commitment hearing in Washington

2015Former RCW 71.09.070; Ambers, 160 Wn.2d at 548 .

2015RCW 71.09.070; Ambers, 160 Wn.2d at 548 .

2025Gravely Disabled under RCW 71.34.020(27)(a) Subsection (a) of the “gravely disabled” definition requires recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for such essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical 3 E.S. also cites In re Detention of V.B. to argue that the evidence must show that a likelihood of serious harm to herself or others is “still present at the time of the commitment hearing.” 104 Wn. App. 953 , 19 P.3d 1062 (2001).

2025Gravely Disabled under RCW 71.34.020(27)(a) Subsection (a) of the “gravely disabled” definition requires recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for such essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical 3 E.S. also cites In re Detention of V.B. to argue that the evidence must show that a likelihood of serious harm to herself or others is “still present at the time of the commitment hearing.” 104 Wn. App. 953 , 19 P.3d 1062 (2001).

2011Id. at 371-72 , 150 P.3d 86 . ¶ 45 Consequently, the Stout court held an SVP detainee has no due process right to confront a live witness at the commitment hearing or to be present at a witness deposition.

2011Id. at 371-72 . ¶45 Consequently, the Stout court held an SVP detainee has no due process right to confront a live witness at the commitment hearing or to be present at a witness deposition.

2023McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 388 .

2015Accordingly, the legislature can define what is required to obtain this additional benefit. 4 Id. ¶14 The argument that change should be measured from the original commitment hearing effectively reads the LRA language (and probably the word “last” from the commitment trial language) out of the statute in derogation of our duty to give effect to all language found in legislation.

2008See RCW 71.09.030,.040; Keeney, 141 Wash.App. at 330 , 169 P.3d 852 .

2008See RCW 71.09.030, .040; Keeney, 141 Wn.

2007In reversing the trial court's grant of a new commitment hearing, we reasoned that the amendments clarified the Legislature's intent that a trial court could not order a new hearing based solely on an SVP's change in age. 134 Wash.App. at 419-20 , 139 P.3d 1140 . ¶ 33 Fox argues that the trial court applied RCW 71.09.090 retroactively, and that this retroactive application unconstitutionally affected his substantive rights.

2007In reversing the trial court's grant of a new commitment hearing, we reasoned that the amendments clarified the Legislature's intent that a trial court could not order a new hearing based solely on an SVP's change in age. 134 Wash.App. at 419-20 , 139 P.3d 1140 . ¶ 33 Fox argues that the trial court applied RCW 71.09.090 retroactively, and that this retroactive application unconstitutionally affected his substantive rights.

2007RCW 71.09.090(2)(a); In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 798-99 , 42 P.3d 952 (2002).

2007RCW 71.09.090(2)(a); In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 798-99 , 42 P.3d 952 (2002).

2007This court granted review at 156 Wash.2d 1030 , 133 P.3d 474 (2006).

2007This court granted review at 156 Wn.2d 1030 (2006).

2006Young, 120 Wash.App. at 762 , 86 P.3d 810 .

2006Young, 120 Wn.

2001In re Det. of Ross, 102 Wash.App. 108 , 6 P.3d 625 (2000); majority at 1039.

2001In re Det. of Ross, 102 Wn.

2018“Equitable estoppel is based on the notion that a party should be held to a representation made or position assumed where inequitable consequences would otherwise result to another party who has justifiably and in good faith relied thereon.” Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 35 , 1 P.3d 1124 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2018“Equitable estoppel is based on the notion that a party should be held to a representation made or position assumed where inequitable consequences would otherwise result to another party who has justifiably and in good faith relied thereon.” Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 35 , 1 P.3d 1124 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017I agree with the Court of Appeals that RCW 71.09.090(4)(a) now "directs the trial court.to measure 'change' from the last time it had to assess the person's condition-whether at a commitment hearing or a subsequent LRA revocation." Marcum, 190 Wn.

2015In re Det. o/Stout, 159 Wn.2d 357 ,367 n.6, 150 P.3d 4 "The legislature had every right to alter a scheme that provides protections beyond what is required by substantive due process to ensure committed persons do not abuse the system to receive full annual evidentiary hearings every year based solely upon a change to a single demographic factor." McQuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 388-89 . 6 No. 32118-5-III In re Del. ofMarcum 86 (2007).

2012Id. at 36 & n. 8, 168 P.3d 1285 ; see also In re Det. of Smith, 163 Wash.2d 699, 700-01 , 184 P.3d 1261 *1110 (2008) (reversing per curiam on facts indistinguishable from Elmore ). ¶ 65 Both Ambers and Elmore foreshadowed the constitutional infirmity of the 2005 amendments to the extent they might operate to impose greater restrictions on the evidence a detainee can present to show he no longer meets the commitment standard.

2012Id. at 36 & n.8; see also In re Det. of Smith, 163 Wn.2d 699, 700-01 , 184 P.3d 1261 (2008) (reversing per curiam on facts indistinguishable from Elmore). ¶65 Both Ambers and Elmore foreshadowed the constitutional infirmity of the 2005 amendments to the extent they might operate to impose greater restrictions on the evidence a detainee can present to show he no longer meets the commitment standard.

2012In In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1, 39 , 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (Young I), we considered and rejected a substantive due process challenge to our SVP commitment scheme, holding that the procedural safeguards at the initial commitment hearing and the procedures for periodic review under former RCW 71.09.090 were sufficient to ensure that “the commitment is tailored to the nature and duration of the mental illness.” See also In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wn.2d 70, 81 , 980 P.2d 1204 (1999) (Petersen I) (“Our sexually violent predator statute unequivocally contemplates an indefinite term

2012In In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1, 39 , 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (Young I), we considered and rejected a substantive due process challenge to our SVP commitment scheme, holding that the procedural safeguards at the initial commitment hearing and the procedures for periodic review under former RCW 71.09.090 were sufficient to ensure that “the commitment is tailored to the nature and duration of the mental illness.” See also In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wn.2d 70, 81 , 980 P.2d 1204 (1999) (Petersen I) (“Our sexually violent predator statute unequivocally contemplates an indefinite term

2011Id. ¶ 31 Providing a transcript of closed proceedings fully vindicates the public interest in open courts.

2011Id. ¶31 Providing a transcript of closed proceedings fully vindicates the public interest in open courts.

2011Cf. State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222, 236 , 217 P.3d 310 (2009) (Fairhurst, J., concurring) (“I do not agree with [the lead opinion’s] conflation of the rights of the defendant, the media, and the public.

2011Cf. State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222, 236 , 217 P.3d 310 (2009) (Fairhurst, J., concurring) (“I do not agree with [the lead opinion’s] conflation of the rights of the defendant, the media, and the public.