function standard in Hawaii

2007Additionally, in the foregoing subsections of HRS § 709-906, the degree of punishment escalates depending on whether the violation is a first offense, second offense, or third or any subsequent offense that occurs within two years of a second or subsequent conviction This court has stated that when “the degree of punishment for a violation ... escalates as a function of whether the violation” was committed within a certain number of years of a prior offense, such language “describes attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and enmeshed in the hierarchy of offenses that [the statute] as a

2007This court has stated that when "the degree of punishment for a violation . . . escalates as a function of whether the violation" was committed within a certain number of years of a prior offense, such language "describes attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and enmeshed in the hierarchy of offenses that [the statute] as a whole describes." Domingues , 106 Hawai`i at 487, 107 P.3d at 416 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai`i 227, 238, 160 P.3d 703, 714 (2007).

1997“The function of a standard of proof as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfind-ing, is ‘to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075-76 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawai'i 1, 13 , 919 P.2d 263, 275 (1996); Masaki

1997“The function of a standard of proof as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfind-ing, is ‘to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075-76 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawai'i 1, 13 , 919 P.2d 263, 275 (1996); Masaki

2025See id.

2010See State v. Tau'a, 98 Hawai'i 426, 438-39 , 49 P.3d 1227, 1239-40 (2002) ("[A]llowing a defendant charged with a possessory offense to avail himself or herself of the exclusionary rule as a function of the violation of a third party's constitutional rights would produce absurd results."); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) (concluding that a defendant, whose own legitimate expectation or privacy was not invaded, lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress evidence illegally seized from a third person).

2010See State v. Tau'a, 98 Hawai'i 426, 438-39 , 49 P.3d 1227, 1239-40 (2002) ("[A]llowing a defendant charged with a possessory offense to avail himself or herself of the exclusionary rule as a function of the violation of a third party's constitutional rights would produce absurd results."); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) (concluding that a defendant, whose own legitimate expectation or privacy was not invaded, lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress evidence illegally seized from a third person).

2010See State v. Tau'a, 98 Hawai'i 426, 438-39 , 49 P.3d 1227, 1239-40 (2002) ("[A]llowing a defendant charged with a possessory offense to avail himself or herself of the exclusionary rule as a function of the violation of a third party's constitutional rights would produce absurd results."); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) (concluding that a defendant, whose own legitimate expectation or privacy was not invaded, lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress evidence illegally seized from a third person).

2007Additionally, in the foregoing subsections of HRS § 709-906, the degree of punishment escalates depending on whether the violation is a first offense, second offense, or third or any subsequent offense that occurs within two years of a second or subsequent conviction This court has stated that when “the degree of punishment for a violation ... escalates as a function of whether the violation” was committed within a certain number of years of a prior offense, such language “describes attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and enmeshed in the hierarchy of offenses that [the statute] as a

2007This court has stated that when "the degree of punishment for a violation . . . escalates as a function of whether the violation" was committed within a certain number of years of a prior offense, such language "describes attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and enmeshed in the hierarchy of offenses that [the statute] as a whole describes." Domingues , 106 Hawai`i at 487, 107 P.3d at 416 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai`i 227, 238, 160 P.3d 703, 714 (2007).

1997“The function of a standard of proof as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfind-ing, is ‘to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075-76 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawai'i 1, 13 , 919 P.2d 263, 275 (1996); Masaki

1997“The function of a standard of proof as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfind-ing, is ‘to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication.’ ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075-76 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawai'i 1, 13 , 919 P.2d 263, 275 (1996); Masaki

1990The rationale behind allowing peremptory challenges was set forth by Chief Justice Burger in that dissenting opinion, quoting from Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 772 (1965): The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.

1990The rationale behind allowing peremptory challenges was set forth by Chief Justice Burger in that dissenting opinion, quoting from Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 772 (1965): The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.

1985Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970).