45 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mastersongreen2 sentences2004People v. Hancock, 329 Ill.App.3d 367, 380-81 , 264 Ill.Dec. 755 , 771 N.E.2d 459 (2002); see People v. Masterson, 207 Ill.2d 305, 331 , 278 Ill.Dec. 351 , 798 N.E.2d 735 (2003) (commenting in obiter dicta that the evidence presented at the defendant's original commitment hearing, including a 14-year-old conviction relied upon exclusively to show demonstrated propensities, was sufficient to justify commitment under then-existing standards); People v. Cole, 299 Ill.App.3d 229, 234 , 233 Ill.Dec. 756 , 701 N.E.2d 821 (1998) (holding that "[c]ourt records" demonstrated the defendant committed pri 2004People v. Hancock, 329 Ill.App.3d 367, 380-81 , 264 Ill.Dec. 755 , 771 N.E.2d 459 (2002); see People v. Masterson, 207 Ill.2d 305, 331 , 278 Ill.Dec. 351 , 798 N.E.2d 735 (2003) (commenting in obiter dicta that the evidence presented at the defendant's original commitment hearing, including a 14-year-old conviction relied upon exclusively to show demonstrated propensities, was sufficient to justify commitment under then-existing standards); People v. Cole, 299 Ill.App.3d 229, 234 , 233 Ill.Dec. 756 , 701 N.E.2d 821 (1998) (holding that "[c]ourt records" demonstrated the defendant committed pri | 5 | 7 |
Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Intercounty Title Co.green2 sentences2005Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Intercounty Title Co. of Illinois, 287 Ill. 2005Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Intercounty Title Co., 287 *184 Ill.App.3d 647, 650, 222 Ill.Dec. 851 , 678 N.E.2d 723 (1997). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Pembrockgreen2 sentences2003See In re Enis , 121 Ill. 2d 124, 133-34 (1988) (ordering a new hearing on the State’s petition to terminate parental rights, to be conducted under the constitutionally proper standard, where the trial court had judged the evidence by the improper standard of proof); Pembrock , 62 Ill. 2d at 321 (remand for new commitment hearing under the SDPA utilizing proper standard of proof); Commitment of W.Z. , 173 N.J. at 133 , 801 A.2d at 219 (remand for additional findings consistent with Crane ). 2003See In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124, 133-34 (1988) (ordering a new hearing on the State’s petition to terminate parental rights, to be conducted under the constitutionally proper standard, where the trial court had judged the evidence by the improper standard of proof); Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d at 321 (remand for new commitment hearing under the SDPA utilizing proper standard of proof); Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133 , 801 A.2d at 219 (remand for additional findings consistent with Crane). | 2 | 3 |
People v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2017Mr. White clearly had ample notice long before the commitment hearing. ¶ 44 The filing of the September 2010 petition distinguishes this case from McDonald, 44 Ill. 2017Mr. White clearly had ample notice long before the commitment hearing. -8- ¶ 44 The filing of the September 2010 petition distinguishes this case from McDonald, 44 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Naugreen2 sentences2014In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 427 , 607 N.E.2d 134, 144 (1992). 2014In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 427 , 607 N.E.2d 134, 144 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Colegreen2 sentences2004App. 3d 367, 380-81 (2002); see People v. Masterson, 207 111. 2d 305, 331 (2003) (commenting in obiter dicta that the evidence presented at the defendant’s original commitment hearing, including a 14-year-old conviction relied upon exclusively to show demonstrated propensities, was sufficient to justify commitment under then-existing standards); People v. Cole, 299 Ill. 2004People v. Hancock, 329 Ill.App.3d 367, 380-81 , 264 Ill.Dec. 755 , 771 N.E.2d 459 (2002); see People v. Masterson, 207 Ill.2d 305, 331 , 278 Ill.Dec. 351 , 798 N.E.2d 735 (2003) (commenting in obiter dicta that the evidence presented at the defendant's original commitment hearing, including a 14-year-old conviction relied upon exclusively to show demonstrated propensities, was sufficient to justify commitment under then-existing standards); People v. Cole, 299 Ill.App.3d 229, 234 , 233 Ill.Dec. 756 , 701 N.E.2d 821 (1998) (holding that "[c]ourt records" demonstrated the defendant committed pri | 2 | 2 |
In Re Detention of Traynoffgreen2 sentences2004See Traynoff, 338 Ill. 2004See Traynoff , 338 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Studdardgreen2 sentences2004People v. Hancock, 329 Ill.App.3d 367, 380-81 , 264 Ill.Dec. 755 , 771 N.E.2d 459 (2002); see People v. Masterson, 207 Ill.2d 305, 331 , 278 Ill.Dec. 351 , 798 N.E.2d 735 (2003) (commenting in obiter dicta that the evidence presented at the defendant's original commitment hearing, including a 14-year-old conviction relied upon exclusively to show demonstrated propensities, was sufficient to justify commitment under then-existing standards); People v. Cole, 299 Ill.App.3d 229, 234 , 233 Ill.Dec. 756 , 701 N.E.2d 821 (1998) (holding that "[c]ourt records" demonstrated the defendant committed pri 2004People v. Hancock, 329 Ill.App.3d 367, 380-81 , 264 Ill.Dec. 755 , 771 N.E.2d 459 (2002); see People v. Masterson, 207 Ill.2d 305, 331 , 278 Ill.Dec. 351 , 798 N.E.2d 735 (2003) (commenting in obiter dicta that the evidence presented at the defendant's original commitment hearing, including a 14-year-old conviction relied upon exclusively to show demonstrated propensities, was sufficient to justify commitment under then-existing standards); People v. Cole, 299 Ill.App.3d 229, 234 , 233 Ill.Dec. 756 , 701 N.E.2d 821 (1998) (holding that "[c]ourt records" demonstrated the defendant committed pri | 2 | 2 |
