typographical error in Connecticut

2012Moreover, this clearly is not a case where a plaintiff was misnamed because of a typographical error, the fault of which was not attributable to the plaintiff; Dyck O’Neal, Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn. App. 161, 166-67 , 742 A.2d 393 (1999); or because of a “ ‘poor and superfluous choice of words,’ ” as was the case in Young v. Vlahos, supra, 103 Conn. App. 478 .

2012Moreover, this clearly is not a case where a plaintiff was misnamed because of a typographical error, the fault of which was not attributable to the plaintiff; Dyck O’Neal, Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn. App. 161, 166-67 , 742 A.2d 393 (1999); or because of a “ ‘poor and superfluous choice of words,’ ” as was the case in Young v. Vlahos, supra, 103 Conn. App. 478 .

2025Also, if the amendment interjects material new issues, the adversary is entitled to reasonable opportu- nity to meet them by pleading and proof.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 745 ; see also, e.g., Spilke v. Wicklow, 138 Conn. App. 251, 270 , 53 A.3d 245 (2012) (filing of four amended complaints did not extinguish default where, ‘‘[a]lthough the complaints differed in some respects from the original complaint, the substan- tive allegations remained the same’’), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 945 , 60 A.3d 737 (2013); Willamette Management Associates, Inc. v. Palczynski, 134 Conn. App. 58,

2025Also, if the amendment interjects material new issues, the adversary is entitled to reasonable opportu- nity to meet them by pleading and proof.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 745 ; see also, e.g., Spilke v. Wicklow, 138 Conn. App. 251, 270 , 53 A.3d 245 (2012) (filing of four amended complaints did not extinguish default where, ‘‘[a]lthough the complaints differed in some respects from the original complaint, the substan- tive allegations remained the same’’), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 945 , 60 A.3d 737 (2013); Willamette Management Associates, Inc. v. Palczynski, 134 Conn. App. 58,

2022The plaintiff, in its appellate brief, does not address this apparent discrepancy. 9 The introductory clause of the lease defines Commerce Park as the ‘‘Landlord.’’ The parties do not appear to dispute that ‘‘Landlord’’ as used in paragraph 28 (b) means Commerce Park. 10 Quoting Atelier Constantin Popescu, LLC v. JC Corp., 134 Conn. App. 731, 757 , 49 A.3d 1003 (2012), in rendering judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on its negligence claim against Commerce Park, Judge Krumeich stated that ‘‘[t]here is no question that a duty of care may arise out of a contract, but when the claim is brought aga

2022The plaintiff, in its appellate brief, does not address this apparent discrepancy. 9 The introductory clause of the lease defines Commerce Park as the ‘‘Landlord.’’ The parties do not appear to dispute that ‘‘Landlord’’ as used in paragraph 28 (b) means Commerce Park. 10 Quoting Atelier Constantin Popescu, LLC v. JC Corp., 134 Conn. App. 731, 757 , 49 A.3d 1003 (2012), in rendering judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on its negligence claim against Commerce Park, Judge Krumeich stated that ‘‘[t]here is no question that a duty of care may arise out of a contract, but when the claim is brought aga

2012Defendant also cites as controlling law the case of Shore v. Haverson Architecture & Design, P.C., 92 Conn. App. 469 , 886 A.2d 837 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 907 , 894 A.2d 988 (2006).

2012Defendant also cites as controlling law the case of Shore v. Haverson Architecture & Design, P.C., 92 Conn. App. 469 , 886 A.2d 837 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 907 , 894 A.2d 988 (2006).

2012Defendant also cites as controlling law the case of Shore v. Haverson Architecture & Design, P.C., 92 Conn. App. 469 , 886 A.2d 837 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 907 , 894 A.2d 988 (2006).

2012Defendant also cites as controlling law the case of Shore v. Haverson Architecture & Design, P.C., 92 Conn. App. 469 , 886 A.2d 837 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 907 , 894 A.2d 988 (2006).

2011Defense counsel corrected a typographical error and then stated that “the only thing else I’d like to say is that to the extent that the court’s final charge differs from the defendant’s request to charge we take exception.” Our resolution of the defendant’s instructional claims turns on our recent decision in State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 , 10 A.3d 942 (2011).

2011Defense counsel corrected a typographical error and then stated that "the only thing else I'd like to say is that to the extent that the court's final charge differs from the defendant's request to charge we take exception." Our resolution of the defendant's instructional claims turns on our recent decision in State v. Kitchens, 299 *677 Conn. at 447, 10 A.3d 942 (2011).

2009Id., 175 .

