transferred intent doctrine in California

2025The Kill Zone Theory, as Explained by Canizales and Mumin The crime of attempted murder requires proof of “ ‘the specific intent to kill.’ ” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602 .) Moreover, “the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.” (Ibid., citing People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313 , 327–328 (Bland).) Because direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, intent generally must be inferred from circumstances s

2025Senate Bill . . . 1437.” (Id. at p. 1147.) Transferred intent applies where “ ‘a defendant . . . shoots with the intent to kill a certain person and hits a bystander instead.’ ” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 321 .) Even 13 though the defendant never meant to harm the bystander, he “ ‘is deemed as culpable as if he had accomplished what he set out to do.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Courts have “reject[ed] [the] suggestion that Senate Bill 1437 abrogated the doctrine of transferred intent”4 because it assigns liability based on the defendant’s own mens rea—it “requires an intent to kill.” (P

2026General Principles of the Kill Zone Theory “To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602 (Canizales), quoting People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 .) “When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted mur

2026General Principles of the Kill Zone Theory “To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602 (Canizales), quoting People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 .) “When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted mur

2016Respondent’s argument evokes the doctrine of transferred intent, under which “ ‘a defendant who shoots with the intent to kill a certain person and hits a bystander instead is subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had ‘ ‘“the fatal blow reached the person for whom intended.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 321 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ], quoting People v. Suesser (1904) 142 Cal. 354, 366 [ 75 P. 1093 ].) Indeed, respondent argues that in the present case, the prosecutor used the natural and probable consequences theory ‘“as a proxy for th

2016Respondent’s argument evokes the doctrine of transferred intent, under which “ ‘a defendant who shoots with the intent to kill a certain person and hits a bystander instead is subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had ‘ ‘“the fatal blow reached the person for whom intended.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 321 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ], quoting People v. Suesser (1904) 142 Cal. 354, 366 [ 75 P. 1093 ].) Indeed, respondent argues that in the present case, the prosecutor used the natural and probable consequences theory ‘“as a proxy for th

2026“Under the doctrine, if a defendant intended to kill A but inadvertently killed B, the intent to kill A is deemed to transfer to the killing of B, so that the defendant is guilty of B’s murder.” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 190 (Mumin).) As the Supreme Court explained long ago, the concept of transferred intent “is a ‘bare-faced’ legal fiction.” (Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 550 .) “[U]nder the transferred intent doctrine, the defendant’s intent is not actually transferred from the intended victim to the unintended victim.” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 664 (Concha).)

2026“Under the doctrine, if a defendant intended to kill A but inadvertently killed B, the intent to kill A is deemed to transfer to the killing of B, so that the defendant is guilty of B’s murder.” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 190 (Mumin).) As the Supreme Court explained long ago, the concept of transferred intent “is a ‘bare-faced’ legal fiction.” (Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 550 .) “[U]nder the transferred intent doctrine, the defendant’s intent is not actually transferred from the intended victim to the unintended victim.” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 664 (Concha).)

2022Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the Court’s Finding Trotter Aided and Abetted the Attempted Murder of Anaya “‘“[G]uilt of attempted murder must be judged separately as to each alleged victim.”’” (People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 230 ; see People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602 [“When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more 24 persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim.”].) An “intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred in

2020The People filed a return, and Glass filed a traverse. 14 DISCUSSION A. The Kill Zone Theory of Concurrent Intent To Kill “To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602 ; accord, People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890 ; People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 224 [“[S]hooting at a person or persons and thereby endangering their lives does not itself establish the requisite intent for the crime of att

2024A. Applicable Law Regarding Attempted Murder “To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ [Citation.] When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 5

2024A. Applicable Law Regarding Attempted Murder “To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ [Citation.] When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 5

2026(Lopez, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250; see also Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 685 [“the jury could not have convicted Nguyen of first degree murder without finding he personally harbored an intent to kill”].) Indeed, as Nguyen observed, the “doctrine is typically applied in the context of a single defendant who is the actual killer.” (Nguyen, at p. 680; see People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 60, 62-66 ; People v. Sutic (1953) 41 Cal.2d 483, 491-492 ; but see People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22 , 33, fn. 9 [applying the transferred intent doctrine to conspirators]; People

2024(People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 64 .) The doctrine of transferred intent, discussed below, does not apply to attempted murder; liability for attempted murder requires the intent to kill the alleged victim, not someone else.