People v. Vernongreen2 sentences2003See Vernon, 285 Ill. 2003See Vernon , 285 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
In Re the Commitment of W.Z.green2 sentences2003Because that standard had not been expressed by the Supreme Court in Crane, or by us, at the time of W.Z.’s commitment hearing, we must remand to the trial court for a determination of whether WZ.’s mental condition causes the required degree of inability to control sexually violent behavior to justify his commitment under the SVPA.” (Emphasis added.) Commitment ofW.Z., 173 N.J. at 133 , 801 A.2d at 219 . 2003Because that standard had not been expressed by the Supreme Court in Crane, or by us, at the time of W.Z.’s commitment hearing, we must remand to the trial court for a determination of whether WZ.’s mental condition causes the required degree of inability to control sexually violent behavior to justify his commitment under the SVPA.” (Emphasis added.) Commitment ofW.Z., 173 N.J. at 133 , 801 A.2d at 219 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Enisgreen2 sentences2003See In re Enis , 121 Ill. 2d 124, 133-34 (1988) (ordering a new hearing on the State’s petition to terminate parental rights, to be conducted under the constitutionally proper standard, where the trial court had judged the evidence by the improper standard of proof); Pembrock , 62 Ill. 2d at 321 (remand for new commitment hearing under the SDPA utilizing proper standard of proof); Commitment of W.Z. , 173 N.J. at 133 , 801 A.2d at 219 (remand for additional findings consistent with Crane ). 2003See In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124, 133-34 (1988) (ordering a new hearing on the State’s petition to terminate parental rights, to be conducted under the constitutionally proper standard, where the trial court had judged the evidence by the improper standard of proof); Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d at 321 (remand for new commitment hearing under the SDPA utilizing proper standard of proof); Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133 , 801 A.2d at 219 (remand for additional findings consistent with Crane). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Barbara H.green2 sentences2019In re Barbara H., 288 Ill. 1998Barbara H., 288 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
In Re D.F.green1 sentence2021See In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002) (“[u]nder a manifest weight of the evidence standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact” and a reviewing court “must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses [or] the weight to be given to the evidence”). ¶ 79 Finally, insofar as the petition claims that a commitment hearing would be more appropriate to address concerns that Rob would be violent in the future, and that “[f]orced medication should not be used to accomplish what the less restrictive treatment of hospitali | 1 | 1 |
People v. John N.green1 sentence2019See In re John N., 364 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Daryll C.green1 sentence2019Because the record is devoid of any explanation or chronology of what happened to Christine after her removal from the commitment hearing, we do not know if she was afforded a chance to return, as the trial court promised, or even if she wanted or was able to return. 12 ¶ 27 In In re Daryll C., 401 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. B.K.green1 sentence2016Despite these clear statutory requirements and ample case law that demonstrates their clarity (see, e.g., In re David M., 2013 IL App (4th) 121004, ¶ 36 (holding that section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) was violated when the State filed a petition for involuntary administration of medication on the same day as the commitment hearing); In re B.K., 362 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Eric H.green1 sentence2016App. 3d 324, 328-329 (2005) (same); In re Eric H., 399 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
In re: David M.green1 sentence2016Despite these clear statutory requirements and ample case law that demonstrates their clarity (see, e.g., In re David M., 2013 IL App (4th) 121004, ¶ 36 (holding that section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) was violated when the State filed a petition for involuntary administration of medication on the same day as the commitment hearing); In re B.K., 362 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Vitek v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kansas v. Crane
green
2 sentences2011On the first occasion, we reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new commitment hearing using standards for civil commitment consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). 2011On the first occasion, we reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new commitment hearing using standards for civil commitment consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). | 4 | 2004–2011 |
Jackson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences1999Jackson, 406 U.S. at 730 , 32 L. 1999Jackson, 406 U.S. at 730 , 32 L. | 3 | 1990–1999 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences2017Thus, we likewise cannot identify a violation of his right to confront adverse witnesses. ¶ 50 Finally, in reference to the right to remain silent, as discussed earlier in this opinion, “there is no privilege against self-incrimination in sexually dangerous person proceedings.” Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 103 . 2017Thus, we likewise cannot identify a violation of his right to confront adverse witnesses. ¶ 50 Finally, in reference to the right to remain silent, as discussed earlier in this opinion, “there is no privilege against self-incrimination in sexually dangerous person proceedings.” Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 103 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. David Earl Wattleton
