral
1 sentence1999(People v Deary, 212 AD2d 960 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 971 [1995]; Matter of Darryl T., 210 AD2d 120 [1st Dept 1994], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 85 NY2d 954 [1995].) “Interrogation” has been defined as “express questioning * * * [or] words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
O'neill v. City Of Auburn
green
1 sentence1996Contrary to respondent’s assertion that petitioner must establish the falsity of the charges, in order to be entitled to a name-clearing hearing, petitioner is not required to do so, because that is the function of the hearing itself (see, O’Neill v City of Auburn, 23 F3d 685 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Corp.
green
1 sentence1984Recognizing that the function of an exception is to provide the court and the opposing party with an opportunity to correct any errors in the conduct of the trial (see Delaney v Philhern Realty Holding Corp., 280 NY 461, 467 ; Gangi v Fradus, 227 NY 452, 458-459 ), we believe that the remarks of defense counsel at the time of the motion adequately apprised the court of the nature of the objection and preserved the issue for appellate review (CPLR 5501, subd [a], par 4). 11 Lastly, we note that the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs judgment as a matter of law (CPLR 4401) on the issue of d | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Gangi v. . Fradus
green
1 sentence1984Recognizing that the function of an exception is to provide the court and the opposing party with an opportunity to correct any errors in the conduct of the trial (see Delaney v Philhern Realty Holding Corp., 280 NY 461, 467 ; Gangi v Fradus, 227 NY 452, 458-459 ), we believe that the remarks of defense counsel at the time of the motion adequately apprised the court of the nature of the objection and preserved the issue for appellate review (CPLR 5501, subd [a], par 4). 11 Lastly, we note that the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs judgment as a matter of law (CPLR 4401) on the issue of d | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Codling v. Paglia
green
1 sentence1983To say that there is no duty to warn when the defect is obvious does not conflict with the obligation imposed by Codling v Paglia ( 32 NY2d 330 , supra) on the manufacturer “to exercise that degree of care in his plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in the manner for which the product was intended * * * as well as an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use”. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
In re Eichner
green
1 sentence1980Corp. v Acme Quilting Co., 46 NY2d 211, 219-220 ; Matter of Eichner [Fox], 73 AD2d 431, 469 , supra.) Whether the formulation here be “clear and convincing evidence” or “substantial and convincing evidence,” as suggested by the cases involving private visitation disputes, is of less import than the function of the standard. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
George Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co.
green
1 sentence1980Corp. v Acme Quilting Co., 46 NY2d 211, 219-220 ; Matter of Eichner [Fox], 73 AD2d 431, 469 , supra.) Whether the formulation here be “clear and convincing evidence” or “substantial and convincing evidence,” as suggested by the cases involving private visitation disputes, is of less import than the function of the standard. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Speiser v. Randall
green
1 sentence1979"To experienced lawyers,” the Supreme Court noted in Speiser v Randall ( 357 US 513, 520-521 ), "it is commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit — and hence the vindication of legal rights — depends more often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of precedents.” "Thus,” the court reasoned, "the procedures by which the facts * * * are determined assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Clemente
green
1 sentence1967A good synthesis of the rule was made by Judge Fuld in People v. Mussenden ( 308 N. Y. 558, 561-562 ): “It has been repeatedly written that if, upon any view of the facts, a defendant could properly be found guilty of a lesser degree or an included crime, the trial judge must submit such lower offense.” The amplitude of a jury’s function under the rule was discussed by Peck, P. J., in People v. Clemente ( 285 App. Div. 258, 264 ): “ It is the policy of the law to allow juries a latitude which is not hemmed in by absolute logic.” He felt that juries “ may, on almost any excuse, convict of a low | 1 | 1967–1967 |
People v. Mussenden
green
1 sentence1967A good synthesis of the rule was made by Judge Fuld in People v. Mussenden ( 308 N. Y. 558, 561-562 ): “It has been repeatedly written that if, upon any view of the facts, a defendant could properly be found guilty of a lesser degree or an included crime, the trial judge must submit such lower offense.” The amplitude of a jury’s function under the rule was discussed by Peck, P. J., in People v. Clemente ( 285 App. Div. 258, 264 ): “ It is the policy of the law to allow juries a latitude which is not hemmed in by absolute logic.” He felt that juries “ may, on almost any excuse, convict of a low | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co.
green
1 sentence1951Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 303 .) We must thus acknowledge the function of the clause found in No. 39 of the general specifications which requires “ the State on its part to order from such contractor (except in the case of emergency) and to pay for at the contract prices, all items ordered, and delivered, within ten (10) percent over or under the award quantity.” Such clause gives sufficient certitude to the quantity which the buyer is required to accept, and •does not subject.the seller to the arbitrary whim of the buyer. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen
red
1 sentence1932The Chelentis case is again quoted on uniformity, and the doctrine of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen ( 244 U. S. 205 ) is reiterated. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart
green
1 sentence1932(Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33 .) In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart ( 253 U. S. 149 ) the need for harmony and uniformity in maritime matters was further stressed in connection with the Judiciary Act of 1789, and its reservation language saved “ to suitors * * * the right of a common law remedy.” It was specifically held that the function of that clause was to preserve something from immediate interference — not to create. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Engel v. Davenport
green
1 sentence1932(Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33 .) In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart ( 253 U. S. 149 ) the need for harmony and uniformity in maritime matters was further stressed in connection with the Judiciary Act of 1789, and its reservation language saved “ to suitors * * * the right of a common law remedy.” It was specifically held that the function of that clause was to preserve something from immediate interference — not to create. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Sterrett v. . Third National Bank of Buffalo
green
1 sentence1896(Sterrett v. Third National Bank, 122 N. Y. 659, 662 ; Chapman v. McCormick, 86 N. Y. 479, 481 .) We think that the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed, either literally or substantially, in accordance with the request presented to the court. | 1 | 1896–1896 |
| Chapman v. . McCormick green | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.