Brown error in California

1998First, the court did not give the “unadorned” Brown instruction (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 538-544 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 709 P.2d 440 ]), which might mislead the jury as to the scope of its sentencing discretion and responsibility. {People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 317; see People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544 , fh. 17.) Second, the instructions adequately performed the constitutional function of guiding the jury’s discretion in sentencing. {People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In this case, the court gave similar instructions that told the jury “it could r

1998First, the court did not give the “unadorned” Brown instruction (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 538-544 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 709 P.2d 440 ]), which might mislead the jury as to the scope of its sentencing discretion and responsibility. {People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 317; see People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544 , fh. 17.) Second, the instructions adequately performed the constitutional function of guiding the jury’s discretion in sentencing. {People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In this case, the court gave similar instructions that told the jury “it could r

2016(People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ] (Brown); see People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 961 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 ] [“ ‘Brown’s “reasonable possibility” standard and Chapman’s “reasonable doubt” test... are the same in substance and effect.’ ”].) Applying the Brown standard, we see no reasonable possibility defendant would have received a more favorable result in this proceeding, even assuming an adequate record would have enabled us to conclude the trial court improperly failed to disclose material responsive to defendant’s Pit

2016(People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ] (Brown); see People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 961 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 ] [“ ‘Brown’s “reasonable possibility” standard and Chapman’s “reasonable doubt” test... are the same in substance and effect.’ ”].) Applying the Brown standard, we see no reasonable possibility defendant would have received a more favorable result in this proceeding, even assuming an adequate record would have enabled us to conclude the trial court improperly failed to disclose material responsive to defendant’s Pit

2021The prosecution later filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s orders on the motions for continuance and for suppression of evidence, stating the People 1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. were unable to proceed with the case and, therefore, the trial court lacked authority to deny their motion for a continuance of the suppression motion under People v. Ferrer (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 873, 877 (Ferrer).

2021The prosecution later filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s orders on the motions for continuance and for suppression of evidence, stating the People 1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. were unable to proceed with the case and, therefore, the trial court lacked authority to deny their motion for a continuance of the suppression motion under People v. Ferrer (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 873, 877 (Ferrer).

1989As we concluded in People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 644 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 863 , 765 P.2d 70 ], "Given the guilt phase evidence and verdicts, it is not reasonably possible that the ` Davenport ' error misled the jury in their task of weighing the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Moreover, we have held that the impact of so-called " Davenport " error may be reduced where the jury fully understood the weighing function and the scope of its sentencing discretion and responsibilities. ( Id., at pp. 644-645; see People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 456; People v. Boyde (

1989As we concluded in People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 644 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 863 , 765 P.2d 70 ], "Given the guilt phase evidence and verdicts, it is not reasonably possible that the ` Davenport ' error misled the jury in their task of weighing the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Moreover, we have held that the impact of so-called " Davenport " error may be reduced where the jury fully understood the weighing function and the scope of its sentencing discretion and responsibilities. ( Id., at pp. 644-645; see People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 456; People v. Boyde (

1992Assuming “our traditional Brown analysis” is still necessary after Boyde (see People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1231, fn. 30), we find no legitimate basis for believing the jury was misled.

1992Assuming "our traditional Brown analysis" is still necessary after Boyde (see People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1231, fn. 30), we find no legitimate basis for believing the jury was misled.

1990(See Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1279 & fn. 38.) Defendant relies on two recent cases in which this court reversed penalty judgments for Brown error ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 , 760 P.2d 423 ]), but neither is persuasive.

1990(See Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1279 & fn. 38.) Defendant relies on two recent cases in which this court reversed penalty judgments for Brown error (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 227 , 760 P.2d 423 ]), but neither is persuasive.

2015(Ibid.) On appeal, the issue was “whether the existence of defendant’s outstanding arrest warrant—which was discovered after the unlawful traffic stop but before the search of his person or the vehicle—dissipated the taint of the illegal seizure and rendered suppression of the evidence seized unnecessary.” (Id. at p. 267.) The Brendlin court applied a three factor test derived from Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (the Brown factors) to determine whether the taint had been attenuated: “the temporal proximity of the unlawful seizure to the subsequent search of the defendant’s pers