green
2 sentences2017App. 3d at 805 . ¶ 21 The decision in United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002), guided the Wolst court’s resolution of the procedural due process argument. 2017App. 3d at 805 . ¶ 21 The decision in United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002), guided the Wolst court’s resolution of the procedural due process argument. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Wolst
green
2 sentences2017The Wolst court first dismissed the substantive due process argument, finding that “the burden of proof at a commitment hearing is an issue of procedure not substance.” Wolst, 347 Ill. 2017The Wolst court first dismissed the substantive due process argument, finding that “the burden of proof at a commitment hearing is an issue of procedure not substance.” Wolst, 347 Ill. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In Re KC
green
2 sentences2011The most closely analogous case we know of—In re K.C., 323 Ill. 2011The most closely analogous case we know of—In re K.C., 323 Ill. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Kansas v. Hendricks
green
2 sentences2011On the first occasion, we reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new commitment hearing using standards for civil commitment consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). 2011On the first occasion, we reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded for a new commitment hearing using standards for civil commitment consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences2004Respondent argues that (1) his due process rights were violated at the original commitment hearing because the SVPA did not require the trial court to find that his mental disorder makes it difficult for him to control his urge to commit sexually violent acts; (2) he was denied his right to equal protection at the conditional release hearing because the SVPA requires the State to prove its case by only clear and convincing evidence rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as is required by the SDPA; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the conditional release hearing 2004Respondent argues that (1) his due process rights were violated at the original commitment hearing because the SVPA did not require the trial court to find that his mental disorder makes it difficult for him to control his urge to commit sexually violent acts; (2) he was denied his right to equal protection at the conditional release hearing because the SVPA requires the State to prove its case by only clear and convincing evidence rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as is required by the SDPA; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the conditional release hearing | 2 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Hager
green
2 sentences2003The Hager court restated the holding of Foucha as, “Once a defendant is involuntarily admitted, he may be held only as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous.” Hager, 253 Ill. 2003The Hager court restated the holding of Foucha as "Once a defendant is involuntarily admitted, he may be held only as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous." Hager , 253 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Bingham
green
1 sentence2020The State can establish a defendant’s “propensities to the commission of sexual offenses” by presenting evidence that defendant committed more than one “sexual offense.” See Bingham, 2014 IL 115964, ¶ 48 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Amanda H.
green
1 sentence2019In re Amanda H., 2017 IL App (3d) 150164, ¶ 34 . ¶ 20 In order to determine whether the trial court violated Christine’s right to be present at the commitment hearing and subsequent medication hearing, it is necessary to determine whether either of the statutory exceptions to the right to be present apply to this case. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Jermaine J. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2012In Johnson, 2012 IL App (5th) 070573, ¶ 14 , we pointed out that even in the criminal setting, the decision to stipulate to evidence is generally a tactical decision that can be made by a defendant’s attorney without any indication in the record that the defendant personally chose to waive his constitutional right to confront particular witnesses and without any indication that this waiver was knowing and voluntary. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| In Re Detention of Hughes green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Hancock green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Bell Ex Rel. Rubin v. Wayne County General Hospital green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Illinois v. Allen green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Superdawg Drive-In, Inc. v. City of Chicago neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Leppert green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Sanchez green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Martinez green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| United States of America Ex Rel. Frank Stachulak v. Joseph Coughlin green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Haak neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Skaggs v. Junis green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.