2006As we shall explain, we reject defendant’s argument because it improperly minimizes the significance of the circumstance that the provisions of section 190.2(a)(22) were drafted, adopted, and reasonably must be interpreted against the background of the transferred intent doctrine, a theory of liability that long has been part of California law and one that “connotes a policy—that a defendant who shoots at an intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark.” (Pe

2006As we shall explain, we reject defendant’s argument because it improperly minimizes the significance of the circumstance that the provisions of section 190.2(a)(22) were drafted, adopted, and reasonably must be interpreted against the background of the transferred intent doctrine, a theory of liability that long has been part of California law and one that “connotes a policy—that a defendant who shoots at an intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark.” (Pe

2026(Lopez, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250; see also Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 685 [“the jury could not have convicted Nguyen of first degree murder without finding he personally harbored an intent to kill”].) Indeed, as Nguyen observed, the “doctrine is typically applied in the context of a single defendant who is the actual killer.” (Nguyen, at p. 680; see People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 60, 62-66 ; People v. Sutic (1953) 41 Cal.2d 483, 491-492 ; but see People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22 , 33, fn. 9 [applying the transferred intent doctrine to conspirators]; People

2024A. Transferred Intent “When intent to kill is at issue in murder, it may be proven through the doctrine of transferred intent.” (People v. Vasquez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1025 (Vasquez).) Transferred intent instructions in murder prosecutions “present the classic ‘bad aim’ cases in which a defendant who attempts to kill one individual and inadvertently kills a bystander instead is convicted of murder on the theory of transferred intent.

2023If all of those actions were in lawful self-defense, the defendant is not guilty of count 4.” 12 who shoots at an intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark.” (Id. at p. 551.) In People v. Mathews (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018 (Mathews), the court applied the transferred intent doctrine to the theory of self-defense to “insulate one from criminal responsibility where his act, justifiably in self-defense, inadvertently results in the injury of an innocent bysta

2023If all of those actions were in lawful self-defense, the defendant is not guilty of count 4.” 12 who shoots at an intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark.” (Id. at p. 551.) In People v. Mathews (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018 (Mathews), the court applied the transferred intent doctrine to the theory of self-defense to “insulate one from criminal responsibility where his act, justifiably in self-defense, inadvertently results in the injury of an innocent bysta

2025(People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 120 [the doctrine of transferred intent “does not apply to attempted murder”]; People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 331 (Bland) [“Defendant’s guilt of attempted murder must be judged separately as to each alleged victim.”].) That said, in certain very limited circumstances, a defendant may be liable for the attempted murder of a surviving victim under a theory of concurrent intent, or as it is popularly labeled, the “kill zone” theory.

2024Someone who intends to kill only one person and attempts unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the intended victim, but not of others.” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 328 ; accord, People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 120 [doctrine of transferred intent “does not apply to attempted 14 murder. ‘To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else.’ ”].) As explained above, the court’s instruction on aiding and abetting accurately stated the law.

2026“Under the doctrine, if a defendant intended to kill A but inadvertently killed B, the intent to kill A is deemed to transfer to the killing of B, so that the defendant is guilty of B’s murder.” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 190 (Mumin).) As the Supreme Court explained long ago, the concept of transferred intent “is a ‘bare-faced’ legal fiction.” (Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 550 .) “[U]nder the transferred intent doctrine, the defendant’s intent is not actually transferred from the intended victim to the unintended victim.” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 664 (Concha).)

