commitment hearing in Georgia

2004Green, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 55 (2) ( 222 SE2d 343 ) (1976) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and . . . once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.”); McClarity v. State, 234 Ga. App. 348, 351 (3) (a) ( 506 SE2d 392 ) (1998). 2 See Blackwell v. Sutton, 261 Ga. 284 ( 404 SE2d 114 ) (1991). 3 State v. Bloodsworth, 241 Ga. App. 840, 842 ( 528 SE2d 285 ) (2000). 4 See id. 5 Id.; see also Da

2004Green, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 55 (2) ( 222 SE2d 343 ) (1976) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and . . . once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.”); McClarity v. State, 234 Ga. App. 348, 351 (3) (a) ( 506 SE2d 392 ) (1998). 2 See Blackwell v. Sutton, 261 Ga. 284 ( 404 SE2d 114 ) (1991). 3 State v. Bloodsworth, 241 Ga. App. 840, 842 ( 528 SE2d 285 ) (2000). 4 See id. 5 Id.; see also Da

2022See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 42-43 (1) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (“[T]he purpose of a commitment hearing is simply to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged, and if so, to bind him over for indictment by the grand jury.”); see also State v. Ruff, 176 Ga. App. 303, 304 ( 335 SE2d 687 ) (1985) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a 20 The day after his arraignment, June 7, Brooks appeared before the trial court on his pro se statutory speedy trial demand.

2022See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 42-43 (1) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (“[T]he purpose of a commitment hearing is simply to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged, and if so, to bind him over for indictment by the grand jury.”); see also State v. Ruff, 176 Ga. App. 303, 304 ( 335 SE2d 687 ) (1985) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a 20 The day after his arraignment, June 7, Brooks appeared before the trial court on his pro se statutory speedy trial demand.

1984These cases hold that, because the purpose of a commitment hearing is to determine whether the defendant should be held for indictment and trial, the failure to hold such hearing is not reversible error after trial and conviction. 7 McClure v. Hopper, supra, footnote 4; Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 430 (1) ( 202 SE2d 26 ) (1973); Hilliard v. Ballard, 229 Ga. 305 ( 191 SE2d 74 ) (1972); Thrash v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 585 ( 193 SE2d 605 ) (1972); Smith v. Brown, 228 Ga. 584, 585 ( 187 SE2d 142 ) (1972); Burston v. Caldwell, 228 Ga. 795 (3) ( 187 SE2d 900 ) (1972); and Ballard v. Smith, 225 Ga.

1984These cases hold that, because the purpose of a commitment hearing is to determine whether the defendant should be held for indictment and trial, the failure to hold such hearing is not reversible error after trial and conviction. 7 McClure v. Hopper, supra, footnote 4; Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 430 (1) ( 202 SE2d 26 ) (1973); Hilliard v. Ballard, 229 Ga. 305 ( 191 SE2d 74 ) (1972); Thrash v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 585 ( 193 SE2d 605 ) (1972); Smith v. Brown, 228 Ga. 584, 585 ( 187 SE2d 142 ) (1972); Burston v. Caldwell, 228 Ga. 795 (3) ( 187 SE2d 900 ) (1972); and Ballard v. Smith, 225 Ga.

1974Johnson v. Plunkett, 215 Ga. 353 (3) ( 110 SE2d 745 ); Johnson v. State, 215 Ga. 839 (5) ( 114 SE2d 35 ); Cannon v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 35 (2, 3) ( 153 SE2d 445 ); Henderson v. State, 225 Ga. 273 (2) ( 168 SE2d 160 )." Shields v. State, 126 Ga. App. 544 (1) ( 191 SE2d 448 ). "[S]ince the purpose of the commitment hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial (Code § 27-407), the subsequent indictment, trial, and conviction of the accused render the omission harmless." Thrash v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 585 (1) ( 193 SE2d 605 ).

