10 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harvey v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628 (1996) (the doctrine of transferred intent operates with full force whenever the unintended victim is hit and killed; it makes no difference whether the intended victim is missed; hit and killed; or hit and only wounded). 2002See Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628 (1996) (the doctrine of transferred intent operates with full force whenever the unintended victim is hit and killed; it makes no difference whether the intended victim is missed; hit and killed; or hit and only wounded). | 3 | 3 |
Cockrell v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Cockrell v. State, 890 So. 2d 174 (Ala. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Carter v. State, 843 So.2d 812 (Ala.2002). 2011See, e.g., Carter v. State, 843 So.2d 812 (Ala.2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hintongreen2 sentences2004In Hinton , the court, after quoting the foregoing from the attempt statute, concluded, "It is not clear from this language whether the legislature meant the doctrine of transferred intent to apply to an attempt crime whenever the statute defining the crime allows the transfer of intent for the completed offense." 227 Conn. at 316 , 630 A.2d at 601 . 2004In Hinton , the court, after quoting the foregoing from the attempt statute, concluded, "It is not clear from this language whether the legislature meant the doctrine of transferred intent to apply to an attempt crime whenever the statute defining the crime allows the transfer of intent for the completed offense." 227 Conn. at 316 , 630 A.2d at 601 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fernandezgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., People v. Fernandez , 88 N.Y.2d 777 , 783 , 673 N.E.2d 910 , 913-14 , 650 N.Y.S.2d 625 , 628-29 (1996) ("[B]ecause an attempt charge always involves an uncompleted crime, the transferred intent doctrine is ordinarily not implicated. . . . 2004See, e.g., People v. Fernandez , 88 N.Y.2d 777 , 783 , 673 N.E.2d 910 , 913-14 , 650 N.Y.S.2d 625 , 628-29 (1996) ("[B]ecause an attempt charge always involves an uncompleted crime, the transferred intent doctrine is ordinarily not implicated. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Ramsey v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Since the focus of the doctrine of transferred intent under Penal Law § 125.25(1) is the identity of the person whose death actually resulted, this doctrine has no relevance in an attempt case, where an actual death is not an element."); Ramsey v. State , 56 P.3d 675 , 682 (Alaska Ct.App. 2002) ("Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Wood erred in instructing the jury and allowing the State to argue that it could convict Ramsey of attempted murder of S.M. if Ramsey intended to kill Palacios and simultaneously injured S.M. 2004Since the focus of the doctrine of transferred intent under Penal Law § 125.25(1) is the identity of the person whose death actually resulted, this doctrine has no relevance in an attempt case, where an actual death is not an element."); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 682 (Alaska Ct.App.2002) ("Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Wood erred in instructing the jury and allowing the State to argue that it could convict Ramsey of attempted murder of S.M. if Ramsey intended to kill Palacios and simultaneously injured S.M. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Calderongreen2 sentences2003Likewise, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when there is no death.' ( Poe v. State , [ 341 Md. 523 , 529 ], 671 A.2d [501, 504 (1996)].) "In another case, it discussed yet another reason not to apply transferred intent to an inchoate crime like attempted murder. `A related reason why transferred intent cannot properly apply to attempted murder derives from the fact that the crime of attempted murder requires no physical injury to the victim [a circumstance noted in [ People v.] Calderon , [ 232 Cal.App.3d 930 , 936 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 833 , 836 (1991)]]. . . . 2003Likewise, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when there is no death.' ( Poe v. State , [ 341 Md. 523 , 529 ], 671 A.2d [501, 504 (1996)].) "In another case, it discussed yet another reason not to apply transferred intent to an inchoate crime like attempted murder. `A related reason why transferred intent cannot properly apply to attempted murder derives from the fact that the crime of attempted murder requires no physical injury to the victim [a circumstance noted in [ People v.] Calderon , [ 232 Cal.App.3d 930 , 936 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 833 , 836 (1991)]]. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Rainesgreen1 sentence1986"In reviewing a capital conviction in which the accused concedes at trial that he participated in the underlying felony but denies that he committed or aided and abetted the intentional killing, this Court must apply a two-part test. `To affirm a finding of a "particularized intent to kill", the jury must be properly charged on the intent to kill issue, and there must be sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant possessed the intent to kill.' Ex parte Raines, 429 So.2d 1111, 1113 (Ala.1982)." Kennedy v. State, 472 So.2d 1092, 1105 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), affir | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Stategreen1 sentence1986"In reviewing a capital conviction in which the accused concedes at trial that he participated in the underlying felony but denies that he committed or aided and abetted the intentional killing, this Court must apply a two-part test. `To affirm a finding of a "particularized intent to kill", the jury must be properly charged on the intent to kill issue, and there must be sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant possessed the intent to kill.' Ex parte Raines, 429 So.2d 1111, 1113 (Ala.1982)." Kennedy v. State, 472 So.2d 1092, 1105 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), affir | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Duren
green
1 sentence2003In Ex parte Duren, 590 So.2d 369 (Ala.1991), the Alabama Supreme Court considered defense counsel's decision to put forth a legally invalid defense *210 based on the doctrine of transferred intent. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Phillips
