function standard in Texas

2015On remand, we adopted the clear-and-convincing burden of proof and defined it as "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979).

2015On remand, we adopted the clear-and-convincing burden of proof and defined it as "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979).

2011Industries, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 304, 314 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (“A party has no duty to warn of obvious risks, since a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning.”); Hanus v. Texas Utilities Co., 71 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (“a manufacturer has no duty to warn of obvious risks because a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning”); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.”).

2011Industries, Inc. , 953 S.W.2d 304, 314 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, no pet.)(“A party has no duty to warn of obvious risks, since a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning.”); Hanus v. Texas Utilities Co. , 71 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)(“a manufacturer has no duty to warn of obvious risks because a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning”); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.--Austin 2000, pet. denied)(“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.”).

2011Industries, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 304, 314 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (“A party has no duty to warn of obvious risks, since a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning.”); Hanus v. Texas Utilities Co., 71 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (“a manufacturer has no duty to warn of obvious risks because a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning”); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.”).

2011Industries, Inc. , 953 S.W.2d 304, 314 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, no pet.)(“A party has no duty to warn of obvious risks, since a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning.”); Hanus v. Texas Utilities Co. , 71 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)(“a manufacturer has no duty to warn of obvious risks because a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning”); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.--Austin 2000, pet. denied)(“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.”).

2011Industries, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 304, 314 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (“A party has no duty to warn of obvious risks, since a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning.”); Hanus v. Texas Utilities Co., 71 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (“a manufacturer has no duty to warn of obvious risks because a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning”); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.”).

2011Industries, Inc. , 953 S.W.2d 304, 314 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, no pet.)(“A party has no duty to warn of obvious risks, since a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning.”); Hanus v. Texas Utilities Co. , 71 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)(“a manufacturer has no duty to warn of obvious risks because a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning”); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.--Austin 2000, pet. denied)(“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.”).

2008See id.

2008See id.

2015The Supreme Court instructed: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication." Id. at 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) 89 S.W.3d 23 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2015The Supreme Court instructed: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication." Id. at 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) 89 S.W.3d 23 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2015The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, under our view, defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise.” Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 96 .

1995The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, under our view, defensive in that it estops a promi-sor from denying the enforceability of the promise.” Id. (quoting Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex.1965)).

1999The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, under our view, defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise.” “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex.1972).

1994The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, under our view, defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise. " Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1973), quoting Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex.1965).

2010Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears , 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995); Hanus , 71 S.W.3d 880 .

2010Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995); Hanus, 71 S.W.3d 880 .

2008In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)).

2008In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).

2007See Medrano v. City of Pearsall , 989 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.); McKinney v. City of Gainesville , 814 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1991, no writ).

2000See Medrano v. City of Pear-sall, 989 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.); McKinney v. City of Gainesville, 814 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1991, no writ).

2007See Medrano v. City of Pearsall , 989 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.); McKinney v. City of Gainesville , 814 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1991, no writ).

2000See Medrano v. City of Pear-sall, 989 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.); McKinney v. City of Gainesville, 814 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1991, no writ).

2015In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Court, by a unanimous vote of the participating Justices, declared: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to Page 755 "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Id. at 423 , quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

2015The Supreme Court instructed: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication." Id. at 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) 89 S.W.3d 23 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

1999The Court of Criminal Appeals has noted that the trial court's relevancy determination is not exclusively a function of rule and logic: The trial court must rely in large part upon its own observations and experiences of the world, as exemplary of common observation and experience, and reason from there in deciding whether proffered evidence has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. at 391 (quoting former TEX.R.CRIM.

1999The Court of Criminal Appeals has noted that the trial court’s relevancy determination is not exclusively a function of rule and logic: The trial court must rely in large part upon its own observations and experiences of the world, as exemplary of common observation and experience, and reason from there in deciding whether proffered evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at 391 (quoting former Tex.R.Crim.

2024Whether an offense is available for enhancement purposes is both substantive law and one that impacts the truth-finding function by affecting the sufficiency of the evidence to support a certain punishment range.1 1 See Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2016) (“[T]his Court has determined whether a new rule is substantive or procedural by considering the function of the rule, not its underlying constitutional source. . . . [W]here the conviction or sentence in fact is not authorized by substantive law, then finality interests are at their weakest.”); Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673,

2022“Respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.” Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015).

2015Is an improper stacking order “in essence” the same as an unauthorized sentence—at least for purposes of deciding whether it should be subject to challenge for the first time in a collateral attack? 1 We have recently determined that whether a claim may be raised for the first time in post-conviction collateral attack should be a function of whether that claim invokes category one of the so-called Marin categories of complaints: systemic requirements or prohibitions that are recognized by our criminal justice system as “essentially independent of the litigants’ wishes.” See Ex parte Sledge, 39

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other grou

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other groun

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other grou

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other groun

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other grou

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other groun

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other grou

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other groun

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other grou

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other groun

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other grou

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other groun

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other grou

2008The Court of Criminal Appeals has attempted to definitively state the standard of review for testing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a criminal conviction on at least seven occasions: Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (overruled in part on other groun