typographical error in Texas

2015Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2012Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2013We conclude that the magistrate could have reasonably inferred that the reference to Daniel Gonzalez was merely a typographical error that did not invalidate the warrant. 9 See, e.g., Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tex. Crim.

2011Because these clerical errors are not the type of error that would invalidate an otherwise valid search warrant, we find that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion to suppress.4 Neither did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because the affidavit stated that "Salzido was asked to perform standard field sobriety drills." At the suppression hearing, Officer Jimenez testified that he asked Appellant to perform 4 See Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (upholding warrant because evidence showed affidavit dated January 6, 1977, i

2013See, e.g., Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 51, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (upholding warrant because evidence showed affidavit dated January 6, 1977, instead of January 6, 1978, was clearly a typographical error), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 19 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Lyons v. State, 503 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (affirming trial court's judgment that facial discrepancy due to incorrectly dated search warrant was cured by explanatory testimony of police officer requesting warrant); Martinez v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 356 , 285 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.Crim.App. 1

2013See, e.g., Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 51, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (upholding warrant because evidence showed affidavit dated January 6, 1977, instead of January 6, 1978, was clearly a typographical error), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 19 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Lyons v. State, 503 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (affirming trial court's judgment that facial discrepancy due to incorrectly dated search warrant was cured by explanatory testimony of police officer requesting warrant); Martinez v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 356 , 285 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.Crim.App. 1

2022See Green v. State, 799 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Champion v. State, 919 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (citing Green v. State, 799 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tex. Crim.

2013See, e.g., Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 51, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (upholding warrant because evidence showed affidavit dated January 6, 1977, instead of January 6, 1978, was clearly a typographical error), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 19 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Lyons v. State, 503 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (affirming trial court's judgment that facial discrepancy due to incorrectly dated search warrant was cured by explanatory testimony of police officer requesting warrant); Martinez v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 356 , 285 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.Crim.App. 1

2013See, e.g., Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 51, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (upholding warrant because evidence showed affidavit dated January 6, 1977, instead of January 6, 1978, was clearly a typographical error), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 19 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Lyons v. State, 503 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (affirming trial court's judgment that facial discrepancy due to incorrectly dated search warrant was cured by explanatory testimony of police officer requesting warrant); Martinez v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 356 , 285 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.Crim.App. 1

2013See, e.g., Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 51, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (upholding warrant because evidence showed affidavit dated January 6, 1977, instead of January 6, 1978, was clearly a typographical error), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 19 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Lyons v. State, 503 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (affirming trial court's judgment that facial discrepancy due to incorrectly dated search warrant was cured by explanatory testimony of police officer requesting warrant); Martinez v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 356 , 285 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.Crim.App. 1

2013See, e.g., Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 51, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (upholding warrant because evidence showed affidavit dated January 6, 1977, instead of January 6, 1978, was clearly a typographical error), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 19 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Lyons v. State, 503 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (affirming trial court's judgment that facial discrepancy due to incorrectly dated search warrant was cured by explanatory testimony of police officer requesting warrant); Martinez v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 356 , 285 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.Crim.App. 1

2007Patrick A. Pirtle Justice Do not publish.ant, the magistrate, in using a common-sense approach, could reasonably have concluded that the word “for” was a typographical error and that the word intended was “from.” See Olivarri v. State , 838 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.).

2003Given the context of and purpose for the statement being made in the probable cause affidavit as a whole, the possible typographical error in the affidavit wherein the affiant sets out that he has received credible information in the past "for" the informant, the magistrate, in using a common-sense approach, could reasonably have concluded that the word "for" was a typographical error and that the word intended was "from." See Olivarri v. State , 838 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.).

2007This allows for amendments to correct mistakes or accidents, such as inadvertently omitting one of the statements required by Rule 25.1(d), see Lefton v. Griffith, 136 S.W.3d 271 , 274 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.), or correcting a typographical error, see City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex.1992) (comparing notices of appeal in two different cases, court contrasted one notice’s typographical error in cause number of isolated case, which was amendable defect, with another notice’s citation of wrong cause number in case that had multiple cause numbers involvin

2007This allows for amendments to correct mistakes or accidents, such as inadvertently omitting one of the statements required by Rule 25.1(d), see Lefton v. Griffith , 136 S.W.3d 271 , 274 n.1 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2004, no pet.), or correcting a typographical error, see City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez , 828 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. 1992) (comparing notices of appeal in two different cases, court contrasted one notice's typographical error in cause number of isolated case, which was amendable defect, with another notice's citation of wrong cause number in case that had multiple cause numbers invo

2011Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 505 (stating that courts need not resort to extrinsic aids in construing an unambiguous statute and that courts must find the legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute).

2011Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 505 (stating that courts need not resort to extrinsic aids in construing an unambiguous statute and that courts must find the legislature's intent as expressed in the language of the statute).

2015Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2012Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2015Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2012Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2015Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2012Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2009See Batjet, Inc. v. Jackson, 161 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (holding that the use of the word “client” instead of “clients” in a rule 11 agreement letter was not dispositive of the intention that multiple defendants be bound to a settlement agreement); City of Galveston v. Galveston Mun.

2009See Batjet, Inc. v. Jackson , 161 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (holding that the use of the word “client” instead of “clients” in a rule 11 agreement letter was not dispositive of the intention that multiple defendants be bound to a settlement agreement); City of Galveston v. Galveston Mun.

2024Further, the presence of the correct mental states in the self-defense and murder portions of the charge as well as the simplicity of the error (a one-word omission) likely keyed the jury to conclude that “the inconsistency was the result of a typographical error.” See id.