1974Johnson v. Plunkett, 215 Ga. 353 (3) ( 110 SE2d 745 ); Johnson v. State, 215 Ga. 839 (5) ( 114 SE2d 35 ); Cannon v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 35 (2, 3) ( 153 SE2d 445 ); Henderson v. State, 225 Ga. 273 (2) ( 168 SE2d 160 )." Shields v. State, 126 Ga. App. 544 (1) ( 191 SE2d 448 ). "[S]ince the purpose of the commitment hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial (Code § 27-407), the subsequent indictment, trial, and conviction of the accused render the omission harmless." Thrash v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 585 (1) ( 193 SE2d 605 ).

1971In Cannon v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 35, 36 ( 153 SE2d 445 ), it was said: "While a cross examination of the State’s witnesses at a commitment hearing can result in the defense attorney obtaining valuable information which will aid in the trial of the case should the defendant be later brought to trial, it must be remembered that the function of a commitment hearing 'is to authorize the keeping in custody of one accused with probable cause of committing a crime, pending determination by the grand jury from evidence presented to it that he should stand trial for the offense.’ Blake v. State, 109 Ga. Ap

1971In Cannon v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 35, 36 ( 153 SE2d 445 ), it was said: "While a cross examination of the State’s witnesses at a commitment hearing can result in the defense attorney obtaining valuable information which will aid in the trial of the case should the defendant be later brought to trial, it must be remembered that the function of a commitment hearing 'is to authorize the keeping in custody of one accused with probable cause of committing a crime, pending determination by the grand jury from evidence presented to it that he should stand trial for the offense.’ Blake v. State, 109 Ga. Ap

1971In Cannon v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 35, 36 ( 153 SE2d 445 ), it was said: "While a cross examination of the State’s witnesses at a commitment hearing can result in the defense attorney obtaining valuable information which will aid in the trial of the case should the defendant be later brought to trial, it must be remembered that the function of a commitment hearing 'is to authorize the keeping in custody of one accused with probable cause of committing a crime, pending determination by the grand jury from evidence presented to it that he should stand trial for the offense.’ Blake v. State, 109 Ga. Ap

1971In Cannon v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 35, 36 ( 153 SE2d 445 ), it was said: "While a cross examination of the State’s witnesses at a commitment hearing can result in the defense attorney obtaining valuable information which will aid in the trial of the case should the defendant be later brought to trial, it must be remembered that the function of a commitment hearing 'is to authorize the keeping in custody of one accused with probable cause of committing a crime, pending determination by the grand jury from evidence presented to it that he should stand trial for the offense.’ Blake v. State, 109 Ga. Ap

2001Nevertheless, “an appellate court, using the appropriate standard, may find in a particular case that error committed by the trial court was constitutionally harmless, without remanding the case for further proceedings.” State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58, 61 ( 222 SE2d 333 ) (1976) (finding no constitutional harm from the denial of counsel at a commitment hearing).

2001Nevertheless, “an appellate court, using the appropriate standard, may find in a particular case that error committed by the trial court was constitutionally harmless, without remanding the case for further proceedings.” State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58, 61 ( 222 SE2d 333 ) (1976) (finding no constitutional harm from the denial of counsel at a commitment hearing).

1992If a defendant wishes to assert the right to a commitment hearing, he must do so promptly and before indictment by filing a habeas corpus petition, McClure v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 45, 48 (2) ( 214 SE2d 503 ) (1975), because once indictment takes place probable cause has been established and a preliminary hearing serves no purpose.

1992If a defendant wishes to assert the right to a commitment hearing, he must do so promptly and before indictment by filing a habeas corpus petition, McClure v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 45, 48 (2) ( 214 SE2d 503 ) (1975), because once indictment takes place probable cause has been established and a preliminary hearing serves no purpose.

1984These cases hold that, because the purpose of a commitment hearing is to determine whether the defendant should be held for indictment and trial, the failure to hold such hearing is not reversible error after trial and conviction. 7 McClure v. Hopper, supra, footnote 4; Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 430 (1) ( 202 SE2d 26 ) (1973); Hilliard v. Ballard, 229 Ga. 305 ( 191 SE2d 74 ) (1972); Thrash v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 585 ( 193 SE2d 605 ) (1972); Smith v. Brown, 228 Ga. 584, 585 ( 187 SE2d 142 ) (1972); Burston v. Caldwell, 228 Ga. 795 (3) ( 187 SE2d 900 ) (1972); and Ballard v. Smith, 225 Ga.

