Brown motion in Kansas

2019Second, we consider 'the presence of intervening circumstances.' Third, and 'particularly' significant, we examine 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' " 136 S. Ct. at 2062 .

2019Second, we consider 'the presence of intervening circumstances.' Third, and 'particularly' significant, we examine 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' " 136 S. Ct. at 2062 .

2007Because Brown’s counsel did not timely inform him of the right to appeal the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, this court held he should be permitted to file his appeal out of time. 278 Kan. at 484-85 . *630 In this case, the Court of Appeals implicitly expanded the Brown analysis to Kargus’ case, observing that “Foy’s analysis has changed since Brown.” In support of this reasoning, the panel recognized that another unpublished Court of Appeals’ decision, Swarthout v. State, Nos. 93,133 and 93,134, unpublished opinion filed May 13, 2005, relied on Brown and held that counsel’s failure to fi

2007Because Brown’s counsel did not timely inform him of the right to appeal the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, this court held he should be permitted to file his appeal out of time. 278 Kan. at 484-85 . *630 In this case, the Court of Appeals implicitly expanded the Brown analysis to Kargus’ case, observing that “Foy’s analysis has changed since Brown.” In support of this reasoning, the panel recognized that another unpublished Court of Appeals’ decision, Swarthout v. State, Nos. 93,133 and 93,134, unpublished opinion filed May 13, 2005, relied on Brown and held that counsel’s failure to fi

2010The Green decision acknowledges as much. 111 F.3d at 522 .

2010The Green decision acknowledges as much. 111 F.3d at 522 .

2026Brown I, 272 Kan. at 822 .

2026Kan. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (denying Brown's petition for writ of habeas corpus), appeal dismissed 517 Fed.

2024"A prosecutor's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused is a violation of a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. Soto, 301 Kan. 969, 978 , 349 P.3d 1256 (2015) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2024"A prosecutor's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused is a violation of a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. Soto, 301 Kan. 969, 978 , 349 P.3d 1256 (2015) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2024"A prosecutor's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused is a violation of a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. Soto, 301 Kan. 969, 978 , 349 P.3d 1256 (2015) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2024Under the second component, "prosecutors have a positive duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused when 'the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'" Warrior, Kan. at 505-06 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2022Here, the district court ordered Brown to pay a monetary sanction of $2,500 to the Clerk of the District Court, not to opposing counsel. 22 In determining whether to issue a sanction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-211(c) and in determining what sanction is appropriate, a district court must consider the nine factors identified in Wood, 269 Kan. at 431 ; Sokol, 49 Kan.

2022The judge replied, "'The—I don't think—No more than just it's an appropriate legal sentence, and the Court considered all the factors in the, in the Sentencing Guidelines relative to durational departure.'" 309 Kan. at 374 .

2022Here, the district court ordered Brown to pay a monetary sanction of $2,500 to the Clerk of the District Court, not to opposing counsel. 22 In determining whether to issue a sanction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-211(c) and in determining what sanction is appropriate, a district court must consider the nine factors identified in Wood, 269 Kan. at 431 ; Sokol, 49 Kan.

2021Continuances Law K.S.A. 22-3401 provides that "[c]ontinuances may be granted to either party for good cause shown." In State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51, 55 , 557 P.2d 1280 (1976), our Supreme Court explained that a trial court "must weigh" the following four factors when considering whether to grant or deny a defendant's motion for continuance to ensure the availability of a witness: (1) "the probability of the witness' appearance at a later date if the continuance is granted"; (2) "the diligence (or lack of it) disclosed in attempting to secure the attendance of the witness"; (3) the "possible pr

2021Continuances Law K.S.A. 22-3401 provides that "[c]ontinuances may be granted to either party for good cause shown." In State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51, 55 , 557 P.2d 1280 (1976), our Supreme Court explained that a trial court "must weigh" the following four factors when considering whether to grant or deny a defendant's motion for continuance to ensure the availability of a witness: (1) "the probability of the witness' appearance at a later date if the continuance is granted"; (2) "the diligence (or lack of it) disclosed in attempting to secure the attendance of the witness"; (3) the "possible pr

2021Soto, 299 Kan. at 121 .

2019See State v. Moralez , 297 Kan. 397 , 415, 300 P.3d 1090 (2013) ; State v. Williams , 297 Kan. 370 , Syl. ¶ 9, 300 P.3d 1072 (2013). *1156 More recently in Strieff , the United States Supreme Court reiterated the Brown factors: "First, we look to the 'temporal proximity' between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search.

