commitment standard in New York

1984In Jackson v Indiana {supra, p 738 ), the Supreme Court held that an individual can only be held for a “reasonable period” of time to determine if he can attain the capacity to proceed to trial and if it be determined that he or she cannot attain that capacity, the State must either institute a civil commitment or release the defendant, rationalizing that subjecting defendant to a more lenient commitment standard and/or a more stringent standard of release than others not charged with crimes, in effect, condemned him or her to permanent institutionalization (Matter of Kesselbrenner v Anonymous

1981In Jackson (supra), the United States Supreme Court held that it was a deprivation of equal protection of the laws to hold an indicted, incompetent person to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses.

1979In accepting this contention, the court held "that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release * * * Indiana deprived petitioner [Jackson] of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment." ( 406 US, at p 730 , supra [footnote omitted].) [3] In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on its prior decisi

1979In accepting this contention, the court held "that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release * * * Indiana deprived petitioner [Jackson] of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment." ( 406 US, at p 730 , supra [footnote omitted].) [3] In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on its prior decisi

1982This contention was put to rest by the United States Supreme Court in Addington v Texas ( 441 US 418 ).

1981The court in Addington v Texas ( 441 US 418, 432-433 ) clearly and in unmistakable descriptive language stated that in a civil commitment proceeding, “To meet due process demands, the standard has to inform the factfinder that proof must be greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases”.

1979Schuster v Herold , 410 F.2d 1071 , cert den 396 US 847 .) "If criminal conviction and *676 imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others," reasoned the court, "the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice." ( Jackson v Indiana , 406 US, at p 724 , supra .) The court then acknowledged that the Baxstrom principle had been extended to commitment upon acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect. ( 406 US, at p 724 , supra , citing Bolton v Harris , 395 F.2d 64

1974Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1071, 1081 , cert. den. 396 U. S. 847 ), held that “ subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded [to others not so charged] deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 730 , supra.) Respondent seeks to distin

1979Schuster v Herold , 410 F.2d 1071 , cert den 396 US 847 .) "If criminal conviction and *676 imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others," reasoned the court, "the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice." ( Jackson v Indiana , 406 US, at p 724 , supra .) The court then acknowledged that the Baxstrom principle had been extended to commitment upon acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect. ( 406 US, at p 724 , supra , citing Bolton v Harris , 395 F.2d 64

1974Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1071, 1081 , cert. den. 396 U. S. 847 ), held that “ subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded [to others not so charged] deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 730 , supra.) Respondent seeks to distin

1979Schuster v Herold , 410 F.2d 1071 , cert den 396 US 847 .) "If criminal conviction and *676 imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others," reasoned the court, "the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice." ( Jackson v Indiana , 406 US, at p 724 , supra .) The court then acknowledged that the Baxstrom principle had been extended to commitment upon acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect. ( 406 US, at p 724 , supra , citing Bolton v Harris , 395 F.2d 64

1979Schuster v Herold, 410 F2d 1071^^^L.den 396 US 847 .) "If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others,” reasoned the court, "the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice.” (Jackson v Indiana, 406 US, at p 724 , supra.) The court then acknowledged that the Baxstrom principle had been extended to commitment upon acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect. ( 406 US, at p 724 , supra, citing Bolton v Harris, 395 F2d 642, supra; Camero

2024The initial hearing under CPL 330.20 (6) is "a critical stage" of the proceedings at which the respondent is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, requiring us to consider whether counsel's performance therein viewed in totality amounted to meaningful representation ( Matter of Brian HH. , 39 AD3d 1007, 1009 [3d Dept 2007]; see People v Juan R., 180 AD3d 935 , 936 [2d Dept 2020]; Matter of Matheson KK., 161 AD3d 1260 , 1262 [3d Dept 2018] lv dismissed 32 NY3d 945 [2018]). "[E]ven if such representation was not error free, less than perfect representation does not equate to ineffecti

2012Harkavy v Consilvio ( 8 NY3d 645 [2007]), Supreme Court denied a stay, holding that “the issues pertaining to respondent’s involuntary commitment to the SOTP at CNYPC under MHL Article 9 must be resolved in an appropriate commitment hearing held in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article 10 of the MHL.

2007“Track status designation, unique to insanity acquittees, is vitally important in determining the level of judicial and prosecutorial involvement in future decisions about an acquittee’s confinement, transfer and release. . . . [T]rack one status is significantly more restrictive than track two status,” the designation given when an acquittee is determined to be mentally ill but not dangerous (id. at 154-155; see Matter of David B., 97 NY2d 267 , 276 n 4 [2002]; Matter of George L., 85 NY2d 295 , 302 n 2 [1995]).

2004Leonard HH. v Nixon, 148 AD2d 75 [1989]).

1991The Court has given expression to this commitment in its rule that the mandates of SEQRA require strict or literal compliance (see, Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524, 528-529 ; Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674, 679-680 ; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 206-207 ; Matter of Niagara Recycling v Town Bd., 83 AD2d 335, 340 [Hancock, Jr., J.], affd 56 NY2d 859 ; see also, Matter of Rye Town/King Civic Assn. v Town of Rye, 82 AD2d 474, 482 , appeal dismissed 56 NY2d 985 ).

1991The Court has given expression to this commitment in its rule that the mandates of SEQRA require strict or literal compliance (see, Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524, 528-529 ; Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674, 679-680 ; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 206-207 ; Matter of Niagara Recycling v Town Bd., 83 AD2d 335, 340 [Hancock, Jr., J.], affd 56 NY2d 859 ; see also, Matter of Rye Town/King Civic Assn. v Town of Rye, 82 AD2d 474, 482 , appeal dismissed 56 NY2d 985 ).

1991The Court has given expression to this commitment in its rule that the mandates of SEQRA require strict or literal compliance (see, Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524, 528-529 ; Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674, 679-680 ; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 206-207 ; Matter of Niagara Recycling v Town Bd., 83 AD2d 335, 340 [Hancock, Jr., J.], affd 56 NY2d 859 ; see also, Matter of Rye Town/King Civic Assn. v Town of Rye, 82 AD2d 474, 482 , appeal dismissed 56 NY2d 985 ).

1991The Court has given expression to this commitment in its rule that the mandates of SEQRA require strict or literal compliance (see, Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524, 528-529 ; Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674, 679-680 ; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 206-207 ; Matter of Niagara Recycling v Town Bd., 83 AD2d 335, 340 [Hancock, Jr., J.], affd 56 NY2d 859 ; see also, Matter of Rye Town/King Civic Assn. v Town of Rye, 82 AD2d 474, 482 , appeal dismissed 56 NY2d 985 ).

1987Indeed, the court in Project Release noted that instructing a patient to remain silent "would needlessly undermine valid mental health objectives” (Project Release v Prevost, 551 F Supp 1298, 1308 , supra; see also, French v Blackburn, 428 F Supp 1351 , affd 443 US 901 ; Tippett v State, 436 F2d 1153, cert granted sub nom.

1984In Jackson v Indiana {supra, p 738 ), the Supreme Court held that an individual can only be held for a “reasonable period” of time to determine if he can attain the capacity to proceed to trial and if it be determined that he or she cannot attain that capacity, the State must either institute a civil commitment or release the defendant, rationalizing that subjecting defendant to a more lenient commitment standard and/or a more stringent standard of release than others not charged with crimes, in effect, condemned him or her to permanent institutionalization (Matter of Kesselbrenner v Anonymous

1984Anonymous v Waugh, 76 Misc 2d 879 [robbery, first degree —16 years]; People v Anonymous, 76 Misc 2d 884 [5 years]).