transferred intent doctrine in Pennsylvania

2025The Commonwealth may also establish specific intent via the doctrine of transferred intent; under this doctrine, “the intent to murder may be -8- J-S20026-25 transferred where the person actually killed is not the intended victim.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 279 (Pa. 2006) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b)(1)); see also Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. 1994) (holding that when the “actual result . . . was that another person was killed instead of the intended victim,” the defendant’s specific intent transferred to the unintended victim).

2024Our Supreme Court has determined that “[t]he very purpose of the transferred intent instruction is to permit appropriate inferences of malice and specific intent to flow to an unintended victim.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 280 (Pa. 2006). - 12 - J-S03009-24 Here, even though the trial court initially charged the jury with the proper elements of the offenses, including the requisite intent for each criminal charge, the jury was then instructed: The essence of the transferred intent theory is that the person who is ultimately the victim need not be the original intended victim.

2025See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b) (doctrine of transferred intent); see also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 739 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000) (if intent to commit crime exists, this intent can be transferred for purpose of finding intent element of another crime).

2018The dissonance is resolved by the doctrine of transferred intent. 4 In Commonwealth v. Thompson , 559 Pa. 229 , 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), our Supreme Court held that transferred intent applies to inchoate crimes.

2016See, e.g., State v. Brady, 903 A.2d 870 (Md. 2006) (cited in Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207 , 218 n. 11 (Pa. 2006) (concluding that the transferred intent doctrine does not apply to crimes of attempt because the defendant has committed a complete crime against the intended victim)). - 16 - J-A06038-16 introduction of facts and circumstances relating the shooting death of Daniek Burns, the Commonwealth’s only eyewitness who identified Appellant as the shooter.

2015Therefore, the intent element for Appellant’s aggravated assault convictions as to these persons was met. 2 The court in Jackson urged our supreme court to revisit Thompson, opining that the better rule, as set forth by the Supreme Court of Maryland in State v. Brady, 903 A.2d 870 (Md. 2006), is that the unintended victim must be actually injured for the transferred intent doctrine to apply.

2025The Commonwealth may also establish specific intent via the doctrine of transferred intent; under this doctrine, “the intent to murder may be -8- J-S20026-25 transferred where the person actually killed is not the intended victim.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 279 (Pa. 2006) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b)(1)); see also Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. 1994) (holding that when the “actual result . . . was that another person was killed instead of the intended victim,” the defendant’s specific intent transferred to the unintended victim).

2001Moreover, under the doctrine of transferred intent, the intent to murder may be transferred where the person actually killed was not the intended victim. 18 Pa.C.S. § 303(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 538 Pa. 258 , 648 A.2d 295, 298 (1994); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 533 Pa. 539 , 626 A.2d 133, 138 (1993).

2018Therefore, based upon the analysis in Jackson and considering the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant harbored the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to any person.3 ____________________________________________ 3 In Jackson, this Court ultimately affirmed the appellant’s convictions for aggravated assault, based upon the doctrine of transferred intent – i.e., “the person who ultimately is the victim not be the original intended victim,” because it was “an established fact that [the a]ppel

2017See also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 739 A.2d 1023, 1029-1030 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted) (“The doctrine of transferred intent provides that if the intent to commit a crime exists, this intent can be transferred for the purpose of finding the intent element of another crime.”); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 445-446 (Pa. Super. 2008) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to support aggravated assault conviction under transferred intent doctrine when bystander was injured in shooting).

2016See, e.g., State v. Brady, 903 A.2d 870 (Md. 2006) (cited in Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207 , 218 n. 11 (Pa. 2006) (concluding that the transferred intent doctrine does not apply to crimes of attempt because the defendant has committed a complete crime against the intended victim)). - 16 - J-A06038-16 introduction of facts and circumstances relating the shooting death of Daniek Burns, the Commonwealth’s only eyewitness who identified Appellant as the shooter.

2015See, e.g., State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502 , 903 A.2d 870 (2006), cited in Commonwealth v. Bullock, 590 Pa. 480 , 913 A.2d 207 , 219 n. 11 (2006), (concluding that the transferred intent doctrine does not apply to crimes of attempt because the defendant has committed a complete crime against the intended victim).

2021The doctrine of transferred intent “provides that if the intent to commit a crime exists, this intent can be transferred for the purpose of finding the intent element for another crime.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 626 A.2d 133, 138 (Pa. 1993) (citation omitted).

2001Moreover, under the doctrine of transferred intent, the intent to murder may be transferred where the person actually killed was not the intended victim. 18 Pa.C.S. § 303(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 538 Pa. 258 , 648 A.2d 295, 298 (1994); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 533 Pa. 539 , 626 A.2d 133, 138 (1993).

2025See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1247 (Pa. 2013) (finding evidence sufficient to support specific intent to kill under transferred intent doctrine where appellant fired his gun into a crowd of people and killed a bystander who was not the specific target).

2017See Padilla, supra; Thompson, supra; Jackson, supra. Accordingly, we reject Hooker’s sufficiency challenge to his convictions for attempted murder.

2025See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b) (doctrine of transferred intent); see also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 739 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000) (if intent to commit crime exists, this intent can be transferred for purpose of finding intent element of another crime).

2008Appellant further argues that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b), enacted to reflect existing law, reveals that the doctrine is to be used only where a defendant shoots a gun at a person, intending to cause serious bodily injury, but hits another, or where the defendant shoots the intended victim, but the bullet does not cause serious harm. ¶24 In Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229 , 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. *449 denied, 531 U.S. 829 , 121 S.Ct. 79 , 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000), our Supreme Court considered the doctrine of transferred intent.

