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20 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cochrell v. Hiattgreen2 sentences1995A review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law leaves no doubt that the conclusion stating that Worker’s claim “is barred” was purely a typographical error, and we read it as if written “is not barred.” See Cochrell v. Hiatt, 97 N.M. 256, 257-58 , 638 P.2d 1101, 1102-03 (Ct.App.1981) (error can be corrected with leave of appellate court). 1995A review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law leaves no doubt that the conclusion stating that Worker’s claim “is barred” was purely a typographical error, and we read it as if written “is not barred.” See Cochrell v. Hiatt, 97 N.M. 256, 257-58 , 638 P.2d 1101, 1102-03 (Ct.App.1981) (error can be corrected with leave of appellate court). | 2 | 2 |
New Mexico Glycerin Co. v. Gallegosgreen2 sentences2000See New Mexico Glycerin Co. v. Gallegos, 48 N.M. 65 , 145 P.2d 995 (1944) (construing substitution of "of” for "or” as "patently a typographical error”); see also State ex rel. 2000See New Mexico Glycerin Co. v. Gallegos, 48 N.M. 65 , 145 P.2d 995 (1944) (construing substitution of "of” for "or” as "patently a typographical error”); see also State ex rel. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Pickettgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Pickett, 2009-NMCA-077, ¶¶ 10-14 , 146 N.M. 655 , 213 P.3d 805 (holding that the defendant’s BAC results of .07 and .08 were relevant to the defendant’s DWI (impaired to the slightest degree) charge to establish consumption of alcohol). {8} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm, and we remand to correct the typographical error discussed above. {9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 2022See State v. Pickett, 2009-NMCA-077, ¶¶ 10-14 , 146 N.M. 655 , 213 P.3d 805 (holding that the defendant’s BAC results of .07 and .08 were relevant to the defendant’s DWI (impaired to the slightest degree) charge to establish consumption of alcohol). {8} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm, and we remand to correct the typographical error discussed above. {9} IT IS SO ORDERED. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Aragongreen2 sentences2020See State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 19 , 127 N.M. 393 , 981 P.2d 1211 . instead of a jury trial. 2020See State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 19 , 127 N.M. 393 , 981 P.2d 1211 . instead of a jury trial. | 1 | 1 |
Associated Home & RV Sales, Inc. v. Bank of Belengreen1 sentence2018See Curry, 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28 . 12 {8} Lastly, in response to this Court’s proposal to conclude that the Luceros failed 13 to meet their burden to defeat summary judgment, they argue that they had previously 14 filed a motion to dismiss but were never afforded a hearing at which to present 15 evidence of the specific evidentiary facts at issue. [MIO 10-11] Regardless, as the 16 party opposing summary judgment, the Luceros had the burden of “mak[ing] an 17 affirmative showing by affidavit or other admissible evidence that there is a genuine 18 issue of material fact once a prima facie showing | 1 | 1 |
Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co.green2 sentences2018Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28 , 320 18 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume 19 no such authority exists.”). 6 1 {7} Third, the Luceros contend that the 2009 assignment of mortgage is legally void 2 because “IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB” is a separate, unknown entity from “IndyMac 3 Bank, FSB” and “IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB” is not identified in the previous 4 mortgage assignment nor on the original note or mortgage, and identifies an incorrect 5 date of July 6, 2007, as the date the mortgage was recorded. [MIO 8-9] While there 6 is a typographical error in 2018See Curry, 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28 . 12 {8} Lastly, in response to this Court’s proposal to conclude that the Luceros failed 13 to meet their burden to defeat summary judgment, they argue that they had previously 14 filed a motion to dismiss but were never afforded a hearing at which to present 15 evidence of the specific evidentiary facts at issue. [MIO 10-11] Regardless, as the 16 party opposing summary judgment, the Luceros had the burden of “mak[ing] an 17 affirmative showing by affidavit or other admissible evidence that there is a genuine 18 issue of material fact once a prima facie showing | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2015See State 7 v. Sisneros, 1982-NMSC-068 , ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 201 , 647 P.2d 403 (“The opposing party 8 to summary disposition must come forward and specifically point out errors in fact 9 and in law.”). 