1984These cases hold that, because the purpose of a commitment hearing is to determine whether the defendant should be held for indictment and trial, the failure to hold such hearing is not reversible error after trial and conviction. 7 McClure v. Hopper, supra, footnote 4; Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 430 (1) ( 202 SE2d 26 ) (1973); Hilliard v. Ballard, 229 Ga. 305 ( 191 SE2d 74 ) (1972); Thrash v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 585 ( 193 SE2d 605 ) (1972); Smith v. Brown, 228 Ga. 584, 585 ( 187 SE2d 142 ) (1972); Burston v. Caldwell, 228 Ga. 795 (3) ( 187 SE2d 900 ) (1972); and Ballard v. Smith, 225 Ga.

2022See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 42-43 (1) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (“[T]he purpose of a commitment hearing is simply to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged, and if so, to bind him over for indictment by the grand jury.”); see also State v. Ruff, 176 Ga. App. 303, 304 ( 335 SE2d 687 ) (1985) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a 20 The day after his arraignment, June 7, Brooks appeared before the trial court on his pro se statutory speedy trial demand.

2022See Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 42-43 (1) ( 165 SE2d 711 ) (1969) (“[T]he purpose of a commitment hearing is simply to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged, and if so, to bind him over for indictment by the grand jury.”); see also State v. Ruff, 176 Ga. App. 303, 304 ( 335 SE2d 687 ) (1985) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a 20 The day after his arraignment, June 7, Brooks appeared before the trial court on his pro se statutory speedy trial demand.

1988Whenever such probable cause exists, it is the duty of the court to commit. [Emphasis supplied.] There is no general right to discovery in a criminal case, Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 782 ( 301 SE2d 234 ) (1983), and nothing in OCGA § 17-7-28 creates one, see Day v. State, 237 Ga. 538, 539 ( 228 SE2d 913 ) (1976), or authorizes the defendant to go on a “fishing expedition” for evidence concededly beyond the scope of the real purpose of the commitment hearing.

1988Whenever such probable cause exists, it is the duty of the court to commit. [Emphasis supplied.] There is no general right to discovery in a criminal case, Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 782 ( 301 SE2d 234 ) (1983), and nothing in OCGA § 17-7-28 creates one, see Day v. State, 237 Ga. 538, 539 ( 228 SE2d 913 ) (1976), or authorizes the defendant to go on a “fishing expedition” for evidence concededly beyond the scope of the real purpose of the commitment hearing.

1992Although the commitment hearing is a “critical stage” of criminal procedure entitling a defendant to counsel, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1, 9-10 (90 SC 1999, 26 LE2d 387) (1970), failure to hold such a hearing does not constitute a deprivation of a defendant’s constitutional rights.

1976In Houston this court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that a commitment hearing in Georgia is similar to the Alabama procedure involved in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (90 SC 1999, 26 LE2d 387) (1970), and that therefore under Coleman, a commitment hearing in Georgia is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings and that the defendant is entitled to counsel.

1977That case is inapposite: at a commitment hearing the state carries the burden of showing cause to detain the defendant for the grand jury (State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721, 722 ( 218 SE2d 13 ) (1975)), making a record of its case which the defense might profitably review in detail.

1977That case is inapposite: at a commitment hearing the state carries the burden of showing cause to detain the defendant for the grand jury (State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721, 722 ( 218 SE2d 13 ) (1975)), making a record of its case which the defense might profitably review in detail.