2004In Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240 , 492 A.2d 159 (1985), our Supreme Court stated that “to set aside a judgment passed upon default [pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212], there must be a showing that: (1) a good defense existed at the time judgment was rendered; and (2) the party seeking to set aside the judgment was prevented from [prosecuting or] appearing because of mistake, accident, or other reasonable cause.” The plaintiffs principal argument, both in its objection to the defendants’ motion to open and in its appellate

2004In Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240 , 492 A.2d 159 (1985), our Supreme Court stated that “to set aside a judgment passed upon default [pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212], there must be a showing that: (1) a good defense existed at the time judgment was rendered; and (2) the party seeking to set aside the judgment was prevented from [prosecuting or] appearing because of mistake, accident, or other reasonable cause.” The plaintiffs principal argument, both in its objection to the defendants’ motion to open and in its appellate

2001"It is, after all, the facts alleged which determine the cause of action, and not the nomenclature employed." Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Chung , 37 Conn. Sup. 587 , 595 , 429 A.2d 158 (App. Sess. 1981).

2001"It is, after all, the facts alleged which determine the cause of action, and not the nomenclature employed." Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Chung , 37 Conn. Sup. 587 , 595 , 429 A.2d 158 (App. Sess. 1981).

1996In accordance with Concept Associates, Ltd., v. Board of Tax Review, 229 Conn. 618 (1994) the court grants leave to amend the complaint and denies defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

1993An estoppel claim is "predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." (Citations omitted.) Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Dubno, 204 Conn. 137 , 148 , 527 A.2d 679 (1987), quoting Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982). "[E]stoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1

1993An estoppel claim is "predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." (Citations omitted.) Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Dubno, 204 Conn. 137 , 148 , 527 A.2d 679 (1987), quoting Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982). "[E]stoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1

1993An estoppel claim is "predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." (Citations omitted.) Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Dubno, 204 Conn. 137 , 148 , 527 A.2d 679 (1987), quoting Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982). "[E]stoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1

1993An estoppel claim is "predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." (Citations omitted.) Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Dubno, 204 Conn. 137 , 148 , 527 A.2d 679 (1987), quoting Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982). "[E]stoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1

1992The defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff's request to amend on the ground that the "defect sought to be amended is more than a typographical error and the amendment is untimely." In the course of the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff argued that typographical errors of this kind frequently occur at the close of the current year and the beginning of the new year and can therefore be properly characterized as "circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects" within the meaning of 52-123 , which provides that no such "writ, pleading, judgment or any kind of proceeding in court . . . shall

1992The defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff's request to amend on the ground that the "defect sought to be amended is more than a typographical error and the amendment is untimely." In the course of the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff argued that typographical errors of this kind frequently occur at the close of the current year and the beginning of the new year and can therefore be properly characterized as "circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects" within the meaning of 52-123 , which provides that no such "writ, pleading, judgment or any kind of proceeding in court . . . shall

1988We observe that when defense counsel, actually present in the courtroom at the time of a claimed error, fails to object and except, we may presume that he did not view the allegedly objectionable language to be as egregious as appellate counsel now urges; nor did he view the error as so prejudicial that his client’s right to a fair trial was seriously jeopardized. 5 State v. Lubesky, 195 Conn. 475, 484 , 488 A.2d 1239 (1985).

1988We observe that when defense counsel, actually present in the courtroom at the time of a claimed error, fails to object and except, we may presume that he did not view the allegedly objectionable language to be as egregious as appellate counsel now urges; nor did he view the error as so prejudicial that his client’s right to a fair trial was seriously jeopardized. 5 State v. Lubesky, 195 Conn. 475, 484 , 488 A.2d 1239 (1985).

1988We must, however, “consider only the information that was actually before the issuing judge at the time he or she signed the warrant.” State v. Delmonaco, 194 Conn. 331, 337 , 481 A.2d 40 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 , 105 S. Ct. 511 , 83 L.

1988We must, however, “consider only the information that was actually before the issuing judge at the time he or she signed the warrant.” State v. Delmonaco, 194 Conn. 331, 337 , 481 A.2d 40 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 , 105 S. Ct. 511 , 83 L.

1988We must, however, “consider only the information that was actually before the issuing judge at the time he or she signed the warrant.” State v. Delmonaco, 194 Conn. 331, 337 , 481 A.2d 40 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 , 105 S. Ct. 511 , 83 L.

1988We must, however, “consider only the information that was actually before the issuing judge at the time he or she signed the warrant.” State v. Delmonaco, 194 Conn. 331, 337 , 481 A.2d 40 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 , 105 S. Ct. 511 , 83 L.

1988We must, however, “consider only the information that was actually before the issuing judge at the time he or she signed the warrant.” State v. Delmonaco, 194 Conn. 331, 337 , 481 A.2d 40 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 , 105 S. Ct. 511 , 83 L.

1985State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 17 , 480 A.2d 489 (1984); Allied Plywood, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 506, 509 , 480 A.2d 584 (1984).

1985State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 17 , 480 A.2d 489 (1984); Allied Plywood, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 506, 509 , 480 A.2d 584 (1984).

1985State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 17 , 480 A.2d 489 (1984); Allied Plywood, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 506, 509 , 480 A.2d 584 (1984).

1985State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 17 , 480 A.2d 489 (1984); Allied Plywood, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 506, 509 , 480 A.2d 584 (1984).