transferred intent doctrine in Texas

2008See Pennsylvania v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006) (defendant responsible for murders of mother and unborn child under Pennsylvania statute similar to Section 6.04(b)(2)); People v. Carlson, 37 Cal.App.3d 349 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 321, 326 (1974) (doctrine of transferred intent applies even though the original object of the assault is killed as well as the person whose death was the unintended result; therefore, “in the present case in the application of the doctrine of transferred intent, the law would transfer defendant’s felonious intent to kill his [murdered] wife to the fetus and

2008Ct. 2006) (defendant responsible for murders of mother and unborn child under Pennsylvania statute similar to Section 6.04(b)(2)); People v. Carlson , 112 Cal. Rptr. 321, 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (doctrine of transferred intent applies even though the original object of the assault is killed as well as the person whose death was the unintended result; therefore, "in the present case in the application of the doctrine of transferred intent, the law would transfer defendant's felonious intent to kill his [murdered] wife to the fetus and the criminality of defendant's act toward the fetus would b

2004Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1992, pet. ref’d), citing Garrett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982).

2001Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, pet. ref'd), citing Garrett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982).

2004Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1992, pet. ref’d), citing Garrett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982).

2001Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, pet. ref'd), citing Garrett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982).

2006Id. at 255 . [9] A hypothetically correct jury charge would include the doctrine of transferred intent. [10] See Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 647-48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (en banc); Swartz v. State, 61 S.W.3d at 786 . 2.

2006Id. at 255 . 9 A hypothetically correct jury charge would include the doctrine of transferred intent. 10 See Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 647-48 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (en banc); Swartz v. State, 61 S.W.3d at 786 . 2.

2016See id.; see also Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174 . 15 We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

2011See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (requiring, when defendant objected to charge at trial, that error cause “some harm” to justify reversal).

2008It, therefore, cannot fairly be said that the Court should disregard the rule of stare decisis and overrule Norris on the basis that Norris was erroneously reasoned or "flawed from the outset." See State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-03 (Tex.Cr.App.2002) (Cochran, J., joined by Keller, P.J., and Keasler, Hervey, and Holcomb, JJ.) (a reason for disregarding the rule of stare decisis is that the previous decision was flawed from the outset).

2008It, therefore, cannot fairly be said that the Court should disregard the rule of stare decisis and overrule Norris on the basis that Norris was erroneously reasoned or “flawed from the outset.” See State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-03 (Tex.Cr.App.2002) (Cochran, J., joined by Keller, P. J., and Keasler, Hervey, and Holcomb, JJ.) (a reason for disregarding the rule of stare decisis is that the previous decision was flawed from the outset).

2008See Pennsylvania v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006) (defendant responsible for murders of mother and unborn child under Pennsylvania statute similar to Section 6.04(b)(2)); People v. Carlson, 37 Cal.App.3d 349 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 321, 326 (1974) (doctrine of transferred intent applies even though the original object of the assault is killed as well as the person whose death was the unintended result; therefore, “in the present case in the application of the doctrine of transferred intent, the law would transfer defendant’s felonious intent to kill his [murdered] wife to the fetus and

2008See Pennsylvania v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006) (defendant responsible for murders of mother and unborn child under Pennsylvania statute similar to Section 6.04(b)(2)); People v. Carlson, 37 Cal.App.3d 349 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 321, 326 (1974) (doctrine of transferred intent applies even though the original object of the assault is killed as well as the person whose death was the unintended result; therefore, “in the present case in the application of the doctrine of transferred intent, the law would transfer defendant’s felonious intent to kill his [murdered] wife to the fetus and

2005Chimney v. State , 6 S.W.3d 681, 700 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d).

2005Chimney v. State, 6 S.W.3d 681, 700 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, pet. ref'd).

2025Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 800 (Tex. Crim.

2016Id. (citing Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (holding that unless defendant timely requests jury instruction on defensive issue, he may not complain about its absence on appeal)).

2024See Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 397 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“A ‘classic example’ of the application of the transferred intent doctrine is ‘the act of firing a gun at an intended victim while that person is in a group of other persons.’”); see also Lewis v. State, No. 04- 12-00428-CR, 2014 WL 1494593 , at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Under the principle of transferred intent, Lewis is criminally responsible for Bennett’s death even though the evidence shows Lewis intended to shoot Griffin, not Be

2024See Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 397 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“A ‘classic example’ of the application of the transferred intent doctrine is ‘the act of firing a gun at an intended victim while that person is in a group of other persons.’”); see also Lewis v. State, No. 04- 12-00428-CR, 2014 WL 1494593 , at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Under the principle of transferred intent, Lewis is criminally responsible for Bennett’s death even though the evidence shows Lewis intended to shoot Griffin, not Be

2015See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743 .

2015See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743 .

2013App. 2002). 30 953 S.W.2d 234, 239-40 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240 .

2019Adams v. State, 744 S.W.2d 622, 628-29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, pet. ref’d).

2019Adams v. State , 744 S.W.2d 622 , 628-29 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, pet. ref'd).

1995An illustration of the doctrine of transferred intent is found in Williams v. State, 567 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).

1990The Fourth Court cited McNeal and Williams v. State, 567 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals clearly held that the doctrine of transferred intent applied to § 19.02(a)(1).

2025See Tex. Penal Code § 6.04(b); see also Bazanes v. State, 310 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d) (noting in harm analysis concerning error in application section that abstract portion of charge “accurately stated the substantive law”).

2016See Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (defendant did not show harm, when court presumed, without deciding, “that the trial court erroneously failed to name the specific intended victim in the application paragraph of the transferred intent instruction”); see also Sakil, 287 S.W.3d at 25–26 (if error does exist, appellate court evaluates whether sufficient harm resulted so as to require reversal).

2016App. 2002) (“[P]oint of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”); Johnson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 602 , 614–15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (because defendant’s jury-charge issue not preserved where issue on appeal did not comport with specific complaint made to trial court, appellate court reviewed record only for “egregious harm”); Rivera v. State, 12 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref’d) (where defendant “did not make any objection to the instruction,” “error does not require reversal unless it is so egregious and created such harm t

2016Id. (citing Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (holding that unless defendant timely requests jury instruction on defensive issue, he may not complain about its absence on appeal)).

2016At trial, appellant objected “to the paragraph [in the trial court’s charge] that [was] specifically designed to define and include transferred intent” because there was not “any evidence presented [at trial] . . . that [appellant] fired a weapon at a third person with the intent to commit harm or serious bodily injury to that third person.” However, on appeal, appellant now argues that the trial court erred in including the transferred-intent instruction in its charge to the jury because the application paragraph did not identify the “specific person” “to whom [a]ppellant intended to cause se

2016At trial, appellant objected “to the paragraph [in the trial court’s charge] that [was] specifically designed to define and include transferred intent” because there was not “any evidence presented [at trial] . . . that [appellant] fired a weapon at a third person with the intent to commit harm or serious bodily injury to that third person.” However, on appeal, appellant now argues that the trial court erred in including the transferred-intent instruction in its charge to the jury because the application paragraph did not identify the “specific person” “to whom [a]ppellant intended to cause se

2015In Ex parte Norris, this Court clarified that the State was not required to prove intent to kill the same number of people actually murdered in a trial for capital murder, and that the doctrine of transferred intent may apply where “separate instances of conduct occurred […] but were still sufficiently separate to involve separate intents.” Ex parte Norris, 390 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. Crim.