22 Louisiana opinions name it 3 courts 1952–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2009In contrast, plaintiffs rely on Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Phillips, 415 So.2d 973, 975 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982), which found that "the intentional, knowledgeable filing of suit in the wrong venue is an unfair trade practice within the contemplation of R.S. 51:1401" to show that intentional use of the judicial process to harass a party can be an unfair trade practice in violation of the Act. 2005In contrast, plaintiffs rely on Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Phillips, 415 So.2d 973, 975 (La.App. 4 Cir.1982), which found that "the intentional, knowledgeable filing of suit in the wrong venue is an unfair trade practice within the contemplation of R.S. 51:1401" to show that intentional use of the judicial process to harass a party can be an unfair trade practice in violation of the Act. | 2 | 2 |
State ex rel. Lawson v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See State v. Foster, 96-0670, (La.6/28/96), 675 So.2d 1101, 1102 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2016See State v. Thomas, 13-0816, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/19/14), 138 So.3d 92, 96 . 4 By way of illustration, one ground for interruption of the statutory two-year period is provided in Article 579 A(2): “[t]he defendant cannot be tried because of ... any other cause beyond the control of the state[.]” We have previously found that a defendant’s ongoing participation in the Orleans Parish district attorney’s pre-trial diversion program prevented the prosecution from commencing trial which was beyond the state’s control, and thus sufficed for interruption of the limitations period. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2016See State v. Brown, 15-2001, pp. 3-4 (La. 2/19/16), 184 So.3d 1265, 1267-68 , | 1 | 1 |
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C.green1 sentence2009We note that in Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000), the court stated that they "cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but on the other hand, deny arbitration's applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.” 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Gulf Corp. v. Bd. of Ethics for Public Employeesgreen1 sentence2000Employees, 96-1907, pp. 5-6 (La.5/9/97), 694 So.2d 173, 175-76 (deciding that under La. | 1 | 1 |
Jarman v. Jarmangreen1 sentence1992See, Jarman v. Jarman, 540 So.2d 444 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bellgreen2 sentences1991See also State v. Davis, 555 So.2d 633 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), writ granted 561 So.2d 108 (1990), affirmed in part and reversed in part, State v. Bell, 566 So.2d 959 (La.1990). *140 Applying the Brown standard to the facts of this case, it is clear that the third prong of the "plain view" exception has been met. 1991See also State v. Davis, 555 So.2d 633 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), writ granted 561 So.2d 108 (1990), affirmed in part and reversed in part, State v. Bell, 566 So.2d 959 (La.1990). *140 Applying the Brown standard to the facts of this case, it is clear that the third prong of the "plain view" exception has been met. | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. State, Department of Corrections Director, Warden of Angolagreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences1991Hall , at 499. 1991Hall , at 499. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Caldwellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alessi v. Town of Independencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
First National Bank of Commerce v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences2009The appellate court dismissed Brown's claim for damages and attorney fees, stating that La.R.S. 51:1409 "does not concern itself with filing suit in a court of improper venue." 525 So.2d at 674 . 2005The appellate court dismissed Brown's claim for damages and attorney fees, stating that La.R.S. 51:1409 "does not concern itself with filing suit in a court of improper venue." 525 So.2d at 674 . | 2 | 2005–2009 |
Wiles v. Wiles
green
1 sentence2023Although Mr. Brown’s motion for appeal only seeks review of the May 31, 2022 judgment denying his motion for new trial, this Court has “consistently considered an appeal of the denial of a motion for new trial as an appeal of the judgment on the merits, when…it is clear from the appellant’s brief that the intent is to appeal the merits of the case.” Wiles v. Wiles, 2015-1302, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/18/16), 193 So.3d 397, 398 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Tate
red
1 sentence2020On May 1, 2015, the trial court denied Mr. Brown’s motion, relying on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , but noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in State v. Montgomery, 13-1163 (La. 6/20/14), 141 So.3d 264 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Collins
green
1 sentence2020On May 1, 2015, the trial court denied Mr. Brown’s motion, relying on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , but noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in State v. Montgomery, 13-1163 (La. 6/20/14), 141 So.3d 264 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Brown v. Drillers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Brown , 630 So.2d at 752 . 2018Brown , 630 So.2d at 752 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2016See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) (“An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.”); State v. Taylor, 93-2201 at pp. 4-7, 669 So.2d at 367-69 . 2016See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) (“An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.”); State v. Taylor, 93-2201 at pp. 4-7, 669 So.2d at 367-69 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2016After the district court granted Brown’s motion pursuant to Graham and amended all his sentences to delete the parole eligibility restrictions, we found the issue was “whether, and to what extent” Graham applied in a case in which a juvenile offender has “committed multiple offenses resulting in cumulative sentences matching or exceeding his life expectancy without the opportunity [for] ... parole.” Brown , 12-0872, p. 5, 118 So.3d at 335 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Legendre
green
1 sentence2015WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED . 362 So.2d 570 (La.1978). . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Serpas
green
1 sentence2014Brown v. Serpas, 12-1308 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/20/13) , 112 So.3d 385 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Barnett
neutral
2 sentences2013Substantive deficiency — the merits Recently, in State v. Barnett, 12-816 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13) , 118 So.3d 1156 , 2013 WL 2121928 , the defendant raised a nearly identical theoretical argument on appeal after the responsive verdict of attempted aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon was rendered at his trial. 6 The defendant argued that the verdict was not legally responsive. 2013Substantive deficiency — the merits Recently, in State v. Barnett, 12-816 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13) , 118 So.3d 1156 , 2013 WL 2121928 , the defendant raised a nearly identical theoretical argument on appeal after the responsive verdict of attempted aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon was rendered at his trial. 6 The defendant argued that the verdict was not legally responsive. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Bradley
neutral
1 sentence2012State v. Hayes, 10-1538, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/1/11), 75 So.3d 8, 12 , writ denied, 11-2144 (La.3/2/12), 83 So.3d 1043 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hayes
green
1 sentence2012State v. Hayes, 10-1538, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/1/11), 75 So.3d 8, 12 , writ denied, 11-2144 (La.3/2/12), 83 So.3d 1043 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Whitney Nat. Bank v. FWF, INC.