green
1 sentence2003In State v. Phillips, supra, this Court addressed this specific question as it related to one of Manassa’s codefen-dants. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Poe v. State
green
2 sentences2003Likewise, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when there is no death.' ( Poe v. State , [ 341 Md. 523 , 529 ], 671 A.2d [501, 504 (1996)].) "In another case, it discussed yet another reason not to apply transferred intent to an inchoate crime like attempted murder. `A related reason why transferred intent cannot properly apply to attempted murder derives from the fact that the crime of attempted murder requires no physical injury to the victim [a circumstance noted in [ People v.] Calderon , [ 232 Cal.App.3d 930 , 936 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 833 , 836 (1991)]]. . . . 2003Likewise, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when there is no death.' ( Poe v. State, [ 341 Md. 523, 529 ], 671 A.2d [501, 504 (1996)].) "In another case, it discussed yet another reason not to apply transferred intent to an inchoate crime like attempted murder. `A related reason why transferred intent cannot properly apply to attempted murder derives from the fact that the crime of attempted murder requires no physical injury to the victim [a circumstance noted in [ People v.] Calderon, [ 232 Cal.App.3d 930, 936 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 833, 836 (1991)]].... | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ex Parte Jackson
green
1 sentence2002They argue that the “doctrine of transferred intent will apply within the same class of individuals, such as police officer to police officer, or child to child, [but that] it will not transfer capitally from one protected class to another protected class.” (Appellees’s brief to this Court, page 5.) They rely solely on the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding in Ex parte Jackson, 614 So.2d 405 (Ala.1993). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Farrior v. State
green
2 sentences2002The State cites this Court’s case of Farrior v. State, 728 So.2d 691 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), in support of its contention.” The State proceeded under the theory that the intent to kill the police officers transferred to the intent to kill six-year-old Kearis Bonham. 2002The State cites this Court’s case of Farri- or v. State, 728 So.2d 691 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), in support of its contention. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Womack v. State
green
1 sentence1986The appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence presented under the accomplice liability doctrine to convict "someone who was an accomplice merely in an underlying felony rather than an intentional killing, particularly when the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply." The appellant concedes in his brief that he was an accomplice in the underlying felony; however, he cites Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754 (Ala.Cr.App.), affirmed, 435 So. 2d 766 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 , 104 S.Ct. 436 , 87 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983), to argue that because he was a non-triggerman accomplice | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ex Parte Womack
green
1 sentence1986The appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence presented under the accomplice liability doctrine to convict "someone who was an accomplice merely in an underlying felony rather than an intentional killing, particularly when the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply." The appellant concedes in his brief that he was an accomplice in the underlying felony; however, he cites Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754 (Ala.Cr.App.), affirmed, 435 So. 2d 766 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 , 104 S.Ct. 436 , 87 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983), to argue that because he was a non-triggerman accomplice | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Salser v. United States
green
1 sentence1986The appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence presented under the accomplice liability doctrine to convict "someone who was an accomplice merely in an underlying felony rather than an intentional killing, particularly when the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply." The appellant concedes in his brief that he was an accomplice in the underlying felony; however, he cites Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754 (Ala.Cr.App.), affirmed, 435 So. 2d 766 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 , 104 S.Ct. 436 , 87 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983), to argue that because he was a non-triggerman accomplice | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Dick v. Kemp
green
1 sentence1986The appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence presented under the accomplice liability doctrine to convict "someone who was an accomplice merely in an underlying felony rather than an intentional killing, particularly when the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply." The appellant concedes in his brief that he was an accomplice in the underlying felony; however, he cites Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754 (Ala.Cr.App.), affirmed, 435 So. 2d 766 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 , 104 S.Ct. 436 , 87 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983), to argue that because he was a non-triggerman accomplice | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ex Parte Kennedy
green
1 sentence1986"In reviewing a capital conviction in which the accused concedes at trial that he participated in the underlying felony but denies that he committed or aided and abetted the intentional killing, this Court must apply a two-part test. `To affirm a finding of a "particularized intent to kill", the jury must be properly charged on the intent to kill issue, and there must be sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant possessed the intent to kill.' Ex parte Raines, 429 So.2d 1111, 1113 (Ala.1982)." Kennedy v. State, 472 So.2d 1092, 1105 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), affir | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.