Brown factors in Maine

2013See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶ 12 , 714 A.2d 141 . 8 flagrancy of the official misconduct.”5 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (citations omitted); see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 (observing that we apply the Brown factors to physical evidence as well as statements made following an illegal arrest).

2013See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶ 12 , 714 A.2d 141 . 8 flagrancy of the official misconduct.”5 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (citations omitted); see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 (observing that we apply the Brown factors to physical evidence as well as statements made following an illegal arrest).

2012See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶¶ 10-11 , 714 A.2d 141 ; cf. State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d at 368 (applying the Brown factors to the defendant's confession and to the results of a breath test). [¶ 16] The purpose of the Brown test is to deter "lawless conduct by ... officers, and [to] clos[e] the doors of the... courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained." 422 U.S. at 599 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (quotation marks omitted). *540 However, the Brown Court emphasized that, "despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illeg

2012See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶¶ 10-11 , 714 A.2d 141 ; cf. State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d at 368 (applying the Brown factors to the defendant's confession and to the results of a breath test). [¶ 16] The purpose of the Brown test is to deter "lawless conduct by ... officers, and [to] clos[e] the doors of the... courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained." 422 U.S. at 599 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (quotation marks omitted). *540 However, the Brown Court emphasized that, "despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illeg

2013See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶ 12 , 714 A.2d 141 . 8 flagrancy of the official misconduct.”5 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (citations omitted); see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 (observing that we apply the Brown factors to physical evidence as well as statements made following an illegal arrest).

2013See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶ 12 , 714 A.2d 141 . 8 flagrancy of the official misconduct.”5 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (citations omitted); see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 (observing that we apply the Brown factors to physical evidence as well as statements made following an illegal arrest).

1990The Brown test differs from the two-pronged test in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 , 99 S.Ct. at 1396 , that we have traditionally applied to roadblocks, only by considering the prong of “promotion of legitimate governmental interests” in two parts rather than one.

1990The Brown test differs from the two-pronged test in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 , 99 S.Ct. at 1396 , that we have traditionally applied to roadblocks, only by considering the prong of “promotion of legitimate governmental interests” in two parts rather than one.

2016See Moody v. State Liquor and Lottery Commission, 2004 ME 20 ,, 9-10, 843 A.2d 43 .

2016See Moody v. State Liquor and Lottery Commission, 2004 ME 20 ,, 9-10, 843 A.2d 43 .

2015Me. 2009); Tisdale v. Rawson, 2003 ME 68, ¶ 15 , 822 A.2d 1136 ; Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 534 (Me. 1973). 2 conclude that DTD owed a duty to its collegiate chapters’ social invitees sufficient to support Brown’s claim based on premises liability, we vacate that portion of the summary judgment.

2013Compare Trusiani, 2004 ME 107, ¶¶ 23-29 , 854 A.2d 860 (focusing on the absence of flagrant police misconduct in holding that the taint was dissipated despite the temporal proximity and the absence of intervening circumstances), with State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d 366, 368 (Me. 1983) (highlighting the temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances in holding that the taint was not dissipated). [¶12] Because the voluntariness of the consent is a threshold factor, see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 , we begin there by noting that Ntim has not raised any objections to the court’s f

2013Compare Trusiani, 2004 ME 107, ¶¶ 23-29 , 854 A.2d 860 (focusing on the absence of flagrant police misconduct in holding that the taint was dissipated despite the temporal proximity and the absence of intervening circumstances), with State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d 366, 368 (Me. 1983) (highlighting the temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances in holding that the taint was not dissipated). [¶12] Because the voluntariness of the consent is a threshold factor, see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 , we begin there by noting that Ntim has not raised any objections to the court’s f

2013See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶ 12 , 714 A.2d 141 . 8 flagrancy of the official misconduct.”5 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (citations omitted); see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 (observing that we apply the Brown factors to physical evidence as well as statements made following an illegal arrest).

2013See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶ 12 , 714 A.2d 141 . 8 flagrancy of the official misconduct.”5 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (citations omitted); see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 (observing that we apply the Brown factors to physical evidence as well as statements made following an illegal arrest).