2026First, while the natural and probable consequences doctrine permits accomplices to be found guilty of murder without malice aforethought, the transferred intent doctrine “requires an intent to kill.” (Lopez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1250.) Second, while under SB 1473’s amendment to section 188 malice may not be imputed to a person “based solely on his or her participation in a crime” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), the transferred intent doctrine attributes the intent to kill the intended victim to the actual victim “based on policy reasons”—namely, the determination that “ ‘ “a defendant who shoots

2016(People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 136 .) The doctrine of transferred intent—“when the defendant intends to kill one person but mistakenly kills another”— does not apply to attempted murder.

2016(People v. Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 137-138 & fn. 3; People v. Campos (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1241, 1243 .) Contrary to defendant’s apparent reasoning, the term “kill zone” is merely shorthand for concurrent intent; it is not a special legal doctrine such as the doctrine of transferred intent.

2003The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply because public policy is satisfied when defendant is convicted of first degree murder for killing A. (People v. Birreuta [, supra,] 162 Cal.App.3d 454 , 458-463 . . . .) [^] In People v. Calderon [, supra,] 232 Cal.App.3d 930 . . . , the court found a similar factual scenario present, except that no victim died, and applied the same policy and concluded transferred intent did not properly apply.” (Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.65 (6th ed. 1996) p. 444.) In 1993 when defendant committed the murders, one authoritative treatise explained: “The cases ar

2003The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply because public policy is satisfied when defendant is convicted of first degree murder for killing A. (People v. Birreuta [, supra,] 162 Cal.App.3d 454 , 458-463 . . . .) [^] In People v. Calderon [, supra,] 232 Cal.App.3d 930 . . . , the court found a similar factual scenario present, except that no victim died, and applied the same policy and concluded transferred intent did not properly apply.” (Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.65 (6th ed. 1996) p. 444.) In 1993 when defendant committed the murders, one authoritative treatise explained: “The cases ar

2022Implied malice—a conscious disregard for life—suffices. [Citation.]” [Citation.] In contrast, “[a]ttempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” ’ ” (People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788 , 796—797 (McCloud).) “ ‘Under the classic formulation of California’s common law doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant who shoots with the intent to kill a certain person and [kills] a bystander instead is subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had “ ‘the fatal blow r

2022Implied malice—a conscious disregard for life—suffices. [Citation.]” [Citation.] In contrast, “[a]ttempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” ’ ” (People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788 , 796—797 (McCloud).) “ ‘Under the classic formulation of California’s common law doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant who shoots with the intent to kill a certain person and [kills] a bystander instead is subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had “ ‘the fatal blow r

2026General Principles of the Kill Zone Theory “To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602 (Canizales), quoting People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 .) “When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted mur

2022Attempted Murder The California Supreme Court has explained that an attempted murder conviction requires that “the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 .) When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred

2003The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply because public policy is satisfied when defendant is convicted of first degree murder for killing A. (People v. Birreuta [, supra,] 162 Cal.App.3d 454 , 458-463 . . . .) [^] In People v. Calderon [, supra,] 232 Cal.App.3d 930 . . . , the court found a similar factual scenario present, except that no victim died, and applied the same policy and concluded transferred intent did not properly apply.” (Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.65 (6th ed. 1996) p. 444.) In 1993 when defendant committed the murders, one authoritative treatise explained: “The cases ar

2002Accordingly, we hold that the transferred intent doctrine does not apply in this case because ... the intended victim ... was killed." (Id. at pp. 460-461, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 .) The Birreuta court cited but found unpersuasive contrary dicta in an earlier case. ( Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 458-459, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 , citing People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 .) In Carlson , the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of his wife and murder of the fetus she was carrying.