2016See id.

2024Co., 642 S.W.3d 551 , 553 n.1 (Tex. 2022) (identifying “a typographical error in the certified question” from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 , 428 n.1 (Tex. 1998) (inserting the word “not” into a statute when otherwise the “literal reading of the statute is patently absurd” and “the obvious legislative intent” was that the Legislature meant to include the “not”); Villareal v. Steve’s & Sons Doors, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (concluding that the listed effective date of a statute “contain

2005See Reyes, 134 S.W.3d at 192 ; Villareal v. Steve’s and Sons Doors, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.)(noting the typographical error in the applicable effective date in Reyes).

2024Co., 642 S.W.3d 551 , 553 n.1 (Tex. 2022) (identifying “a typographical error in the certified question” from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 , 428 n.1 (Tex. 1998) (inserting the word “not” into a statute when otherwise the “literal reading of the statute is patently absurd” and “the obvious legislative intent” was that the Legislature meant to include the “not”); Villareal v. Steve’s & Sons Doors, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (concluding that the listed effective date of a statute “contain

2005See Reyes, 134 S.W.3d at 192 ; Villareal v. Steve’s and Sons Doors, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.)(noting the typographical error in the applicable effective date in Reyes).

2024See Berthelot, 322 S.W.3d at 368 , 8 The Berthelot opinion appears to contain a typographical error because it states in one place that the sheriff sold to Berthelot “all the right, title[,] and interest which the said Virginia Brinkmann held on the 1st day of February . . . 1984,” but that would precede the date of the 1993 judgment—the judgment that prompted the sale. 322 S.W.3d at 368 .

2024See Berthelot, 322 S.W.3d at 368 , 8 The Berthelot opinion appears to contain a typographical error because it states in one place that the sheriff sold to Berthelot “all the right, title[,] and interest which the said Virginia Brinkmann held on the 1st day of February . . . 1984,” but that would precede the date of the 1993 judgment—the judgment that prompted the sale. 322 S.W.3d at 368 .

2023This Court has held in a similar circumstance that “a verdict should not be reversed based on a typographical error if the error is susceptible to commonsense detection by the jury.” Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC, 549 S.W.3d 256, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. dism’d) (quotation omitted).

2021See Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC, 549 S.W.3d 256, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. dism’d) (noting that a “verdict should not be reversed based on a typographical error if the error is susceptible to commonsense detection by the jury”). c.

2018Bradford v. Vento , 997 S.W.2d 713 , 730 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999), rev'd in part on other grounds , 48 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001) ; see also Miller v. State , 846 S.W.2d 513 , 514-15 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, pet. ref'd) (holding that charge authorized jury to convict defendant of credit card offense even though charge was missing zero on card number where omission was most likely due to typographical error).

1999See Miller v. State, 846 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, pet. ref'd) (conviction should not be reversed because of typographical error in the jury charge); see also Fain v. State, 688 S.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1985, aff'd 725 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)) (typographical error in jury charge susceptible to lay, common sense correction not grounds for reversal).

2015Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2012Agency, 923 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [8] See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011); Alex Sheshunoff Management Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 , 651-52 & n. 4 (Tex.2006). [9] See Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999) (holding that, although Texas Government Code section 311.023 states that courts may consider the legislative history of unambiguous statutes, the legislative history of a statute cannot be used to alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute, except for the rare

2021See Falk & Fish, LLP, 317 S.W.3d at 527-28 .

2018The court reasoned that due to a typographical error, the forum-selection clause was not “clear and unequivocal.” Id. at 528 .

2015Guerra further contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a deadly weapon finding because there is no evidence that “the tape (or other object)” facilitated the kidnapping. –17– Guerra relies on Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855 , 859–60 (Tex. Crim.

2015Guerra further contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a deadly weapon finding because there is no evidence that "the tape (or other object)" facilitated the kidnapping. -17- Guerra relies oh Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855, 859-60 (Tex. Crim.

2020The return, however, also stated “Came to hand on the 30th day of November, 1986.” The Fifth Court of Appeals stated, “When we examine the record and the sequence of events which occurred, it becomes obvious that the month of ‘November’ following ‘Came to hand’ is a typographical error.” Id.

2020The court held that “no reasonable interpretation can be placed upon it, other than that it shows a receipt by the district clerk on October 30, 1986.” Id.

2015App. 1991); Cisneros v. State, 7 See Leal, 456 S.W.3d at 568 . 290 S.W.3d 457, 462-63 (Tex. App.--Houston 8 See Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 882 . [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. dism'd); Vicknair v. State, 670 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Tim eliness Dist.] 1983), aff'd, 751 S.W.2d 180, 187-90 (Tex. Crim.

2015The motion contains no Eighth Amendment arguments, and the odd reference appears to be a typographical error. 7 See Leal, 456 S.W.3d at 568 . 8 See Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 882 . 3 Timeliness The record shows the following chronology of events relevant to the preservation-of-error analysis: At the time of the hearing, the only live motion pending before the trial court was the amended motion to suppress. 9 The moment appellant filed the amended motion, the original motion ceased to exist.

2015Investigator Wallace testified that he had intended for that date to read September 20, 2011, 5 and that he had based the affidavit on the September 20, 2011 events-the "knock and talk" at Parks's residence, the 4 Cf. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18 ("The government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").

2014Investigator Wallace testified that he had intended for that date to read September 20, 2011,5 and that he had based the affidavit on the September 20, 2011 events—the “knock and talk” at Parks’s residence, the 4 Cf. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (“The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).