2013Compare Trusiani, 2004 ME 107, ¶¶ 23-29 , 854 A.2d 860 (focusing on the absence of flagrant police misconduct in holding that the taint was dissipated despite the temporal proximity and the absence of intervening circumstances), with State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d 366, 368 (Me. 1983) (highlighting the temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances in holding that the taint was not dissipated). [¶12] Because the voluntariness of the consent is a threshold factor, see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 , we begin there by noting that Ntim has not raised any objections to the court’s f

2013Compare Trusiani, 2004 ME 107, ¶¶ 23-29 , 854 A.2d 860 (focusing on the absence of flagrant police misconduct in holding that the taint was dissipated despite the temporal proximity and the absence of intervening circumstances), with State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d 366, 368 (Me. 1983) (highlighting the temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances in holding that the taint was not dissipated). [¶12] Because the voluntariness of the consent is a threshold factor, see Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 15 , 41 A.3d 535 , we begin there by noting that Ntim has not raised any objections to the court’s f

2012See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55 , 110 S.Ct. 2481 (distinguishing formalized sobriety checkpoint stops from random stops which involve standardless and unconstrained police discretion); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (“For Fourth Amendment purposes, we also see insufficient resemblance between sporadic and random stops of individual vehicles ... and those stops occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles are brought to a halt ... and all are subjected to a show of the police power of the community.”); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 , 96 S.Ct. 3074 (

2012See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55 , 110 S.Ct. 2481 (distinguishing formalized sobriety checkpoint stops from random stops which involve standardless and unconstrained police discretion); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (“For Fourth Amendment purposes, we also see insufficient resemblance between sporadic and random stops of individual vehicles ... and those stops occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles are brought to a halt ... and all are subjected to a show of the police power of the community.”); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 , 96 S.Ct. 3074 (

2012Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment requires that such stops still be reasonable “on the basis of the individual circumstances.” Id. at 426, 124 S.Ct. 885 . “[I]n judging reasonableness, we look to ‘the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.’ ” Id. at 427 , 124 S.Ct. 885 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)); see also LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, ¶8 , 26 A.3d 337 (articulating the Brown factors). [¶ 11] At the outset, we

2012Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment requires that such stops still be reasonable “on the basis of the individual circumstances.” Id. at 426, 124 S.Ct. 885 . “[I]n judging reasonableness, we look to ‘the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.’ ” Id. at 427 , 124 S.Ct. 885 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)); see also LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, ¶8 , 26 A.3d 337 (articulating the Brown factors). [¶ 11] At the outset, we

2004When discussing the factors that should be considered when determining whether evidence was tainted by a constitutional violation, the United States Supreme Court listed the factors discussed above, and said, " particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (emphasis added). [¶ 25] In State v. Turner, 394 A.2d 798 (Me.1978), we stated that "[t]he emphasis that the Supreme Court placed on the fifth factor in Brown is entirely consistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 800.

2004When discussing the factors that should be considered when determining whether evidence was tainted by a constitutional violation, the United States Supreme Court listed the factors discussed above, and said, " particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (emphasis added). [¶ 25] In State v. Turner, 394 A.2d 798 (Me.1978), we stated that "[t]he emphasis that the Supreme Court placed on the fifth factor in Brown is entirely consistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 800.

2004See United States *867 v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct is the most important factor in the Brown test because "it comes closest to satisfying `the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule'") (quoting United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1979)).

2004See United States *867 v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct is the most important factor in the Brown test because "it comes closest to satisfying `the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule'") (quoting United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1979)).

2004See United States *867 v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct is the most important factor in the Brown test because "it comes closest to satisfying `the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule'") (quoting United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1979)).

2004See United States *867 v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct is the most important factor in the Brown test because "it comes closest to satisfying `the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule'") (quoting United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1979)).

1997II v. Verrill & Dana, 645 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me.1994) (citing Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me.1986)). [¶ 11] The essence of Brown’s claim is that the umon did not fairly represent him because it negligently missed a filing deadline that resulted in the extmgmshment of Brown’s grievance.

1997II v. Verrill & Dana, 645 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me.1994) (citing Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me.1986)). [¶ 11] The essence of Brown’s claim is that the umon did not fairly represent him because it negligently missed a filing deadline that resulted in the extmgmshment of Brown’s grievance.

1979Id. at ---, 99 S.Ct. at 2259-2260 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839-40 .

1979Id. at ---, 99 S.Ct. at 2259-2260 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839-40 .