transferred intent doctrine in South Carolina

2025King, 422 S.C. at 63-4 , 810 S.E.2d at 26-27 ("We find the General Assembly expressly repealed the offense of ABWIK and purposefully created the new offense of attempted murder . . . ."). 3 See 340 S.C. at 272 , 531 S.E.2d at 515 ("[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder or manslaughter in a case of bad or mistaken aim under the doctrine of transferred intent."); 21 Am.

2025King, 422 S.C. at 63-4 , 810 S.E.2d at 26-27 ("We find the General Assembly expressly repealed the offense of ABWIK and purposefully created the new offense of attempted murder . . . ."). 3 See 340 S.C. at 272 , 531 S.E.2d at 515 ("[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder or manslaughter in a case of bad or mistaken aim under the doctrine of transferred intent."); 21 Am.

2025Id.; see also State v. Gerald Rudell Williams, 427 S.C. 148 , 157 n.9, 829 S.E.2d 702 , 707 n.9 (2019) (finding "the doctrine of transferred intent [is] unnecessary to sustain the convictions for the attempted murders").

2025Id.; see also State v. Gerald Rudell Williams, 427 S.C. 148 , 157 n.9, 829 S.E.2d 702 , 707 n.9 (2019) (finding "the doctrine of transferred intent [is] unnecessary to sustain the convictions for the attempted murders").

2025See State v. Devonta Edward Williams, 437 S.C. 100 , 103, 103- 06, 876 S.E.2d 324 , 326, 326-28 (Ct. App. 2022) (stating the crime of attempted murder "often seems to present confusing issues" and discussing whether transferred intent applies); State v. James Caleb Williams, 435 S.C. 288 , 299, 867 S.E.2d 430 , 436 (Ct. App. 2021) ("We find the doctrine of transferred intent inapplicable to this charge of attempted murder."), rev'd on other grounds, 439 S.C. 620 , 889 S.E.2d 562 (2023); State v. Michael Juan Smith, 425 S.C. 20, 34 , 819 S.E.2d 187, 194 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding "the State prope

2025See State v. Devonta Edward Williams, 437 S.C. 100 , 103, 103- 06, 876 S.E.2d 324 , 326, 326-28 (Ct. App. 2022) (stating the crime of attempted murder "often seems to present confusing issues" and discussing whether transferred intent applies); State v. James Caleb Williams, 435 S.C. 288 , 299, 867 S.E.2d 430 , 436 (Ct. App. 2021) ("We find the doctrine of transferred intent inapplicable to this charge of attempted murder."), rev'd on other grounds, 439 S.C. 620 , 889 S.E.2d 562 (2023); State v. Michael Juan Smith, 425 S.C. 20, 34 , 819 S.E.2d 187, 194 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding "the State prope

2021See Cockrell v. State, 890 So. 2d 174, 181 (Ala. 2004) ("Applying the foregoing rules of construction, we conclude that the statute defining 'attempt' does not clearly evince a legislative intent to apply the doctrine of transferred intent—applicable only to the completed crime of murder—to punish as attempted murder the consequences of an unintended, nonfatal result."); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (finding the jury would have to conclude the defendant intended to kill the injured victim to convict her of attempted murder and could not rely upon transferred intent)

2018The Hinton court relied on the "rule of lenity" commonly used to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant: "Under the circumstances of this case, the rule of lenity leads us to conclude that the transferred intent doctrine should not be applied to the crime of attempted murder." 630 A.2d at 602 .

2018See e.g. , State v. Horne , 282 S.C. 444 , 446, 319 S.E.2d 703 , 704 (1984) ("If **435 there was malice in [the actor's] heart ... it matters not whether he killed his intended victim or a third person through mistake.... [T]he actor's intent to kill his intended victim is said to be transferred to his actual victim.").

2018See e.g. , State v. Horne , 282 S.C. 444 , 446, 319 S.E.2d 703 , 704 (1984) ("If **435 there was malice in [the actor's] heart ... it matters not whether he killed his intended victim or a third person through mistake.... [T]he actor's intent to kill his intended victim is said to be transferred to his actual victim.").