10 Sufficiency of the Evidence 11 {4} Defendant continues to argue that insufficient evidence was presented to 12 support any of his convictions, pursuant to Franklin and Boyer. [MIO 6] Our notice 13 detailed the evidence presented in support of each of Defendant’s convictions. [CN 14 3–10] In response, Defendant’s memorandum in opposition asks this Court to reweigh 15 the evidence presented [MIO 7] a 2015See State 7 v. Sisneros, 1982-NMSC-068 , ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 201 , 647 P.2d 403 (“The opposing party 8 to summary disposition must come forward and specifically point out errors in fact 9 and in law.”). 10 Sufficiency of the Evidence 11 {4} Defendant continues to argue that insufficient evidence was presented to 12 support any of his convictions, pursuant to Franklin and Boyer. [MIO 6] Our notice 13 detailed the evidence presented in support of each of Defendant’s convictions. [CN 14 3–10] In response, Defendant’s memorandum in opposition asks this Court to reweigh 15 the evidence presented [MIO 7] a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sisnerosgreen2 sentences2015See State 7 v. Sisneros, 1982-NMSC-068 , ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 201 , 647 P.2d 403 (“The opposing party 8 to summary disposition must come forward and specifically point out errors in fact 9 and in law.”). 10 Sufficiency of the Evidence 11 {4} Defendant continues to argue that insufficient evidence was presented to 12 support any of his convictions, pursuant to Franklin and Boyer. [MIO 6] Our notice 13 detailed the evidence presented in support of each of Defendant’s convictions. [CN 14 3–10] In response, Defendant’s memorandum in opposition asks this Court to reweigh 15 the evidence presented [MIO 7] a 2015See State 7 v. Sisneros, 1982-NMSC-068 , ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 201 , 647 P.2d 403 (“The opposing party 8 to summary disposition must come forward and specifically point out errors in fact 9 and in law.”). 10 Sufficiency of the Evidence 11 {4} Defendant continues to argue that insufficient evidence was presented to 12 support any of his convictions, pursuant to Franklin and Boyer. [MIO 6] Our notice 13 detailed the evidence presented in support of each of Defendant’s convictions. [CN 14 3–10] In response, Defendant’s memorandum in opposition asks this Court to reweigh 15 the evidence presented [MIO 7] a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Foxengreen2 sentences2015See State 7 v. Sisneros, 1982-NMSC-068 , ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 201 , 647 P.2d 403 (“The opposing party 8 to summary disposition must come forward and specifically point out errors in fact 9 and in law.”). 10 Sufficiency of the Evidence 11 {4} Defendant continues to argue that insufficient evidence was presented to 12 support any of his convictions, pursuant to Franklin and Boyer. [MIO 6] Our notice 13 detailed the evidence presented in support of each of Defendant’s convictions. [CN 14 3–10] In response, Defendant’s memorandum in opposition asks this Court to reweigh 15 the evidence presented [MIO 7] a 2015See State 7 v. Sisneros, 1982-NMSC-068 , ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 201 , 647 P.2d 403 (“The opposing party 8 to summary disposition must come forward and specifically point out errors in fact 9 and in law.”). 10 Sufficiency of the Evidence 11 {4} Defendant continues to argue that insufficient evidence was presented to 12 support any of his convictions, pursuant to Franklin and Boyer. [MIO 6] Our notice 13 detailed the evidence presented in support of each of Defendant’s convictions. [CN 14 3–10] In response, Defendant’s memorandum in opposition asks this Court to reweigh 15 the evidence presented [MIO 7] a | 1 | 1 |
