transferred intent doctrine in Florida

2009(Crim.) 7.2 (defining “premeditation” and “transferred intent”); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) (“Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as ‘the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.’ ” (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla.1993))), cer t.

2009(Crim.) 7.2 (defining "premeditation" and "transferred intent"); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) ("Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as `the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.'" (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993))), cert. d

2010See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that transferred intent was not applicable when a student intended to strike a fellow student, but instead struck a school employee); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (explaining that “only the appellant’s intent to strike his opponent — a student — could be transferred, and there could be no intent to strike a school employee”); Sagner v. State, 791 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(stating that the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to enhance the severity of the intended crime against a

2001See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(where defendant intended to hit a fellow student and not a school employee, the defendant could only be adjudicated of simple battery); V.M. v. State, 729 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(doctrine of transferred intent did not operate to elevate defendant's general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to commit aggravated battery on a pregnant woman); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(where juvenile's intent was only to strike student, doctrine could not support finding of guilt of at

2003However, we held that the transferred intent doctrine supported the firstdegree murder conviction because the premeditated design to kill the two officers "directly resulted in the death of another human being." Id. at 1181 .

1993Appellant provides no direct authority for his argument but cites Provenzano v. State, 497 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1986), and Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250 , 190 So. 520 (1939), cases where the intended victim of a murder attempt was not killed but an unintended victim was, as setting the parameters for the proper use of the transferred intent doctrine.

1993Appellant provides no direct authority for his argument but cites Provenzano v. State, 497 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1986), and Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250 , 190 So. 520 (1939), cases where the intended victim of a murder attempt was not killed but an unintended victim was, as setting the parameters for the proper use of the transferred intent doctrine.

1993Appellant provides no direct authority for his argument but cites Provenzano v. State, 497 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1986), and Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250 , 190 So. 520 (1939), cases where the intended victim of a murder attempt was not killed but an unintended victim was, as setting the parameters for the proper use of the transferred intent doctrine.

2019We agree with those courts that have held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the “crime of attempted murder of the unintended victim.” Id. at 28 , and cases cited therein; see also State v. Brady, 745 So. 2d 954, 956, n.2 (Fla. 1999).

2018See Bell v. State, 768 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(stating that if the issue is whether the defendant attempted to murder multiple victims, then such specific intent is not subject to transfer but rather such intent should be independently evaluated as to each victim); but see Frederick v. State, 93 So.3d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)(holding that the giving of a transferred intent instruction was not fundamental error because defendant was not charged with attempting to murder multiple victims).

2010See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that transferred intent was not applicable when a student intended to strike a fellow student, but instead struck a school employee); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (explaining that “only the appellant’s intent to strike his opponent — a student — could be transferred, and there could be no intent to strike a school employee”); Sagner v. State, 791 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(stating that the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to enhance the severity of the intended crime against a

2001See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(where defendant intended to hit a fellow student and not a school employee, the defendant could only be adjudicated of simple battery); V.M. v. State, 729 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(doctrine of transferred intent did not operate to elevate defendant's general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to commit aggravated battery on a pregnant woman); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(where juvenile's intent was only to strike student, doctrine could not support finding of guilt of at

2026To be sure, we have said that “[t]he usual case involving the doctrine of transferred intent is when a defendant aims and shoots at A intending to kill him but instead misses and kills B.” Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. 1986) (citing Pressley v. State, 395 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)).

2025To be sure, we have said that “[t]he usual case involving the doctrine of transferred intent is when a defendant aims and shoots at A intending to kill him but instead misses and kills B.” Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. 1986) (citing Pressley v. State, 395 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)).

2026Lee, 141 So. 2d at 259 ; see also Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 409 (1991); Coston, 190 So. at 522 (“The law, as well as reason, prevents plaintiff in error from taking advantage of his own wrong doing, or excusing himself when this unlawful act, if committed by plaintiff in error, strikes down an unintended victim.”). 7 B.

2025Lee, 141 So. 2d at 259 ; see also Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 409 (1991); Coston, 190 So. at 522 (“The law, as well as reason, prevents plaintiff in error from taking advantage of his own wrong doing, or excusing himself when this unlawful act, if committed by plaintiff in error, strikes down an unintended victim.”). 7 B.

2026Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016) (citing Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010)). 1.

2025Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016) (citing Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010)). 1.

2026Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016) (citing Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010)). 1.