2002We also find unpersuasive a New Mexico intermediate appellate court decision predating Czahara, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 836 , and Calderon, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 930 , 283 Cal. Rptr. 833 , that concluded transferred intent applies to attempted murder. ( State v. Gillette (N.M.Ct.App.1985) 102 N.M. 695 , 699 P.2d 626, 634-636 .) [6] This concurrent intent theory is not a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions such as is the doctrine of transferred intent.

2002We also find unpersuasive a New Mexico intermediate appellate court decision predating Czahara, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 836 , and Calderon, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 930 , 283 Cal. Rptr. 833 , that concluded transferred intent applies to attempted murder. ( State v. Gillette (N.M.Ct.App.1985) 102 N.M. 695 , 699 P.2d 626, 634-636 .) [6] This concurrent intent theory is not a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions such as is the doctrine of transferred intent.

2024(People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834 , 850–851, fn. 9; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 317 .) The transferred intent doctrine does not signify an actual transfer of intent from the intended victim to the unintended victim.

2001(See Perkins & Boyce[, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982)] at p. 924.)" ( People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 317 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 .) "The transferred intent doctrine does not . . . denote an actual `transfer' of `intent' from the intended victim to the unintended victim.

2024“When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602 .) In Bland, the California Supreme Court recognized the so-called “kill zone” theory of liability for the attempted murders of multiple victims based on “concurrent intent.” “ ‘The intent is concurrent . . . when the nature and scope of the attack, wh

2020Where the means employed to commit the crime against a primary victim create a zone of harm around that victim, the factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that harm to all who are in the anticipated zone.’” The Supreme Court in Bland gave as examples of appropriate applications of the kill zone theory where an assailant places a bomb on a commercial plane intending to harm a primary target on the plane by killing all the passengers and where a defendant attacks a group of people by using “‘automatic weapon fire or an explosive 15 device devastating enough to kill everyone

2024(People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834 , 850–851, fn. 9; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 317 .) The transferred intent doctrine does not signify an actual transfer of intent from the intended victim to the unintended victim.

2024(People v. Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 850–851, fn. 9.) Instead, this doctrine expresses a policy “that a defendant who shoots at an intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The transferred intent doctrine can be used to establish murder for the death of the unintended victim even when a defendant is charged with the attempted murder of the intended target.

2003The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply because public policy is satisfied when defendant is convicted of first degree murder for killing A. (People v. Birreuta [, supra,] 162 Cal.App.3d 454 , 458-463 . . . .) [^] In People v. Calderon [, supra,] 232 Cal.App.3d 930 . . . , the court found a similar factual scenario present, except that no victim died, and applied the same policy and concluded transferred intent did not properly apply.” (Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.65 (6th ed. 1996) p. 444.) In 1993 when defendant committed the murders, one authoritative treatise explained: “The cases ar

2002We also find unpersuasive a New Mexico intermediate appellate court decision predating Czahara, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 836 , and Calderon, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 930 , 283 Cal. Rptr. 833 , that concluded transferred intent applies to attempted murder. ( State v. Gillette (N.M.Ct.App.1985) 102 N.M. 695 , 699 P.2d 626, 634-636 .) [6] This concurrent intent theory is not a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions such as is the doctrine of transferred intent.

2026(Lopez, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250; see also Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 685 [“the jury could not have convicted Nguyen of first degree murder without finding he personally harbored an intent to kill”].) Indeed, as Nguyen observed, the “doctrine is typically applied in the context of a single defendant who is the actual killer.” (Nguyen, at p. 680; see People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 60, 62-66 ; People v. Sutic (1953) 41 Cal.2d 483, 491-492 ; but see People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22 , 33, fn. 9 [applying the transferred intent doctrine to conspirators]; People

1984(People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 189 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ]; People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 88-89 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 539 P.2d 43 ]; People v. Sutic (1953) 41 Cal.2d 483, 490-492 [ 261 P.2d 241 ].) Although the validity of the transferred intent doctrine as a general proposition is not open to question at our level of the appellate process, its application to a case where the intended victim has been actually killed appears to be an open question.