Newsome v. Farergreen1 sentence2009(We note that this Court’s calendar 5 notice contained a typographical error in that it provided the time period ran on 6 March 20, 2009.) Respondent did not file her notice of appeal until April 1, 2009. 7 To the extent Respondent seeks to have this Court consider her appeal based 8 on misinformation received from the district court clerk, we note that pro se 9 litigants are held to the “same standard of conduct and compliance with court rules, 10 procedures, and orders as are members of the bar.” Newsome v. Farer, 103 N.M. 11 415, 419, 708 P.2d 327, 331 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Helman v. Gallegosgreen2 sentences2000Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353 , 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994) (noting with approval rule that typographical errors in a statute may be disregarded so that statute may be interpreted in manner that elucidates true meaning). 2 . 2000Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353 , 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994) (noting with approval rule that typographical errors in a statute may be disregarded so that statute may be interpreted in manner that elucidates true meaning). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lucero
green
2 sentences2022The State relies on State v. Lucero, 1968-NMCA-021 , ¶¶ 6-7, 79 N.M. 131 , 440 P.2d 806 , where a change in the address given was held to be the correction of an error that did not prejudice the defendant, and was therefore permissible. 2022The State relies on State v. Lucero, 1968-NMCA-021 , ¶¶ 6-7, 79 N.M. 131 , 440 P.2d 806 , where a change in the address given was held to be the correction of an error that did not prejudice the defendant, and was therefore permissible. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2015Count 5: False Imprisonment, NMSA 1978[, § 30-4-3 (1963)], a fourth degree 13 felony[,]” was a typographical error. [RP 304] We remand to the district court for 14 correction of the judgment and sentence. 15 Arraignment 16 {3} Defendant continues to argue that his rights to due process and fair trial were 17 denied when he was not arraigned on the charge in the second superceding grand jury 18 indictment within fifteen days of the indictment. [MIO 6; DS 11] In support of his 19 continued contention, Defendant relies on State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151 , 78 20 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 , and Stat 2009Specifically, Defendant’s judgment and sentence reflects 13 a conviction under Section 66-8-102(A) (impaired to the slightest degree), instead of 14 Section 66-8-102(D) (aggravated, refusal). 15 Battery on a Peace Officer 16 Defendant contends, pursuant to State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127 , 483 P.2d 982 17 (1967), and State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. 655 , 712 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1985), that there was 18 insufficient evidence to support his conviction for battery on a peace officer. | 2 | 2009–2015 |
State v. Boyer
green
2 sentences2015Count 5: False Imprisonment, NMSA 1978[, § 30-4-3 (1963)], a fourth degree 13 felony[,]” was a typographical error. [RP 304] We remand to the district court for 14 correction of the judgment and sentence. 15 Arraignment 16 {3} Defendant continues to argue that his rights to due process and fair trial were 17 denied when he was not arraigned on the charge in the second superceding grand jury 18 indictment within fifteen days of the indictment. [MIO 6; DS 11] In support of his 19 continued contention, Defendant relies on State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151 , 78 20 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 , and Stat 2009Specifically, Defendant’s judgment and sentence reflects 13 a conviction under Section 66-8-102(A) (impaired to the slightest degree), instead of 14 Section 66-8-102(D) (aggravated, refusal). 15 Battery on a Peace Officer 16 Defendant contends, pursuant to State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127 , 483 P.2d 982 17 (1967), and State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. 655 , 712 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1985), that there was 18 insufficient evidence to support his conviction for battery on a peace officer. | 2 | 2009–2015 |
Matter of Herkenhoff
green
2 sentences1997We note that there is a typographical error at 119 N.M. at 234 , 889 P.2d at 842 . 1997We note that there is a typographical error at 119 N.M. at 234 , 889 P.2d at 842 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Hoyt v. State
green
1 sentence2022Remaining unpersuaded, we reverse. {2} Respondent contends that the district court made a typographical error in its order when it stated that Petitioner had failed to comply with “NMRA 1-0054 [sic].” Respondent posits that the district court intended to refer to Rule 1-004 NMRA, and thus denial of the petition was actually based on insufficient service of process under that rule. [MIO 4] We remain unpersuaded. {3} “Following the statutes and case law, an action for mandamus commences when a petition for a writ is filed.” Hoyt v. State, 2015-NMCA-108, ¶ 15 , 359 P.3d 147 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Chavez
