transferred intent doctrine in District of Columbia

2014See O'Connor v. United States, 399 A.2d 21, 24 (D.C.1979) (noting that the doctrine of transferred intent "provides that when a defendant purposely attempts to kill one person but by mistake or accident kills another, the felonious intent of the defendant will be transferred from the intended victim to the actual, unintended victim”). 139 .

1995Apparently, in neither O'Connor, supra note 6, nor In re E.D.P., 573 A.2d 1307, 1308 (D.C.1990), each of which expressly applied the doctrine of transferred intent, was the defendant charged with assaulting his intended victim. .

2022In explaining that conclusion, we emphasized the statute’s “major . . . purpose, to punish an assailant whose criminal conduct potentially exposes the assault victim to a greater risk of harm because the assault is accompanied by an intent to commit another offense.” Id. 54 I understand Moore to adopt a simple, uniform rule: as a matter of statutory interpretation, § 22-401 does not require that the victim of the assault also be the person whom the defendant intends to rob or kill or poison, etc. Thus, there is no need for the “common law doctrine of transferred intent.” Brooks v. United State

2005In order to establish plain error, West must show that any error in giving the transferred intent instruction was “obvious or readily apparent, and that it was so clearly prejudicial to [his] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.” Id. (quoting Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154 , 159 & n. 6 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (citations omitted)).

2022By contrast, “non-application of the transferred intent doctrine to cases of inchoate criminal homicide [including assault with intent to kill] does not create the punishment vacuum that might be present in cases of consummated criminal homicide.” Harvey, 681 A.2d at 642-43 .

2022Moreover, “[i]n the case of unintended victims who are simply in harm’s way and are not actually injured, the crime of reckless endangerment is also available to pick up much of the slack and to make resort to the transferred intent doctrine less compelling.” Id. at 643 .

2022See, e.g., Ruffin v. United States, 642 A.2d 1288 (D.C. 1994); Brooks v. United States, 655 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1995); Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106 (D.C. 1995); Dockery v. United States, 853 A.2d 687 (D.C. 2004); West v. United States, 866 A.2d 74 (D.C. 2005). 13 The parties disagree about whether this court has resolved the question presented here.

2004See Mungo v. United States, 772 A.2d 240, 245-46 (D.C.2001) (defining assault to include an attempt to cause injury); (Steven) Brooks v. United States, 655 A.2d 844, 846-49 (D.C.1995) (discussing doctrine of transferred intent); Ruffin v. United States, 642 A.2d 1288, 1293-96 (D.C.1994) (same). 12 .

2022In addition to Dockery, discussed above, see, e.g., Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 43 (D.C. 2014) (“[T]he doctrine of transferred intent . . . allowed appellants to be held liable for the . . . wounding of Flores-Bonilla even though the appellants intended to kill Madhis.”); In re E.D.P., 573 A.2d 1307 , 1308 (D.C. 1990) (“Under the doctrine of transferred intent, the trial judge could find that where a person attempts to injure one person (W.F.), but injures another by mistake (the three juvenile supervisors), the intent of the defendant will be transferred from the intended victim (W.F.

1995Apparently, in neither O'Connor, supra note 6, nor In re E.D.P., 573 A.2d 1307, 1308 (D.C.1990), each of which expressly applied the doctrine of transferred intent, was the defendant charged with assaulting his intended victim. .

2022The Maryland court further noted that “extend[ing] the doctrine of transferred intent to cases where the [un]intended victim is not harmed would be untenable” because the “absurd result would be to make one criminally culpable for each unintended 21 victim who, although in harm’s way, was in fact not harmed by a missed attempt towards a specific person.” Id. at 639 (quoting Harrod v. State, 499 A.2d 959, 968 (Md.

2022In addition to Dockery, discussed above, see, e.g., Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 43 (D.C. 2014) (“[T]he doctrine of transferred intent . . . allowed appellants to be held liable for the . . . wounding of Flores-Bonilla even though the appellants intended to kill Madhis.”); In re E.D.P., 573 A.2d 1307 , 1308 (D.C. 1990) (“Under the doctrine of transferred intent, the trial judge could find that where a person attempts to injure one person (W.F.), but injures another by mistake (the three juvenile supervisors), the intent of the defendant will be transferred from the intended victim (W.F.

2014See Foreman v. United States, 792 A.2d 1043, 1058 (D.C.2002). 140 .

2004See Mungo v. United States, 772 A.2d 240, 245-46 (D.C.2001) (defining assault to include an attempt to cause injury); (Steven) Brooks v. United States, 655 A.2d 844, 846-49 (D.C.1995) (discussing doctrine of transferred intent); Ruffin v. United States, 642 A.2d 1288, 1293-96 (D.C.1994) (same). 12 .