2006McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 396 , 211 A.2d 460, 462 (1965) (describing the transferred intent rule); State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502 , 903 A.2d 870, 875-78 (2006); In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512 , 849 N.E.2d 286, 289 (2006) (“[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, an offender who intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.”); State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444 , 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (explaining the operation of transferred intent in a common-law fetal homicide scenario). .

2006McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 396 , 211 A.2d 460, 462 (1965) (describing the transferred intent rule); State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502 , 903 A.2d 870, 875-78 (2006); In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512 , 849 N.E.2d 286, 289 (2006) (“[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, an offender who intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.”); State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444 , 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (explaining the operation of transferred intent in a common-law fetal homicide scenario). .

2024Moreover, “our Supreme Court [has] held that the proscriptions against double jeopardy do not prevent us from remanding for resentencing on all bills of information where our vacation of various related counts has upset the trial court's sentencing scheme.”9 Commonwealth v. Sutton, 583 A.2d 500, 502 (Pa. Super. 1990), citing Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 517 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1986). ____________________________________________ 8 Further, we recognize that there was only one count of stalking for the jury to consider and, therefore, there could be no confusion with the transferred intent instruction

2020Commonwealth v. Hall, 701 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1997). 4 “Pursuant to the doctrine of transferred intent, the intent to murder may be transferred where the person actually killed is not the intended victim.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 279 (Pa. 2006) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b)(1)). -8- J-S33026-20 1/28/16, at 136-37.

2016See Kane, 10 A.3d at 332 . 6 The doctrine of transferred intent applied to Appellant’s first-degree murder conviction because Appellant killed Ms. Witter although Mr. Mable (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 15 - J-A06038-16 We conclude the trial court appropriately analyzed and rejected Appellant’s assertions regarding criminal attempt, explaining: In defining Criminal Attempt, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a) states that, “[a] person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” The crime alleged

2016Co. v. Martin, 595 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 612 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1992) (“Intent may be transferred from an intended victim to another.”), citing Nationwide Mut.

2016A. Sufficiency of the Evidence "The standard of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to support all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Strouse, 909 A.2d 368, 368-69 (Pa. Super. 2006).

2015See Cruz, supra at 281 .

2014See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 997 A.2d 368 , 374 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc). - 14 - J.

2006McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 396 , 211 A.2d 460, 462 (1965) (describing the transferred intent rule); State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502 , 903 A.2d 870, 875-78 (2006); In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512 , 849 N.E.2d 286, 289 (2006) (“[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, an offender who intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.”); State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444 , 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (explaining the operation of transferred intent in a common-law fetal homicide scenario). .

2006McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 396 , 211 A.2d 460, 462 (1965) (describing the transferred intent rule); State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502 , 903 A.2d 870, 875-78 (2006); In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512 , 849 N.E.2d 286, 289 (2006) (“[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, an offender who intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.”); State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444 , 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (explaining the operation of transferred intent in a common-law fetal homicide scenario). .

2006Given that the Commonwealth accurately characterized this Court’s precedent on the doctrine of transferred intent, Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271 , 684 A.2d 1025, 1034 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 , 117 S.Ct. 1825 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1997); see Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 479 Pa. 88 , 387 A.2d 848, 850 (1978), appellant has failed to identify anything objectionable in the prosecutor’s summation of the law.

2006Given that the Commonwealth accurately characterized this Court’s precedent on the doctrine of transferred intent, Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271 , 684 A.2d 1025, 1034 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 , 117 S.Ct. 1825 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1997); see Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 479 Pa. 88 , 387 A.2d 848, 850 (1978), appellant has failed to identify anything objectionable in the prosecutor’s summation of the law.

2006Given that the Commonwealth accurately characterized this Court’s precedent on the doctrine of transferred intent, Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271 , 684 A.2d 1025, 1034 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 , 117 S.Ct. 1825 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1997); see Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 479 Pa. 88 , 387 A.2d 848, 850 (1978), appellant has failed to identify anything objectionable in the prosecutor’s summation of the law.

2006Given that the Commonwealth accurately characterized this Court’s precedent on the doctrine of transferred intent, Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271 , 684 A.2d 1025, 1034 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 , 117 S.Ct. 1825 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1997); see Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 479 Pa. 88 , 387 A.2d 848, 850 (1978), appellant has failed to identify anything objectionable in the prosecutor’s summation of the law.

2006See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 567 Pa. 415 , 787 A.2d 394 (2001) (defendant convicted of murder of rival drug dealer and a bystander on basis of transferred intent after shooting both bystander and intended victim to death).

2006See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 567 Pa. 415 , 787 A.2d 394 (2001) (defendant convicted of murder of rival drug dealer and a bystander on basis of transferred intent after shooting both bystander and intended victim to death).

2006McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 396 , 211 A.2d 460, 462 (1965) (describing the transferred intent rule); State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502 , 903 A.2d 870, 875-78 (2006); In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512 , 849 N.E.2d 286, 289 (2006) (“[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, an offender who intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.”); State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444 , 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (explaining the operation of transferred intent in a common-law fetal homicide scenario). .

2006McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 396 , 211 A.2d 460, 462 (1965) (describing the transferred intent rule); State v. Brady, 393 Md. 502 , 903 A.2d 870, 875-78 (2006); In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512 , 849 N.E.2d 286, 289 (2006) (“[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, an offender who intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.”); State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444 , 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (explaining the operation of transferred intent in a common-law fetal homicide scenario). .