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7 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Feketegreen2 sentences2009“When a criminal statute 17 matches specific intent with a specific victim, the doctrine of transferred intent 18 protects an unintended victim.” Id. (providing as an example the specific intent crime 19 of murder where “a defendant, while intending to kill one person, accidentally kills 13 1 an innocent bystander or another unintended victim”) (internal quotation marks 2 omitted). 1999See State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 296 , 901 P.2d 708, 714 (1995) (“The doctrine of transferred intent is a legal fiction that is used to hold a defendant criminally liable to the full extent of his or her criminal culpability.”); People v. Czahara, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 836, 838-39 (1988) (stating that “[t]he transferred intent rule serves to ensure that [a defendant] is punished to the full extent of his [or her] culpability” and stating that the transferred intent rule is inapplicable if the intended victim is killed because the killer’s punishment can be commensurate to his o | 1 | 3 |
People v. Blandgreen2 sentences2018"Contrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being used up." People v. Bland , 28 Cal.4th 313 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 , 1113 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2018"Contrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being used up." People v. Bland , 28 Cal.4th 313 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 , 1113 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Juarez v. Stategreen1 sentence1999See State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 296 , 901 P.2d 708, 714 (1995) (“The doctrine of transferred intent is a legal fiction that is used to hold a defendant criminally liable to the full extent of his or her criminal culpability.”); People v. Czahara, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 836, 838-39 (1988) (stating that “[t]he transferred intent rule serves to ensure that [a defendant] is punished to the full extent of his [or her] culpability” and stating that the transferred intent rule is inapplicable if the intended victim is killed because the killer’s punishment can be commensurate to his o | 1 | 1 |
People v. Czaharagreen2 sentences1999See State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 296 , 901 P.2d 708, 714 (1995) (“The doctrine of transferred intent is a legal fiction that is used to hold a defendant criminally liable to the full extent of his or her criminal culpability.”); People v. Czahara, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 836, 838-39 (1988) (stating that “[t]he transferred intent rule serves to ensure that [a defendant] is punished to the full extent of his [or her] culpability” and stating that the transferred intent rule is inapplicable if the intended victim is killed because the killer’s punishment can be commensurate to his o 1999See State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 296 , 901 P.2d 708, 714 (1995) (“The doctrine of transferred intent is a legal fiction that is used to hold a defendant criminally liable to the full extent of his or her criminal culpability.”); People v. Czahara, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 836, 838-39 (1988) (stating that “[t]he transferred intent rule serves to ensure that [a defendant] is punished to the full extent of his [or her] culpability” and stating that the transferred intent rule is inapplicable if the intended victim is killed because the killer’s punishment can be commensurate to his o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carpio
green
2 sentences1985State v. Carpio, 27 N.M. 265 , 199 P. 1012 , 18 A.L.R. 914 (1921). 1985State v. Carpio, 27 N.M. 265 , 199 P. 1012 , 18 A.L.R. 914 (1921). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Sanders
green
2 sentences1985Moreover, the standard of review for determining if instructions which deviate from the Uniform Jury Instructions constitute reversible error is “the slightest evidence of prejudice.” State v. Sanders, 93 N.M. 450, 451 , 601 P.2d 83 (Ct.App. 1979). 1985Moreover, the standard of review for determining if instructions which deviate from the Uniform Jury Instructions constitute reversible error is “the slightest evidence of prejudice.” State v. Sanders, 93 N.M. 450, 451 , 601 P.2d 83 (Ct.App. 1979). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences1985People v. Smith, 94 Ill.App.3d 969 , 50 Ill.Dec. 296 , 419 N.E.2d 404 (1981); Kitchens v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 135 , 192 S.W.2d 449 (1946). 1985People v. Smith, 94 Ill.App.3d 969 , 50 Ill.Dec. 296 , 419 N.E.2d 404 (1981); Kitchens v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 135 , 192 S.W.2d 449 (1946). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Kitchens v. State
green
2 sentences1985People v. Smith, 94 Ill.App.3d 969 , 50 Ill.Dec. 296 , 419 N.E.2d 404 (1981); Kitchens v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 135 , 192 S.W.2d 449 (1946). 1985People v. Smith, 94 Ill.App.3d 969 , 50 Ill.Dec. 296 , 419 N.E.2d 404 (1981); Kitchens v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 135 , 192 S.W.2d 449 (1946). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Ochoa
green
1 sentence1976This instruction conforms with the doctrine of transferred intent as stated in State v. Carpio, supra, and State v. Ochoa, supra. Instructions are to be read and considered as a whole and when so considered they are proper if they fairly and accurately state the applicable law. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Padilla v. State
green
1 sentence1976State v. Rushing, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 (1973); State v. Rhea, 86 N.M. 291 , 523 P.2d 26 (Ct.App.) cert. denied, 86 N. M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Rhea
green
2 sentences1976State v. Rushing, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 (1973); State v. Rhea, 86 N.M. 291 , 523 P.2d 26 (Ct.App.) cert. denied, 86 N. M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974). 1976State v. Rushing, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 (1973); State v. Rhea, 86 N.M. 291 , 523 P.2d 26 (Ct.App.) cert. denied, 86 N. M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Rushing
green
2 sentences1976State v. Rushing, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 (1973); State v. Rhea, 86 N.M. 291 , 523 P.2d 26 (Ct.App.) cert. denied, 86 N. M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974). 1976State v. Rushing, 85 N.M. 540 , 514 P.2d 297 (1973); State v. Rhea, 86 N.M. 291 , 523 P.2d 26 (Ct.App.) cert. denied, 86 N. M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.