11 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lockleargreen2 sentences2025However, Defendant admitted to intentionally shooting Little. “[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, it is immaterial whether the defendant intended injury to the person actually harmed; if he in fact acted with the required or elemental intent toward someone, that intent suffices as the intent element of the crime charged as a matter of substantive law.” State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 245 , 415 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1992) (citing State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519 , 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971)) (other citations omitted). 2025However, Defendant admitted to intentionally shooting Little. “[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, it is immaterial whether the defendant intended injury to the person actually harmed; if he in fact acted with the required or elemental intent toward someone, that intent suffices as the intent element of the crime charged as a matter of substantive law.” State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 245 , 415 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1992) (citing State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519 , 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971)) (other citations omitted). | 6 | 8 |
State v. Wynngreen2 sentences2025However, Defendant admitted to intentionally shooting Little. “[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, it is immaterial whether the defendant intended injury to the person actually harmed; if he in fact acted with the required or elemental intent toward someone, that intent suffices as the intent element of the crime charged as a matter of substantive law.” State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 245 , 415 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1992) (citing State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519 , 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971)) (other citations omitted). 2025However, Defendant admitted to intentionally shooting Little. “[U]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, it is immaterial whether the defendant intended injury to the person actually harmed; if he in fact acted with the required or elemental intent toward someone, that intent suffices as the intent element of the crime charged as a matter of substantive law.” State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 245 , 415 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1992) (citing State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519 , 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971)) (other citations omitted). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2009According to our Supreme Court, discharging a firearm into occupied property is defined as “intentionally, without legal justification or excuse, discharging] a firearm into an occupied building with *339 knowledge that the building is then occupied by one or more persons or when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the building might be occupied by one or more persons.” State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 73 , 199 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1973) (emphasis omitted); N.C. 2009According to our Supreme Court, discharging a firearm into occupied property is defined as “intentionally, without legal justification or excuse, discharging] a firearm into an occupied building with *339 knowledge that the building is then occupied by one or more persons or when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the building might be occupied by one or more persons.” State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 73 , 199 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1973) (emphasis omitted); N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Christiangreen1 sentence2002State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239 , 415 S.E.2d 726 (1999); see also, State v. Christian, 150 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Abrahamgreen2 sentences1997State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 332 , 451 S.E.2d 131, 139 (1994) (quoting State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519 , 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971)). 1997State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 332 , 451 S.E.2d 131, 139 (1994) (quoting State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519 , 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Swiftgreen2 sentences1992Id.; cf. State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 407 , 226 S.E.2d 652, 669 (1976) (felony murder rule makes premeditation and deliberation immaterial and does not violate due process by establishing a presumption of premeditation and deliberation); 2 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 215 (3d ed. 1988) (distinguishing presumptions arising upon evidence from matters of substantive law). 1992Id.; cf. State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 407 , 226 S.E.2d 652, 669 (1976) (felony murder rule makes premeditation and deliberation immaterial and does not violate due process by establishing a presumption of premeditation and deliberation); 2 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 215 (3d ed. 1988) (distinguishing presumptions arising upon evidence from matters of substantive law). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Van Jordan
green
1 sentence2009Defendant cites State v. Jordan, 140 N.C. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. James
green
2 sentences2009Defendant cites State v. James, 342 N.C. 589 , 466 S.E.2d 710 (1996), for the proposition that the statute requires proof that defendant knew the structure into which she shot was occupied. 2009Defendant cites State v. James, 342 N.C. 589 , 466 S.E.2d 710 (1996), for the proposition that the statute requires proof that defendant knew the structure into which she shot was occupied. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences2009In contrast, this Court has expressly authorized the use of the transferred intent doctrine “to satisfy the intent element of discharging a firearm into occupied property, where the evidence tends to show that defendant intended to shoot a person, but instead shot into an occupied residence.” Fletcher, 125 N.C. 2009App. at 513 , 481 S.E.2d at 423 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.