2019See State v. Moralez , 297 Kan. 397 , 415, 300 P.3d 1090 (2013) ; State v. Williams , 297 Kan. 370 , Syl. ¶ 9, 300 P.3d 1072 (2013). *1156 More recently in Strieff , the United States Supreme Court reiterated the Brown factors: "First, we look to the 'temporal proximity' between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search.

2017In Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 , the Supreme Court considered a strikingly similar question—"whether informing a suspect that an attorney would be appointed for him 'if and when you go to court' renders Miranda warnings inadequate." 492 U.S. at 200-01 .

2017In Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 , the Supreme Court considered a strikingly similar question—"whether informing a suspect that an attorney would be appointed for him 'if and when you go to court' renders Miranda warnings inadequate." 492 U.S. at 200-01 .

2017The panel also believed the informant's statements in this case were comparable to informant statements considered in United State v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005), which were held to be nontestimonial.

2017The panel also believed the informant's statements in this case were comparable to informant statements considered in United State v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005), which were held to be nontestimonial.

2016Accordingly, we remanded with directions to appoint conflict-free counsel and conduct a hearing on Brown's motion. 300 Kan. at 590 .

2016We also directed the district court to "determine whether [Brown] has established justifiable dissatisfaction with his counsel and whether that conflict adversely affected the adequacy of the attorney's representation." 300 Kan. at 578 . 2.

2011While the Brown test remains a useful iteration of some of the considerations found in the Supreme Court’s decisions, the Court provided further clarification in four subsequent cases: Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S __, 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L.

2011While the Brown test remains a useful iteration of some of the considerations found in the Supreme Court’s decisions, the Court provided further clarification in four subsequent cases: Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S __, 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L.

2011Ed. 2d 610 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 , 131 S. Ct. 1143 , 179 L.

2011Ed. 2d 610 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 , 131 S. Ct. 1143 , 179 L.

2007The dissent contends the following quote from State v. Arrocha, 30 Kan.App.2d 120 , 39 P.3d 101 , supports assessing the State with the 19 days between the date Brown's motion was granted and the original trial: "The State briefly argues that Arrocha acquiesced to all of the delay between August 17 and October 30.

2007The dissent contends the following quote from State v. Arrocha, 30 Kan.App.2d 120 , 39 P.3d 101 , supports assessing the State with the 19 days between the date Brown's motion was granted and the original trial: "The State briefly argues that Arrocha acquiesced to all of the delay between August 17 and October 30.

2005State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291, 310 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002); State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744, 748 , 933 P.2d 730 (1997). *751 The specific issue for our consideration is whether the delay after Brown's motion to continue was granted is attributable to him.

2005State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291, 310 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002); State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744, 748 , 933 P.2d 730 (1997). *751 The specific issue for our consideration is whether the delay after Brown's motion to continue was granted is attributable to him.

2005State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291, 310 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002); State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744, 748 , 933 P.2d 730 (1997). *751 The specific issue for our consideration is whether the delay after Brown's motion to continue was granted is attributable to him.

2005State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291, 310 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002); State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744, 748 , 933 P.2d 730 (1997). *751 The specific issue for our consideration is whether the delay after Brown's motion to continue was granted is attributable to him.

2005Brown correctly contends that because the error affected his fundamental constitutional right to the presumption of innocence, the error should be reviewed under the constitutional harmless error rule announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 17 L.

2005Brown correctly contends that because the error affected his fundamental constitutional right to the presumption of innocence, the error should be reviewed under the constitutional harmless error rule announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 17 L.

2002The trial court also held the 60-day limit was directory and Brown was not prejudiced by the delay. 26 Kan.

2002This court in Brown reversed the trial court and found error in the denial of Brown’s motion to dismiss. 26 Kan.

1999CONCLUSION We adopt Brown’s analysis and hold: (1) When requested by a defendant in a criminal possession of a firearm case, the district court must approve a stipulation whereby the parties acknowledge that the defendant is, without further elaboration, a prior convicted felon. (2) At the same time, the State may place into the record, at its discretion, the actual judgment(s) and sentence(s) of the prior felony conviction(s). (3) Neither these documents nor the number and nature of the prior convictions should be disclosed to the trial jury. (4) Out of the jury’s presence and after consultat

1999CONCLUSION We adopt Brown's analysis and hold: (1) When requested by a defendant in a criminal possession of a firearm case, the district court must approve a stipulation whereby the parties acknowledge that the defendant is, without further elaboration, a prior convicted felon. (2) At the same time, the State may place into the record, at its discretion, the actual judgment(s) and sentence(s) of the prior felony conviction(s). (3) Neither these documents nor the number and nature of the prior convictions should be disclosed to the trial *816 jury. (4) Out of the jury's presence and after cons