2015(Ibid.) On appeal, the issue was “whether the existence of defendant’s outstanding arrest warrant—which was discovered after the unlawful traffic stop but before the search of his person or the vehicle—dissipated the taint of the illegal seizure and rendered suppression of the evidence seized unnecessary.” (Id. at p. 267.) The Brendlin court applied a three factor test derived from Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (the Brown factors) to determine whether the taint had been attenuated: “the temporal proximity of the unlawful seizure to the subsequent search of the defendant’s pers

2016Chief Romero can be held liable in his individual capacity ‘ “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation[;] or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” ’ ”); see Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378 (respondeat superior liability under section 1983 where supervisor was deliberately indifferent to misconduct of individual officers under him). 18 Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057 (officers brandishing shotguns while ma

2016Chief Romero can be held liable in his individual capacity ‘ “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation[;] or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” ’ ”); see Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378 (respondeat superior liability under section 1983 where supervisor was deliberately indifferent to misconduct of individual officers under him). 18 Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057 (officers brandishing shotguns while ma

2016Chief Romero can be held liable in his individual capacity ‘ “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation[;] or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” ’ ”); see Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378 (respondeat superior liability under section 1983 where supervisor was deliberately indifferent to misconduct of individual officers under him). 18 Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057 (officers brandishing shotguns while ma

2016Chief Romero can be held liable in his individual capacity ‘ “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation[;] or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” ’ ”); see Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378 (respondeat superior liability under section 1983 where supervisor was deliberately indifferent to misconduct of individual officers under him). 18 Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057 (officers brandishing shotguns while ma

2016Chief Romero can be held liable in his individual capacity ‘ “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation[;] or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” ’ ”); see Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378 (respondeat superior liability under section 1983 where supervisor was deliberately indifferent to misconduct of individual officers under him). 18 Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057 (officers brandishing shotguns while ma

2016Chief Romero can be held liable in his individual capacity ‘ “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation[;] or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” ’ ”); see Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378 (respondeat superior liability under section 1983 where supervisor was deliberately indifferent to misconduct of individual officers under him). 18 Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057 (officers brandishing shotguns while ma

2016Brown’s defense, which 17 Blankenhorn, supra, 485 F.3d at page 485 (“Blankenhorn also seeks to hold Chief Romero liable for Nguyen’s alleged use of excessive force in punching Blankenhorn during the arrest.

2016Brown’s defense, which 17 Blankenhorn, supra, 485 F.3d at page 485 (“Blankenhorn also seeks to hold Chief Romero liable for Nguyen’s alleged use of excessive force in punching Blankenhorn during the arrest.

2015(People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1133 , citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) Under either standard, we must reverse the judgment in this matter. 9 Here, the crux of Brown's defense was that he was provoked and responded by killing his mother.

1981We find ourselves unable to declare, in the light of the whole record and the other error we have found, that the Brigham error was harmless according to the criteria of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] (cert. den., 355 U.S. 846 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 55 , 78 S.Ct. 70 ]), and the state’s Constitution, article VI, section 13.

1999In recognizing the extent to which the majority rule pervades California precedents in both drug and nondrug cases, Brown clearly implied that knowledge is also a component of strict liability for failure to warn in cases other than prescription drug cases.’ (Id. at p. 1000; see also Vermeulen v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1192 , 1206 . . . [‘We ... do not interpret Brown’s analysis of the failure to warn issue to necessarily be limited to prescription drug cases.

1996In recognizing the extent to which the majority rule pervades California precedents in both drug and nondrug cases, Brown clearly implied that knowledge is also a component of strict liability for failure to warn in cases other than prescription drug cases.” (Id. at p. 1000; see also Vermeulen v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1206 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 805 ] [“We . . . do not interpret Brown’s analysis of the failure to warn issue to necessarily be limited to prescription drug cases.

1989Those convictions and findings should at least be vacated for Castro error. ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ].) The verdict of death should be set aside because of Deere error ( People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353 [ 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 ]) and also because of Brown error ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [ 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 , 709 P.2d 440 ], revd. on other grounds sub nom. *1047 California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 934 , 107 S.Ct. 837 ]).

1989Those convictions and findings should at least be vacated for Castro error. ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ].) The verdict of death should be set aside because of Deere error ( People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353 [ 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 ]) and also because of Brown error ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [ 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 , 709 P.2d 440 ], revd. on other grounds sub nom. *1047 California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 934 , 107 S.Ct. 837 ]).