green
2 sentences2020The State responds that there was sufficient evidence of child abuse as to D.F. because “Defendant’s conduct caused a substantial risk of harm to D.F. by shooting up his home during the murders.” The State asserts that the evidence must only show a “truly significant risk of serious harm” to the child, citing State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC- 035, ¶ 22, 146 N.M. 434 , 211 P.3d 891 . {53} “The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element ess 2020The State responds that there was sufficient evidence of child abuse as to D.F. because “Defendant’s conduct caused a substantial risk of harm to D.F. by shooting up his home during the murders.” The State asserts that the evidence must only show a “truly significant risk of serious harm” to the child, citing State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC- 035, ¶ 22, 146 N.M. 434 , 211 P.3d 891 . {53} “The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element ess | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Silva
green
2 sentences2020“Tampering with evidence is a specific intent crime, requiring sufficient evidence from which the jury can infer that the defendant acted with an intent to prevent apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person[.]” State v. Silva, 2008-NMSC- 051, ¶ 18, 144 N.M. 815 , 192 P.3d 1192 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2020“Tampering with evidence is a specific intent crime, requiring sufficient evidence from which the jury can infer that the defendant acted with an intent to prevent apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person[.]” State v. Silva, 2008-NMSC- 051, ¶ 18, 144 N.M. 815 , 192 P.3d 1192 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gildersleeve v. Industrial Accident Commission
neutral
1 sentence2015Count 5: False Imprisonment, NMSA 1978[, § 30-4-3 (1963)], a fourth degree 13 felony[,]” was a typographical error. [RP 304] We remand to the district court for 14 correction of the judgment and sentence. 15 Arraignment 16 {3} Defendant continues to argue that his rights to due process and fair trial were 17 denied when he was not arraigned on the charge in the second superceding grand jury 18 indictment within fifteen days of the indictment. [MIO 6; DS 11] In support of his 19 continued contention, Defendant relies on State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151 , 78 20 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 , and Stat | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wood v. Sloan
green
1 sentence2015Count 5: False Imprisonment, NMSA 1978[, § 30-4-3 (1963)], a fourth degree 13 felony[,]” was a typographical error. [RP 304] We remand to the district court for 14 correction of the judgment and sentence. 15 Arraignment 16 {3} Defendant continues to argue that his rights to due process and fair trial were 17 denied when he was not arraigned on the charge in the second superceding grand jury 18 indictment within fifteen days of the indictment. [MIO 6; DS 11] In support of his 19 continued contention, Defendant relies on State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151 , 78 20 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 , and Stat | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Haar
green
2 sentences2013VIGIL, Justice 1 Haar initially states that the cost of replacing the dishwasher was $100, but this figure appears to be a typographical error. 110 N.M. at 520 , 797 P.2d at 309 . 2013VIGIL, Justice 1 Haar initially states that the cost of replacing the dishwasher was $100, but this figure appears to be a typographical error. 110 N.M. at 520 , 797 P.2d at 309 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Matter of Hamilton
green
2 sentences1992Additionally, Gholson asserts thao the use of the word “intestate” in the notice of informal appointment of personal representative was “obviously” a typographical error and “an error by counsel.” She cites In re Will of Hamilton, 97 N.M. 111 , 637 P.2d 542 (1981), to support her argument that the evidence is insufficient. 1992Additionally, Gholson asserts thao the use of the word “intestate” in the notice of informal appointment of personal representative was “obviously” a typographical error and “an error by counsel.” She cites In re Will of Hamilton, 97 N.M. 111 , 637 P.2d 542 (1981), to support her argument that the evidence is insufficient. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.