function challenge in Mississippi

1999The function of the rule is reduction of delay, increase of judicial efficiency and economy and procedural safeguards for litigants.” Crocker, 455 So.2d at 1311 . ¶ 48.

1999The function of the rule is reduction of delay, increase of judicial efficiency and economy and procedural safeguards for litigants." Crocker, 455 So.2d at 1311 . ¶ 48.

1998In this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that "to perform its high function in the best way `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 772 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). ¶ 125.

1998In this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that "to perform its high function in the best way `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 772 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). ¶ 125.

1982The above holdings are reiterated in Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792 , 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952), and Brasier v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145 , 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958).

1982The above holdings are reiterated in Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792 , 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952), and Brasier v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145 , 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958).

1982Justice Blackmun in speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court, quoted from Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), stating that: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Santosky, ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 .

1982Justice Blackmun in speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court, quoted from Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), stating that: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Santosky, ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 .

1982The above holdings are reiterated in Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792 , 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952), and Brasier v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145 , 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958).

1982The above holdings are reiterated in Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792 , 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952), and Brasier v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145 , 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958).

1982Justice Blackmun in speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court, quoted from Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), stating that: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Santosky, ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 .

1982Justice Blackmun in speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court, quoted from Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), stating that: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Santosky, ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 1395 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 607 .

1982The inference in both the Rhodes and Granite Oil Securities cases was that if the legislature intended the function to have immunity it would have specifically granted it in the act, and not simply by use of the word "governmental." See Stocker v. City of Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483 , 126 S.W.2d 339 , 124 A.L.R. 345 (1939).

1982The inference in both the Rhodes and Granite Oil Securities cases was that if the legislature intended the function to have immunity it would have specifically granted it in the act, and not simply by use of the word "governmental." See Stocker v. City of Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483 , 126 S.W.2d 339 , 124 A.L.R. 345 (1939).