typographical error in Indiana

2009See McBride v. Monroe County Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (concluding trial court's use of word "possible" instead of "probable" in termination order was typographical error that did not warrant reversal in light of court's statements made during hearing and court's findings and conclusions read as a whole).

2009See McBride v. Monroe County Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (concluding trial court's use of word "possible" instead of "probable" in termination order was typographical error that did not warrant reversal in light of court's statements made during hearing and court's findings and conclusions read as a whole).

2025See Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687 .

2019Compare Schriber v. Anonymous, 848 N.E.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Ind. 2006) (noting that continued tolling of the statute of limitations was appropriate remedy where defendants attempted to obfuscate plaintiff’s ability to determine provider’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-1582 | December 6, 2019 Page 9 of 13 proper business name, and thus there was reason to doubt the accuracy of the IDOI’s determination), with Rumell, 88 N.E.3d at 1119-20 (distinguishing Schriber where “[h]ere, on the other hand, [plaintiff] knew the identities of the Defendants, so there was little reason

2018E.g., Creekmore v. State, 800 N.E.2d 230, 235-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that incorrect directional coordinates in the search warrant did not require suppression in part because, despite the mistake, the warrant sufficiently described the property to be searched); Houser, 678 N.E.2d at 101 (finding that the incorrect address in the search warrant did not invalidate the warrant because the warrant sufficiently described the property to be searched despite the mistake and the error was an innocent one).

2018E.g., Creekmore v. State, 800 N.E.2d 230, 235-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that incorrect directional coordinates in the search warrant did not require suppression in part because, despite the mistake, the warrant sufficiently described the property to be searched); Houser, 678 N.E.2d at 101 (finding that the incorrect address in the search warrant did not invalidate the warrant because the warrant sufficiently described the property to be searched despite the mistake and the error was an innocent one).

2017In re Estate of Stayback, 38 N.E.3d 705, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2016See Pasha v. State, 524 N.E.2d 310, 314 (Ind. 1988) (“Bald assertions of 2 We presume this is a typographical error.

2015“Where time is not of the essence of the offense, … the State is not confined to proving the commission on the date alleged in the affidavit or indictment, but may prove the commission at any time within the statutory period of limitations.” Id. (citing Quillen v. State, 271 Ind. 251, 252 , 391 N.E.2d 817, 818-19 (1979)). 3 In Love, our supreme court held that the State’s typographical error in the dates within which the defendant was alleged to have committed child molesting did not prejudice the defendant because time was not of the essence of the offense.

2015“Where time is not of the essence of the offense, … the State is not confined to proving the commission on the date alleged in the affidavit or indictment, but may prove the commission at any time within the statutory period of limitations.” Id. (citing Quillen v. State, 271 Ind. 251, 252 , 391 N.E.2d 817, 818-19 (1979)). 3 In Love, our supreme court held that the State’s typographical error in the dates within which the defendant was alleged to have committed child molesting did not prejudice the defendant because time was not of the essence of the offense.

2015Both Tiplick and the State assert that the vagueness analysis is the same under both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions, relying on Bemis v. State, 652 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).

2014Although Huntington requested reformation based on what it characterized as a scrivener’s error, the legal description here contains more than a typographical error, see Keybank, 699 N.E.2d at 326 (typographical error did not nullify mortgage), and does not simply encompass more property than was intended to be encumbered, see Matter of Estate 9 of Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (legal description encompassing more property than intended to be encumbered nonetheless valid).

2014Although Huntington requested reformation based on what it characterized as a scrivener’s error, the legal description here contains more than a typographical error, see Keybank, 699 N.E.2d at 326 (typographical error did not nullify mortgage), and does not simply encompass more property than was intended to be encumbered, see Matter of Estate 9 of Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (legal description encompassing more property than intended to be encumbered nonetheless valid).

2007See, e.g., Broadus v. State, 487 N.E.2d 1298, 1306 (Ind.1986) (holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered); Elmore v. State, 688 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that a final jury instruction containing the cause number "241" instead of "214" was not reversible error because it would not have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant had been charged with an additional conviction).

2007See, e.g., Broadus v. State, 487 N.E.2d 1298, 1306 (Ind.1986) (holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered); Elmore v. State, 688 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that a final jury instruction containing the cause number “241” instead of “214” was not reversible error because it would not have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant had been charged with an additional conviction).

2007See, e.g., Broadus v. State, 487 N.E.2d 1298, 1306 (Ind.1986) (holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered); Elmore v. State, 688 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that a final jury instruction containing the cause number "241" instead of "214" was not reversible error because it would not have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant had been charged with an additional conviction).

2007See, e.g., Broadus v. State, 487 N.E.2d 1298, 1306 (Ind.1986) (holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered); Elmore v. State, 688 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that a final jury instruction containing the cause number “241” instead of “214” was not reversible error because it would not have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant had been charged with an additional conviction).

2007And we acknowledge that "`an error in the instruction of the jury does not require reversal if the conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise.'" Elmore, 688 N.E.2d at 219 (quoting Burton v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Ind.1988)) (emphasis added).

2007And we acknowledge thát “ ‘an error in the instruction of the jury does not require reversal if the conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise.’ ” Elmore, 688 N.E.2d at 219 (quoting Burton v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Ind.1988)) (emphasis added).

2003See Willig v. Dowell, 625 N.E.2d 476, 482 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (stating typographical error in court's factual finding did not corrupt judgment), vacated in part on other grounds on reh'g, 627 N.E.2d 1865 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. 11 B.

1999Manuilov did admit that he was arrested and put in jail after Kurihara called the police on December 13, 1995. [9] The documents include an "ATTACHMENT To Application For TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER" describing an incident of physical abuse on December 13, 1995; an untitled document dated December 15, 1995, and signed by Kurihara that is obviously related to the temporary protective order; a "RECOMMENDATION REGARDING TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER" against Manuilov from the District Court, Family Division of Clark County, Nevada, filed December 19, 1995, and signed by a district court master who re

1994See Trout v. State (1886), 107 Ind. 578 , 8 N.E. 618 (error in date in information is mere clerical error and is not available on appeal in absence of motion to quash for uncertainty).

1994See Trout v. State (1886), 107 Ind. 578 , 8 N.E. 618 (error in date in information is mere clerical error and is not available on appeal in absence of motion to quash for uncertainty).

1990See Dixon v. State (1988), Ind., 524 N.E.2d 2 (incorrect date of 1980 in order book entry rather than 1981, where evidence indicated true date of 1981 for prior conviction did not render evidence insufficient to support habitual offender finding).