2021See Cockrell v. State, 890 So. 2d 174, 181 (Ala. 2004) ("Applying the foregoing rules of construction, we conclude that the statute defining 'attempt' does not clearly evince a legislative intent to apply the doctrine of transferred intent—applicable only to the completed crime of murder—to punish as attempted murder the consequences of an unintended, nonfatal result."); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (finding the jury would have to conclude the defendant intended to kill the injured victim to convict her of attempted murder and could not rely upon transferred intent)

2018Intent to murder is transferable to each unintended victim once there is an attempt to kill someone."), and State v. Gillette , 102 N.M. 695 , 699 P.2d 626 , 636 (Ct. App. 1985) (affirming three convictions of attempted murder when a defendant sent a poisoned drink to an intended victim, and the intended victim and two others ingested the drink but were not injured; finding defendant's felonious intent to kill transferred to others who foreseeably would ingest the poison), with Harrison v. State , 382 Md. 477 , 855 A.2d 1220 , 1237 (2004) (listing cases from several jurisdictions that have rej

2025King, 422 S.C. at 63-4 , 810 S.E.2d at 26-27 ("We find the General Assembly expressly repealed the offense of ABWIK and purposefully created the new offense of attempted murder . . . ."). 3 See 340 S.C. at 272 , 531 S.E.2d at 515 ("[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder or manslaughter in a case of bad or mistaken aim under the doctrine of transferred intent."); 21 Am.

2025King, 422 S.C. at 63-4 , 810 S.E.2d at 26-27 ("We find the General Assembly expressly repealed the offense of ABWIK and purposefully created the new offense of attempted murder . . . ."). 3 See 340 S.C. at 272 , 531 S.E.2d at 515 ("[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder or manslaughter in a case of bad or mistaken aim under the doctrine of transferred intent."); 21 Am.

2021See Cockrell v. State, 890 So. 2d 174, 181 (Ala. 2004) ("Applying the foregoing rules of construction, we conclude that the statute defining 'attempt' does not clearly evince a legislative intent to apply the doctrine of transferred intent—applicable only to the completed crime of murder—to punish as attempted murder the consequences of an unintended, nonfatal result."); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (finding the jury would have to conclude the defendant intended to kill the injured victim to convict her of attempted murder and could not rely upon transferred intent)

2021See Cockrell v. State, 890 So. 2d 174, 181 (Ala. 2004) ("Applying the foregoing rules of construction, we conclude that the statute defining 'attempt' does not clearly evince a legislative intent to apply the doctrine of transferred intent—applicable only to the completed crime of murder—to punish as attempted murder the consequences of an unintended, nonfatal result."); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (finding the jury would have to conclude the defendant intended to kill the injured victim to convict her of attempted murder and could not rely upon transferred intent)

2021See Cockrell v. State, 890 So. 2d 174, 181 (Ala. 2004) ("Applying the foregoing rules of construction, we conclude that the statute defining 'attempt' does not clearly evince a legislative intent to apply the doctrine of transferred intent—applicable only to the completed crime of murder—to punish as attempted murder the consequences of an unintended, nonfatal result."); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (finding the jury would have to conclude the defendant intended to kill the injured victim to convict her of attempted murder and could not rely upon transferred intent)

2021See Cockrell v. State, 890 So. 2d 174, 181 (Ala. 2004) ("Applying the foregoing rules of construction, we conclude that the statute defining 'attempt' does not clearly evince a legislative intent to apply the doctrine of transferred intent—applicable only to the completed crime of murder—to punish as attempted murder the consequences of an unintended, nonfatal result."); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (finding the jury would have to conclude the defendant intended to kill the injured victim to convict her of attempted murder and could not rely upon transferred intent)

2019See id. at 434 , 818 S.E.2d at 490-91 (finding, under this scenario, the trial court did not err in finding mutual combat a viable theory of prosecution for the murder charge); id. at 434-35 , 818 S.E.2d at 491 (determining the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of transferred intent to Young, Jr., noting there was evidence Robinson fired at the Youngs with intent to kill such that his intent was transferred to Victim, and under the theory of mutual combat, all combatants are deemed equally responsible for the natural consequences of their actions during combat and all may be hel

2019See id. at 434 , 818 S.E.2d at 490-91 (finding, under this scenario, the trial court did not err in finding mutual combat a viable theory of prosecution for the murder charge); id. at 434-35 , 818 S.E.2d at 491 (determining the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of transferred intent to Young, Jr., noting there was evidence Robinson fired at the Youngs with intent to kill such that his intent was transferred to Victim, and under the theory of mutual combat, all combatants are deemed equally responsible for the natural consequences of their actions during combat and all may be hel

2018As to issue one: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455 , 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617 , 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict, issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion are not preserved for appellate review."); id. ("A defendant cannot argue on appeal an issue in support of his directed verdict motion when the issue was not presented to the trial court below."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.

2018As to issue one: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455 , 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617 , 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict, issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion are not preserved for appellate review."); id. ("A defendant cannot argue on appeal an issue in support of his directed verdict motion when the issue was not presented to the trial court below."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.

2018As to issue one: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455 , 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617 , 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict, issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion are not preserved for appellate review."); id. ("A defendant cannot argue on appeal an issue in support of his directed verdict motion when the issue was not presented to the trial court below."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.