1984These cases recognize that, in Georgia, a commitment hearing, if held, is a critical stage in criminal proceedings, that the accused therefore should be afforded the assistance of counsel, but that failure to provide counsel may be harmless error. 4 See McClure v. Hopper, supra; and Stynchcombe v. Hardy, 228 Ga. 130 ( 184 SE2d 356 ) (1971). 5 See Casteel v. State, 235 Ga. 804 ( 221 SE2d 579 ) (1976); Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 SE2d 28 ) (1977). 6 State v. Middlebrooks, supra; Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771 (4) ( 208 SE2d 825 ) (1974) cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1115 (1975); Tucker v

1984These cases recognize that, in Georgia, a commitment hearing, if held, is a critical stage in criminal proceedings, that the accused therefore should be afforded the assistance of counsel, but that failure to provide counsel may be harmless error. 4 See McClure v. Hopper, supra; and Stynchcombe v. Hardy, 228 Ga. 130 ( 184 SE2d 356 ) (1971). 5 See Casteel v. State, 235 Ga. 804 ( 221 SE2d 579 ) (1976); Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 SE2d 28 ) (1977). 6 State v. Middlebrooks, supra; Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771 (4) ( 208 SE2d 825 ) (1974) cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1115 (1975); Tucker v

1975State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721 ( 218 SE2d 13 ) held that the commitment hearing provided for by our statutes is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and that the ruling in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (90 SC 1999, 26 LE2d 387), rather than the ruling in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54), was controlling so that the assistance of counsel was required at the commitment hearing.

1975State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721 ( 218 SE2d 13 ) held that the commitment hearing provided for by our statutes is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and that the ruling in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (90 SC 1999, 26 LE2d 387), rather than the ruling in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54), was controlling so that the assistance of counsel was required at the commitment hearing.

2012(Emphasis supplied.) Lynn v. State, 236 Ga. App. 600, 601 (1) ( 512 SE2d 695 ) (1999).

2012(Emphasis supplied.) Lynn v. State, 236 Ga. App. 600, 601 (1) ( 512 SE2d 695 ) (1999).

2011Whenever such probable cause exists, it is the duty of the court to commit.”); see also Neal v. State, 160 Ga. App. 498, 499 (1) ( 287 SE2d 399 ) (1981), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404 ( 401 SE2d 599 ) (1991) (“The state’s burden at the commitment hearing is simply to show probable cause to believe the accused guilty, and if so, to bind him over to the grand jury for indictment, rather than to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as at trial.”).

2011Whenever such probable cause exists, it is the duty of the court to commit.”); see also Neal v. State, 160 Ga. App. 498, 499 (1) ( 287 SE2d 399 ) (1981), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404 ( 401 SE2d 599 ) (1991) (“The state’s burden at the commitment hearing is simply to show probable cause to believe the accused guilty, and if so, to bind him over to the grand jury for indictment, rather than to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as at trial.”).

2007After this appeal was filed, Tidwell was indicted by a grand jury on May 7,2007. “[0]nce an indictment has been returned against a defendant, the question of whether a commitment hearing should have been held becomes moot.” (Citation omitted.) Ross v. Lemacks, 264 Ga. 839 ( 452 SE2d 109 ) (1995).

2007Lawrence, 281 Ga. 300, 301, n. 3 ( 637 SE2d 687 ) (2006), which states, in its entirety: See Ross v. Lemacks, 264 Ga. 839 ( 452 SE2d 109 ) (1995) (although OCGA § 17-4-26 2 provides that a defendant must be released from custody if not provided a commitment hearing within 72 hours of his arrest pursuant to a warrant, a defendant’s indictment moots question of whether he should have been brought before a judicial officer within 72 hours).

2007After this appeal was filed, Tidwell was indicted by a grand jury on May 7,2007. “[0]nce an indictment has been returned against a defendant, the question of whether a commitment hearing should have been held becomes moot.” (Citation omitted.) Ross v. Lemacks, 264 Ga. 839 ( 452 SE2d 109 ) (1995).

2007Lawrence, 281 Ga. 300, 301, n. 3 ( 637 SE2d 687 ) (2006), which states, in its entirety: See Ross v. Lemacks, 264 Ga. 839 ( 452 SE2d 109 ) (1995) (although OCGA § 17-4-26 2 provides that a defendant must be released from custody if not provided a commitment hearing within 72 hours of his arrest pursuant to a warrant, a defendant’s indictment moots question of whether he should have been brought before a judicial officer within 72 hours).