neutral
1 sentence2000However, none of these arguments were asserted in opposition to Mr. Brown's motion in the court below, nor was TRSL given notice of Ms. Harrell's challenges to the agency's rules and regulations. [7] Under Rule 1-3 of the Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, this court cannot consider an argument not raised in the trial court "unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise." See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. F.W.F., Inc., 93-1152, p. 2, n. 1 (La.App. 4th Cir.3/29/94), 635 So.2d 361, 363 , writ denied, 94-1546 (La.9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1301 , and cases cited therein; see also Georgia Gulf Corp. v. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Adams v. Lammon
neutral
1 sentence2000However, none of these arguments were asserted in opposition to Mr. Brown's motion in the court below, nor was TRSL given notice of Ms. Harrell's challenges to the agency's rules and regulations. [7] Under Rule 1-3 of the Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, this court cannot consider an argument not raised in the trial court "unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise." See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. F.W.F., Inc., 93-1152, p. 2, n. 1 (La.App. 4th Cir.3/29/94), 635 So.2d 361, 363 , writ denied, 94-1546 (La.9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1301 , and cases cited therein; see also Georgia Gulf Corp. v. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Miller v. Poimboeuf
green
2 sentences1999The court in Miller v. Poimboeuf , 514 So.2d 484 (La.App. 3 rd Cir. 1987), in applying the Brown test, expounded on its application. 1999The court in Miller v. Poimboeuf , 514 So.2d 484 (La.App. 3 rd Cir. 1987), in applying the Brown test, expounded on its application. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1998Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 , 95 S.Ct. at 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 427 ; State v. Scott, 389 So.2d at 1288. 1998Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 , 95 S.Ct. at 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 427 ; State v. Scott, 389 So.2d at 1288. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Laughlin v. Breaux
green
1 sentence1992As in Brown, supra, we find the court of appeal's reliance on Laughlin, supra, [12] to find each incident of harassment alleged by Ms. Bustamento constitutes a separate tort is misplaced. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Brown v. Vaughn
green
1 sentence1992Ms. Brown's claim was based upon LSA-R.S. 23:1006, the Louisiana anti-discrimination statute, which prohibits intentional job discrimination. [9] As expounded in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 , 106 S.Ct. 2399 , 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), there are two types of sexual harassment in the workplace: (1) quid pro quo harassment, which consists of employment or economic favors given in exchange for sexual favors; and (2) hostile environment harassment, which consists of verbal or physical conduct that has the effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. 589 So. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
green
2 sentences1992Ms. Brown's claim was based upon LSA-R.S. 23:1006, the Louisiana anti-discrimination statute, which prohibits intentional job discrimination. [9] As expounded in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 , 106 S.Ct. 2399 , 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), there are two types of sexual harassment in the workplace: (1) quid pro quo harassment, which consists of employment or economic favors given in exchange for sexual favors; and (2) hostile environment harassment, which consists of verbal or physical conduct that has the effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. 589 So. 1992Ms. Brown's claim was based upon LSA-R.S. 23:1006, the Louisiana anti-discrimination statute, which prohibits intentional job discrimination. [9] As expounded in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 , 106 S.Ct. 2399 , 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), there are two types of sexual harassment in the workplace: (1) quid pro quo harassment, which consists of employment or economic favors given in exchange for sexual favors; and (2) hostile environment harassment, which consists of verbal or physical conduct that has the effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. 589 So. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. LaBranch neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| EAGLE PLUMBING, HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, INC. v. Ragusa green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.