2018As to issue one: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455 , 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617 , 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict, issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion are not preserved for appellate review."); id. ("A defendant cannot argue on appeal an issue in support of his directed verdict motion when the issue was not presented to the trial court below."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.

2018Compare State v. Brady , 745 So.2d 954 , 957 n.4, 958 (Fla. 1999) (finding "no need to resort to the doctrine of transferred intent" when the facts supported the conviction of attempted second-degree murder, but listing cases from several jurisdictions in which courts used transferred intent to affirm convictions when the crime required proof of an intent to kill), id. ("[S]o long as there is evidence of an intent to kill, it makes no difference that someone other than the intended victim was killed or injured."), State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales , 164 Ariz. 1 , 790 P.2d 287 , 288 (Ct. App. 1990) (

2018Compare State v. Brady , 745 So.2d 954 , 957 n.4, 958 (Fla. 1999) (finding "no need to resort to the doctrine of transferred intent" when the facts supported the conviction of attempted second-degree murder, but listing cases from several jurisdictions in which courts used transferred intent to affirm convictions when the crime required proof of an intent to kill), id. ("[S]o long as there is evidence of an intent to kill, it makes no difference that someone other than the intended victim was killed or injured."), State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales , 164 Ariz. 1 , 790 P.2d 287 , 288 (Ct. App. 1990) (

2018As to issue one: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455 , 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617 , 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict, issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion are not preserved for appellate review."); id. ("A defendant cannot argue on appeal an issue in support of his directed verdict motion when the issue was not presented to the trial court below."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.

2018As to issue one: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455 , 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617 , 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999) ("In reviewing a denial of directed verdict, issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict motion are not preserved for appellate review."); id. ("A defendant cannot argue on appeal an issue in support of his directed verdict motion when the issue was not presented to the trial court below."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.

2018Compare State v. Brady , 745 So.2d 954 , 957 n.4, 958 (Fla. 1999) (finding "no need to resort to the doctrine of transferred intent" when the facts supported the conviction of attempted second-degree murder, but listing cases from several jurisdictions in which courts used transferred intent to affirm convictions when the crime required proof of an intent to kill), id. ("[S]o long as there is evidence of an intent to kill, it makes no difference that someone other than the intended victim was killed or injured."), State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales , 164 Ariz. 1 , 790 P.2d 287 , 288 (Ct. App. 1990) (

2018Compare State v. Brady , 745 So.2d 954 , 957 n.4, 958 (Fla. 1999) (finding "no need to resort to the doctrine of transferred intent" when the facts supported the conviction of attempted second-degree murder, but listing cases from several jurisdictions in which courts used transferred intent to affirm convictions when the crime required proof of an intent to kill), id. ("[S]o long as there is evidence of an intent to kill, it makes no difference that someone other than the intended victim was killed or injured."), State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales , 164 Ariz. 1 , 790 P.2d 287 , 288 (Ct. App. 1990) (

2000See People v. Scott, 14 Cal.4th 544 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 , 927 P.2d 288, 292 (1996) (“[cjontrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being ‘used up’ once it is employed to convict a defendant of a specific intent crime against the intended victim”); State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301 , 630 A.2d 593, 597-98 (1993) (rejecting argument that intent to kill may not be transferred to unintended victim *272 when intended victim is killed); Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628, 637 (1996) (explaining that the mens rea

2000See People v. Scott, 14 Cal.4th 544 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 , 927 P.2d 288, 292 (1996) (“[cjontrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being ‘used up’ once it is employed to convict a defendant of a specific intent crime against the intended victim”); State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301 , 630 A.2d 593, 597-98 (1993) (rejecting argument that intent to kill may not be transferred to unintended victim *272 when intended victim is killed); Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628, 637 (1996) (explaining that the mens rea

2000See People v. Scott, 14 Cal.4th 544 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 , 927 P.2d 288, 292 (1996) (“[cjontrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being ‘used up’ once it is employed to convict a defendant of a specific intent crime against the intended victim”); State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301 , 630 A.2d 593, 597-98 (1993) (rejecting argument that intent to kill may not be transferred to unintended victim *272 when intended victim is killed); Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628, 637 (1996) (explaining that the mens rea

2000See People v. Scott, 14 Cal.4th 544 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 , 927 P.2d 288, 292 (1996) (“[cjontrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being ‘used up’ once it is employed to convict a defendant of a specific intent crime against the intended victim”); State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301 , 630 A.2d 593, 597-98 (1993) (rejecting argument that intent to kill may not be transferred to unintended victim *272 when intended victim is killed); Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628, 637 (1996) (explaining that the mens rea