transferred intent doctrine in Indiana

2020Under the doctrine of transferred intent, “a defendant’s intent to kill one person is transferred when, by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third person” and, despite his intent to kill another, “the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of the person who was killed.” Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998).

2015Under the doctrine of transferred intent “a defendant’s intent to kill one person is transferred when, by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third person; the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of the person who was killed, even though the defendant intended to kill another.” Blanche, 690 N.E.2d at 712 (citing White, 638 N.E.2d at 786 ). [16] The doctrine of transferred intent has not previously been applied to the crime of intimidation.

2012See Norris v. State, 275 Ind. 608, 614-15 , 419 N.E.2d 129, 132-33 (1981) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that the defendant, suffering from delusions and paranoia cause by his ingestion of PCP, intended to kill someone, and therefore affirming defendant's conviction for attempted murder based on the doctrine of transferred intent). 16 .For example, in State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854, 858 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, the defendant shot and killed his girlfriend and was charged with murder.

2012See Norris v. State, 275 Ind. 608, 614-15 , 419 N.E.2d 129, 132-33 (1981) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that the defendant, suffering from delusions and paranoia cause by his ingestion of PCP, intended to kill someone, and therefore affirming defendant's conviction for attempted murder based on the doctrine of transferred intent). 16 .For example, in State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854, 858 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, the defendant shot and killed his girlfriend and was charged with murder.

2012See Norris v. State, 275 Ind. 608, 614-15 , 419 N.E.2d 129, 132-33 (1981) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that the defendant, suffering from delusions and paranoia cause by his ingestion of PCP, intended to kill someone, and therefore affirming defendant‟s conviction for attempted murder based on the doctrine of transferred intent). 16 For example, in State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854, 858 (Utah 1999), cert. denied, the defendant shot and killed his girlfriend and was charged with murder.

2012See Norris v. State, 275 Ind. 608, 614-15 , 419 N.E.2d 129, 132-33 (1981) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that the defendant, suffering from delusions and paranoia cause by his ingestion of PCP, intended to kill someone, and therefore affirming defendant's conviction for attempted murder based on the doctrine of transferred intent). 16 .For example, in State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854, 858 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, the defendant shot and killed his girlfriend and was charged with murder.

1991The Norris court clearly did not limit the doctrine of transferred intent to the particular situation of mistaken identity of the victim, but stated: "Under the doctrine of transferred intent, the essential element is present if the accused intended to kill someone." Norris, supra, at 133 , citing Taylor v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 264, 279-80 , 295 N.E.2d 600, 609 , cert. denied, (1973) 414 U.S. 1012 , 94 S.Ct. 377 , 38 L.Ed.2d 250 .

1991The Norris court clearly did not limit the doctrine of transferred intent to the particular situation of mistaken identity of the victim, but stated: "Under the doctrine of transferred intent, the essential element is present if the accused intended to kill someone." Norris, supra, at 133 , citing Taylor v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 264, 279-80 , 295 N.E.2d 600, 609 , cert. denied, (1973) 414 U.S. 1012 , 94 S.Ct. 377 , 38 L.Ed.2d 250 .

2016See White v. State, 638 N.E.2d 785, 786 (Ind. 1994) (“Under the doctrine of transferred intent, when a person deliberately attempts to kill another but in the process kills a third person, his intent to kill is transferred and he may be found guilty of the murder of the person who was killed.”). 9 Because there was no serious evidentiary dispute, we need not address Jones’ assertion the trial court erroneously found his tendered instructions were not in proper form.

2015Under the doctrine of transferred intent “a defendant’s intent to kill one person is transferred when, by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third person; the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of the person who was killed, even though the defendant intended to kill another.” Blanche, 690 N.E.2d at 712 (citing White, 638 N.E.2d at 786 ). [16] The doctrine of transferred intent has not previously been applied to the crime of intimidation.

2020Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 629 (Ind. 2002). [31] Over Brumfield’s objection, the trial court gave the State’s tendered instruction on the doctrine of transferred intent, stating: The crime of murder is defined by law as follows: a person who knowingly kills another human being.

2020See Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1077 (Ind. 2001).

2020Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to “make a fair trial impossible.” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002). [16] Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant’s intent to kill one person is transferred when, by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third person; thus, the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of the person who was killed, even though the defendant intended to kill another.

2019Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998); Straub v. State, 567 N.E.2d 87, 90 (Ind. 1991) (holding that the State need not introduce evidence that defendant intended to kill the actual victim, but only that defendant intended to kill someone). [20] Here, Quinones—who does not deny that he acted with specific intent to kill H.J.—fired his gun indiscriminately, as many as eleven times, at the group of seven young men, including R.L.

2019Under the doctrine of transferred intent, “if the evidence shows the requisite mental state to exist in conjunction with the performance of a criminal act, then the law may punish the perpetrator, although the particular person injured was a mere bystander.” Henderson v. State, 343 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. 1976).

2019See Gamble v. State , 831 N.E.2d 178 , 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("[e]rror invited by the complaining party is not reversible error"), trans. denied .

2019See Wright v. State , 828 N.E.2d 904 , 907 (Ind. 2005) (under the invited error doctrine, "a party may not take advantage of an error that she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or misconduct").

2017See McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 764 .

2016App. Ct. 2003) (“Under the doctrine of transferred intent, defendant can be exonerated if he shoots an assailant in self-defense but injures another; defendant’s intent to shoot his assailant in self-defense is transferred to the unintended victim.”); State v. Zumwalt, 973 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“Missouri courts have long applied the rule that if the killing or injury of a person intended to be hit would, under all the circumstances, have been excusable or justifiable on the theory of self-defense, then the unintended killing or injury of a bystander by a random shot fired in the

2016See, e.g., People v. Blue, 799 N.E.2d 804, 811 (Ill.