2023Every attenuation case involves an improper search or seizure, but not every impropriety rises to the level of purposeful or flagrant illegality. ( Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 242–243; see Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 271 .) But as McWilliams emphasizes, here Officer Croucher’s basis to suspect McWilliams of violating the law was 4 Where neither of the first two Brown factors establishes sufficient attenuation, courts have held that evidence may be subject to suppression even absent flagrant or purposeful conduct.

2023Every attenuation case involves an improper search or seizure, but not every impropriety rises to the level of purposeful or flagrant illegality. ( Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 242–243; see Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 271 .) But as McWilliams emphasizes, here Officer Croucher’s basis to suspect McWilliams of violating the law was 4 Where neither of the first two Brown factors establishes sufficient attenuation, courts have held that evidence may be subject to suppression even absent flagrant or purposeful conduct.

2020(People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339 [involuntary confession claim based upon improper inducement forfeited for failure to object in trial court].) 7 “ ‘The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable.’ ” (People v. Duncan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1018 .) “The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792 .) Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient on its own to prove guilt b

1998We find no error. *344 “We have repeatedly held that a jury told it may sympathetically consider all mitigating evidence need not also be expressly instructed it may exercise ‘mercy.’ [Citations.]” {People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 840 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 , 897 P.2d 481 ]; see also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 163-164 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 , 833 P.2d 561 ].) Here, the trial court gave the standard instruction to take into account “any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspe

2019Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’ ”]; and see O’Connor v. City of Newark (2016) 440 F.3d 125, 127 [wrongful suspension and wrongful discipline are discrete acts]; Bass v. Joliet Public School District No. 86 (7th Cir. 2014) 746 F.3d 835, 839-840 [reassignment of duties and suspensions are discrete acts].) Even so assuming, we conclude that Brown’s claim based on the dumping suspension was timely.

2019Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice' "]; and see O'Connor v. City of Newark (2016) 440 F.3d 125 , 127 [wrongful suspension and wrongful discipline are discrete acts]; Bass v. Joliet Public School District No. 86 (7th Cir. 2014) 746 F.3d 835 , 839-840 [reassignment of duties and suspensions are discrete acts].) Even so assuming, we conclude that Brown's claim based on the dumping suspension was timely.

2019Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’ ”]; and see O’Connor v. City of Newark (2016) 440 F.3d 125, 127 [wrongful suspension and wrongful discipline are discrete acts]; Bass v. Joliet Public School District No. 86 (7th Cir. 2014) 746 F.3d 835, 839-840 [reassignment of duties and suspensions are discrete acts].) Even so assuming, we conclude that Brown’s claim based on the dumping suspension was timely.

2019Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice' "]; and see O'Connor v. City of Newark (2016) 440 F.3d 125 , 127 [wrongful suspension and wrongful discipline are discrete acts]; Bass v. Joliet Public School District No. 86 (7th Cir. 2014) 746 F.3d 835 , 839-840 [reassignment of duties and suspensions are discrete acts].) Even so assuming, we conclude that Brown's claim based on the dumping suspension was timely.

2018(See Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473 , 479, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 ["[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief"]; Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852 , 867, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ["[w]hen an action involves a matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur, a court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue, even if an event occurring during the pe

2018(See Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473 , 479, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 ["[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief"]; Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852 , 867, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ["[w]hen an action involves a matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur, a court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue, even if an event occurring during the pe

2018(See Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473 , 479, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 ["[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief"]; Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852 , 867, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ["[w]hen an action involves a matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur, a court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue, even if an event occurring during the pe

2018(See Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473 , 479, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 ["[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief"]; Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852 , 867, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ["[w]hen an action involves a matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur, a court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue, even if an event occurring during the pe

1989(See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 544, fn. 17 .) It is, however, plain error to instruct a 1977-law jury under the language of the 1978 law. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 883 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ].) Thus, contrary to the majority view, we should not undertake the Brown analysis in the present case, but move directly to the question whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.

1989(See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 544, fn. 17 .) It is, however, plain error to instruct a 1977-law jury under the language of the 1978 law. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 883 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ].) Thus, contrary to the majority view, we should not undertake the Brown analysis in the present case, but move directly to the question whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.

2026The court denied Brown’s motion, ruling that the convictions involved moral turpitude, went “straight to the heart of her credibility,” and were not “too remote” or “too prejudicial.” “A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931 (Clark).) “Moral turpitude is defined as the ‘general readiness to do evil.’” (People v. Feaster (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091 , italics omitted.) “[M]ora