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6 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1935–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Kanegreen2 sentences1998We previously ruled, in an "Extraordinary Writ" action by Brown, that the trial court has the discretion to implement a dual jury procedure because Oklahoma law does not prohibit such a procedure. [2] Under the theory of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that issue may not be re-litigated between the same parties or their privies in a suit on a different cause of action." Wilson v. Kane, 1993 OK 65, n. 23 , 852 P.2d 717, 727, n. 23 . [3] Therefore, the principle of collateral estoppel prevents Brown from raising 1998We previously ruled, in an "Extraordinary Writ" action by Brown, that the trial court has the discretion to implement a dual jury procedure because Oklahoma law does not prohibit such a procedure. [2] Under the theory of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that issue may not be re-litigated between the same parties or their privies in a suit on a different cause of action." Wilson v. Kane, 1993 OK 65, n. 23 , 852 P.2d 717, 727, n. 23 . [3] Therefore, the principle of collateral estoppel prevents Brown from raising | 2 | 2 |
MULLENDORE v. MERCY HOSPITAL ARDMOREgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g. , Mullendore , 2019 OK 11 , ¶¶ 13, 17, 21, 438 P.3d at 363-65 ; Pina , 2018 OK 40 , ¶ 15, 419 P.3d at 236 . 2021See, e.g. , Mullendore , 2019 OK 11 , ¶¶ 13, 17, 21, 438 P.3d at 363-65 ; Pina , 2018 OK 40 , ¶ 15, 419 P.3d at 236 . | 1 | 1 |
Pina v. Am. Piping Inspection, Inc.green2 sentences2021See, e.g. , Mullendore , 2019 OK 11 , ¶¶ 13, 17, 21, 438 P.3d at 363-65 ; Pina , 2018 OK 40 , ¶ 15, 419 P.3d at 236 . 2021See, e.g. , Mullendore , 2019 OK 11 , ¶¶ 13, 17, 21, 438 P.3d at 363-65 ; Pina , 2018 OK 40 , ¶ 15, 419 P.3d at 236 . | 1 | 1 |
MULLENDORE v. MERCY HOSPITAL ARDMOREgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g. , Mullendore , 2019 OK 11 , ¶¶ 13, 17, 21, 438 P.3d at 363-65 ; Pina , 2018 OK 40 , ¶ 15, 419 P.3d at 236 . 2021See, e.g. , Mullendore , 2019 OK 11 , ¶¶ 13, 17, 21, 438 P.3d at 363-65 ; Pina , 2018 OK 40 , ¶ 15, 419 P.3d at 236 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
green
2 sentences2007T 11 In Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 , 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), the Court applied the Brown test in upholding the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint program conducted by the Michigan State Police. 2007T 11 In Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 , 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), the Court applied the Brown test in upholding the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint program conducted by the Michigan State Police. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Crowell v. State
neutral
2 sentences2007We find dispositive the case of Crowell v. State, 2000 OK CR 3, ¶ 5 , 994 P.2d 788, 790 , wherein the court found there is no requirement that the State conduct a roadblock or checkpoint according to a specified, written plan in order for it to be constitutionally valid. {19 Thus, in evaluating applicable constitutional safeguards, we find that the checkpoint at issue in the present case does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and Mr. Clark's arrest for activities not related to the checkpoint's original intent was therefore valid. 2007We find dispositive the case of Crowell v. State, 2000 OK CR 3, ¶ 5 , 994 P.2d 788, 790 , wherein the court found there is no requirement that the State conduct a roadblock or checkpoint according to a specified, written plan in order for it to be constitutionally valid. {19 Thus, in evaluating applicable constitutional safeguards, we find that the checkpoint at issue in the present case does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and Mr. Clark's arrest for activities not related to the checkpoint's original intent was therefore valid. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Staples v. State
green
2 sentences1975Defendant urges that a fact situation even closer to our present case occurred in Staples v. State, Okl.Cr., 528 P.2d 1131 (1974) where we reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession analyzing the facts as follows: “In the instant case the evidence showed that the defendant was neither the owner nor the operator of the vehicle; there was no evidence direct or otherwise that the vehicle was under his control. 1975Defendant urges that a fact situation even closer to our present case occurred in Staples v. State, Okl.Cr., 528 P.2d 1131 (1974) where we reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession analyzing the facts as follows: “In the instant case the evidence showed that the defendant was neither the owner nor the operator of the vehicle; there was no evidence direct or otherwise that the vehicle was under his control. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Orwig v. Emerick
green
1 sentence1935This court, in Orwig et al. v. Emerick, 107 Okla. 134 , 231 P. 234 , considering the question as here presented, and in construing section 4103, supra, said: “The language in question, in order to give effect thereto, must be construed to mean that when the attorney has shown a compliance by him with the statute, and the settlement, without notice, by the adverse party, a prima facie ease only of liability against the defendant is established, 'but it then devolves upon the attorney to go forward and show the amount of probable recovery that would have been had in the original action. “* * * P | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Elliott v. Jenkins
green
1 sentence1935This court, in Orwig et al. v. Emerick, 107 Okla. 134 , 231 P. 234 , considering the question as here presented, and in construing section 4103, supra, said: “The language in question, in order to give effect thereto, must be construed to mean that when the attorney has shown a compliance by him with the statute, and the settlement, without notice, by the adverse party, a prima facie ease only of liability against the defendant is established, 'but it then devolves upon the attorney to go forward and show the amount of probable recovery that would have been had in the original action. “* * * P | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.