2007In Dodson v. Grimes, 220 Ga. 269, 270 (1) ( 138 SE2d 311 ) (1964), we held that OCGA § 17-4-26 does not provide that the committing magistrate shall have a hearing within 72 hours after the arrest.

2007In Dodson v. Grimes, 220 Ga. 269, 270 (1) ( 138 SE2d 311 ) (1964), we held that OCGA § 17-4-26 does not provide that the committing magistrate shall have a hearing within 72 hours after the arrest.

2004Green, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 55 (2) ( 222 SE2d 343 ) (1976) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and . . . once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.”); McClarity v. State, 234 Ga. App. 348, 351 (3) (a) ( 506 SE2d 392 ) (1998). 2 See Blackwell v. Sutton, 261 Ga. 284 ( 404 SE2d 114 ) (1991). 3 State v. Bloodsworth, 241 Ga. App. 840, 842 ( 528 SE2d 285 ) (2000). 4 See id. 5 Id.; see also Da

2004Green, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 55 (2) ( 222 SE2d 343 ) (1976) (“[A] preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and . . . once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.”); McClarity v. State, 234 Ga. App. 348, 351 (3) (a) ( 506 SE2d 392 ) (1998). 2 See Blackwell v. Sutton, 261 Ga. 284 ( 404 SE2d 114 ) (1991). 3 State v. Bloodsworth, 241 Ga. App. 840, 842 ( 528 SE2d 285 ) (2000). 4 See id. 5 Id.; see also Da

1998Thus it appears that an arrestee out on appearance bond is not entitled to a commitment hearing under the Fourth Amendment.” Watts v. Pitts, 253 Ga. 501, 503 ( 322 SE2d 252 ) (1984).

1998Thus it appears that an arrestee out on appearance bond is not entitled to a commitment hearing under the Fourth Amendment.” Watts v. Pitts, 253 Ga. 501, 503 ( 322 SE2d 252 ) (1984).

1975This case does not involve an unlawful waiver of the commitment hearing as did Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866 ( 148 SE2d 305 ).

1975This case does not involve an unlawful waiver of the commitment hearing as did Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866 ( 148 SE2d 305 ).

1984These cases recognize that, in Georgia, a commitment hearing, if held, is a critical stage in criminal proceedings, that the accused therefore should be afforded the assistance of counsel, but that failure to provide counsel may be harmless error. 4 See McClure v. Hopper, supra; and Stynchcombe v. Hardy, 228 Ga. 130 ( 184 SE2d 356 ) (1971). 5 See Casteel v. State, 235 Ga. 804 ( 221 SE2d 579 ) (1976); Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 SE2d 28 ) (1977). 6 State v. Middlebrooks, supra; Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771 (4) ( 208 SE2d 825 ) (1974) cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1115 (1975); Tucker v

1984These cases recognize that, in Georgia, a commitment hearing, if held, is a critical stage in criminal proceedings, that the accused therefore should be afforded the assistance of counsel, but that failure to provide counsel may be harmless error. 4 See McClure v. Hopper, supra; and Stynchcombe v. Hardy, 228 Ga. 130 ( 184 SE2d 356 ) (1971). 5 See Casteel v. State, 235 Ga. 804 ( 221 SE2d 579 ) (1976); Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 SE2d 28 ) (1977). 6 State v. Middlebrooks, supra; Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771 (4) ( 208 SE2d 825 ) (1974) cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1115 (1975); Tucker v

1979"We hold that a preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and that once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.” State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 55 ( 222 SE2d 343 ) (1976); Sims v. State, 148 Ga. App. 733 ( 252 SE2d 910 ) (1979). 2.

1979"We hold that a preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and that once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing.” State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 55 ( 222 SE2d 343 ) (1976); Sims v. State, 148 Ga. App. 733 ( 252 SE2d 910 ) (1979). 2.