2025Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016) (citing Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010)). 1.

2010See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that transferred intent was not applicable when a student intended to strike a fellow student, but instead struck a school employee); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (explaining that “only the appellant’s intent to strike his opponent — a student — could be transferred, and there could be no intent to strike a school employee”); Sagner v. State, 791 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(stating that the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to enhance the severity of the intended crime against a

2010See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that transferred intent was not applicable when a student intended to strike a fellow student, but instead struck a school employee); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (explaining that "only the appellant's intent to strike his opponent—a student—could be transferred, and there could be no intent to strike a school employee"); Sagner v. State, 791 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(stating that the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to enhance the severity of the intended crime against an un

2000Id. at 1000.

1999Id. at 1000.

2019We agree with those courts that have held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the “crime of attempted murder of the unintended victim.” Id. at 28 , and cases cited therein; see also State v. Brady, 745 So. 2d 954, 956, n.2 (Fla. 1999).

2000On these facts, the supreme court found "no need to resort to the doctrine of transferred intent," id. at 958 , to uphold Brady's convictions for attempted second-degree murder, explaining that a jury could reasonably conclude that Brady intentionally committed an act imminently dangerous to others, including Mack and Harrell, without regard for human life which would have resulted in death had the bullet fatally struck either Mack or Harrell.

2018Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301, 302-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); see also S.G. v. State, 29 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (doctrine of transferred intent could not apply to enhance severity of battery to battery on school employee where the appellant threw a stapler at another student but the stapler hit a school employee).

2014See e.g., V.M. v. State, 729 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (stating that the doctrine of transferred intent would not apply to elevate V.M.’s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to commit a battery on a pregnant person); S.G. v. State, 29 So.3d 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (stating that the doctrine of transferred intent would not apply to transfer the intent to strike a student, a simple battery, to the intent to strike a school employee).

2018Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301, 302-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); see also S.G. v. State, 29 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (doctrine of transferred intent could not apply to enhance severity of battery to battery on school employee where the appellant threw a stapler at another student but the stapler hit a school employee).

2001See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(where defendant intended to hit a fellow student and not a school employee, the defendant could only be adjudicated of simple battery); V.M. v. State, 729 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(doctrine of transferred intent did not operate to elevate defendant's general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to commit aggravated battery on a pregnant woman); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(where juvenile's intent was only to strike student, doctrine could not support finding of guilt of at

2014See e.g., V.M. v. State, 729 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (stating that the doctrine of transferred intent would not apply to elevate V.M.’s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to commit a battery on a pregnant person); S.G. v. State, 29 So.3d 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (stating that the doctrine of transferred intent would not apply to transfer the intent to strike a student, a simple battery, to the intent to strike a school employee).

2001See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(where defendant intended to hit a fellow student and not a school employee, the defendant could only be adjudicated of simple battery); V.M. v. State, 729 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(doctrine of transferred intent did not operate to elevate defendant's general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to commit aggravated battery on a pregnant woman); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(where juvenile's intent was only to strike student, doctrine could not support finding of guilt of at

2009(Crim.) 7.2 (defining “premeditation” and “transferred intent”); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) (“Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as ‘the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.’ ” (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla.1993))), cer t.

2009(Crim.) 7.2 (defining "premeditation" and "transferred intent"); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) ("Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as `the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.'" (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993))), cert. d

2009(Crim.) 7.2 (defining “premeditation” and “transferred intent”); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) (“Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as ‘the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.’ ” (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla.1993))), cer t.

2009(Crim.) 7.2 (defining "premeditation" and "transferred intent"); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) ("Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as `the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.'" (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993))), cert. d

2004City of Winter Haven v. Allen, 541 So.2d 128, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).

2003Consistent with our precedent, the CCP finding should comport with the purpose of the transferred intent rule: "to hold a defendant criminally liable to the full extent of his or her criminal culpability." State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708, 714 (N.M.1995).

2003Consistent with our precedent, the CCP finding should comport with the purpose of the transferred intent rule: "to hold a defendant criminally liable to the full extent of his or her criminal culpability." State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708, 714 (N.M.1995).

2001See also In the Interest of J.G., 655 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (where juvenile intended to hit another student, but instead missed the student and hit the student's car and shattered the rear window, juvenile should have been acquitted of criminal mischief, because juvenile's intent to strike another person could not be transferred to an intent to damage another's property).