2002See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

2002See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

2002To accept that limitation, given the difficulties inherent in proving criminal mens rea in regard to an unintended victim, see Harvey, 681 A.2d at 642 ; Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 39 (D.C.1990) (en banc), would risk rewarding a shooter who merely happens to have demonstrated a good aim, contrary to an underlying principle of the doctrine that “the intent with which a criminal act is done determines the legal character of its consequences.” Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1325 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2002To accept that limitation, given the difficulties inherent in proving criminal mens rea in regard to an unintended victim, see Harvey, 681 A.2d at 642 ; Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 39 (D.C.1990) (en banc), would risk rewarding a shooter who merely happens to have demonstrated a good aim, contrary to an underlying principle of the doctrine that “the intent with which a criminal act is done determines the legal character of its consequences.” Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1325 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2002See also Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501, 503 (1996) (“[T]he passing of the bullet through the arm of the intended victim before killing the unintended victim does not alter or negate the application of the doctrine of transferred intent”); Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628, 638 (1996) (“[T]here is no doubt that the guilt of the defendant for the death of the unintended victim would be precisely the same in the Poe scenario, regardless of whether the intended victim (1) was hit and only wounded or (2) was hit and killed.

2002See also Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501, 503 (1996) (“[T]he passing of the bullet through the arm of the intended victim before killing the unintended victim does not alter or negate the application of the doctrine of transferred intent”); Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628, 638 (1996) (“[T]here is no doubt that the guilt of the defendant for the death of the unintended victim would be precisely the same in the Poe scenario, regardless of whether the intended victim (1) was hit and only wounded or (2) was hit and killed.

1995Ford, 625 A.2d at 1000 (quoting People v. Calderon, 282 Cal.App.3d 930 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 833, 836 (1991)). 8 Under Ford , therefore, appellant’s intent to murder Aeklin could be “transferred” only if he had killed German or Strauss.

1995Ford, 625 A.2d at 1000 (quoting People v. Calderon, 232 Cal.App.3d 930 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 833, 836 (1991)). [8] Under Ford , therefore, appellant's intent to murder Acklin could be "transferred" only if he had killed German or Strauss.

1995He accordingly must demonstrate both that the alleged instructional error was “ ‘obvious or readily apparent,’” and that it was “‘so clearly prejudicial to [his] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.’” Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154 , 159 & n. 6 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 795 (D.C.1993) (“Both prongs of the [plain error] standard must be satisfied”).

1995He accordingly must demonstrate both that the alleged instructional error was "`obvious or readily apparent,'" and that it was "`so clearly prejudicial to [his] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.'" Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154 , 159 & n. 6 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 795 (D.C.1993) ("Both prongs of the [plain error] standard must be satisfied").

1995Indeed, the Ford court recognized that its understanding of transferred intent was contrary to the prevailing rule in Maryland of Wilson, supra, that transferred intent could properly support a conviction for attempted murder (or, presumably, assault with intent to murder) even if that crime had also been completed against the intended victim. 9 See also State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156 , 571 A.2d 1227, 1231 (1990) (specific intent required for attempted murder “may be a ‘transferred’ intent, that is, the mens rea of a defendant as to his intended victim will be transferred to an unintended victim w

1995Indeed, the Ford court recognized that its understanding of transferred intent was contrary to the prevailing rule in Maryland of Wilson, supra, that transferred intent could properly support a conviction for attempted murder (or, presumably, assault with intent to murder) even if that crime had also been completed against the intended victim. 9 See also State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156 , 571 A.2d 1227, 1231 (1990) (specific intent required for attempted murder “may be a ‘transferred’ intent, that is, the mens rea of a defendant as to his intended victim will be transferred to an unintended victim w

1994Appellant argues in conclusion (Brief at 46) that this court must reverse his first-degree murder conviction and “order a new trial on the lesser included offense of the second-degree murder of Marcia Williams.... ” *1291 We preliminarily note that first-degree murder is a purposeful killing with “premeditated and deliberate malice,” D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989), while second-degree murder is “unplanned or impulsive.” Watson v. United States, 501 A.2d 791, 792 (D.C.1985); Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C.1982).

1994Appellant argues in conclusion (Brief at 46) that this court must reverse his first-degree murder conviction and “order a new trial on the lesser included offense of the second-degree murder of Marcia Williams.... ” *1291 We preliminarily note that first-degree murder is a purposeful killing with “premeditated and deliberate malice,” D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989), while second-degree murder is “unplanned or impulsive.” Watson v. United States, 501 A.2d 791, 792 (D.C.1985); Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C.1982).