commitment hearing in North Dakota

2007The court granted [Anderson]’s request. [Anderson] cannot now complain about the delay occasioned by his own request for an independent evaluation.” See In re M.D., 1999 ND 160, ¶¶ 17, 18 , 598 N.W.2d 799 (allowing a six-month delay between the finding of probable cause and the commitment hearing).

2007The court granted [Anderson]’s request. [Anderson] cannot now complain about the delay occasioned by his own request for an independent evaluation.” See In re M.D., 1999 ND 160, ¶¶ 17, 18 , 598 N.W.2d 799 (allowing a six-month delay between the finding of probable cause and the commitment hearing).

2011See, e.g., Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 (holding the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 authorizes the executive director to decide the least restrictive available treatment program or facility for a sexually dangerous individual and the statute is not violative of due process or double jeopardy); Interest of B.V., 2006 ND 22, ¶¶ 13, 17 , 708 N.W.2d 877 (holding N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not allow the trial court to determine treatment options at an initial commitment hearing, but rather places that determination with DHS).

2011See, e.g., Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 (holding the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 authorizes the executive director to decide the least restrictive available treatment program or facility for a sexually dangerous individual and the statute is not violative of due process or double jeopardy); Interest of B.V., 2006 ND 22, ¶¶ 13, 17 , 708 N.W.2d 877 (holding N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not allow the trial court to determine treatment options at an initial commitment hearing, but rather places that determination with DHS).

2013In Interest of J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶¶ 1, 15, 23-26 , 713 N.W.2d 518 , we affirmed J.M.’s commitment, holding the evidence was sufficient to commit him as a sexually dangerous individual and an error in not holding a commitment hearing within 60 days after a finding of probable cause did not warrant vacation of the commitment order.

2013In Interest of J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶¶ 1, 15, 23-26 , 713 N.W.2d 518 , we affirmed J.M.’s commitment, holding the evidence was sufficient to commit him as a sexually dangerous individual and an error in not holding a commitment hearing within 60 days after a finding of probable cause did not warrant vacation of the commitment order.

2011See In re MH 2006-000749, 214 Ariz. 318 , 152 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Ariz.Ct.App.2007) (“[W]aiver ... is particularly problematic in an involuntary treatment hearing such as this, which was ordered at the request of physicians who averred that the patient was so persistently or acutely disabled as a result of a mental disorder that she should be compelled to receive treatment.”).

2011See In re MH 2006-000749, 214 Ariz. 318 , 152 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Ariz.Ct.App.2007) (“[W]aiver ... is particularly problematic in an involuntary treatment hearing such as this, which was ordered at the request of physicians who averred that the patient was so persistently or acutely disabled as a result of a mental disorder that she should be compelled to receive treatment.”).

2011See, e.g., Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 (holding the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 authorizes the executive director to decide the least restrictive available treatment program or facility for a sexually dangerous individual and the statute is not violative of due process or double jeopardy); Interest of B.V., 2006 ND 22, ¶¶ 13, 17 , 708 N.W.2d 877 (holding N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not allow the trial court to determine treatment options at an initial commitment hearing, but rather places that determination with DHS).

2011See, e.g., Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 (holding the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 authorizes the executive director to decide the least restrictive available treatment program or facility for a sexually dangerous individual and the statute is not violative of due process or double jeopardy); Interest of B.V., 2006 ND 22, ¶¶ 13, 17 , 708 N.W.2d 877 (holding N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not allow the trial court to determine treatment options at an initial commitment hearing, but rather places that determination with DHS).

2011Here, whether L.T. waived attendance at his hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-15 is a question of law, which we review de novo. [¶ 8] Section 25-03.1-15, N.D.C.C., provides, “The respondent must be present at all hearings unless the respondent waives the right to be present either orally or in writing.” The United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized “that due process for a commitment hearing, ‘requires that [the respondent] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of

2011Here, whether L.T. waived attendance at his hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25- 03.1-15 is a question of law, which we review de novo. [¶8] Section 25-03.1-15, N.D.C.C., provides, “The respondent must be present at all hearings unless the respondent waives the right to be present either orally or in writing.” The United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized “that due process for a commitment hearing, ‘requires that [the respondent] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of

2010"Under the second prong of the commitment analysis, all conduct of a sexually predatory nature can be used to determine if an individual has a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder...." Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 13 , 777 N.W.2d 908 (citing In re P.F., 2006 ND 82, ¶¶ 2, 20 , 712 N.W.2d 610 ). [¶ 16] A.M. claims the district court erred because the evidence establishes the diagnosis of paraphilia not otherwise specified (nonconsent), as applied by Sullivan, is not valid.

2010"Under the second prong of the commitment analysis, all conduct of a sexually predatory nature can be used to determine if an individual has a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder...." Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 13 , 777 N.W.2d 908 (citing In re P.F., 2006 ND 82, ¶¶ 2, 20 , 712 N.W.2d 610 ). [¶ 16] A.M. claims the district court erred because the evidence establishes the diagnosis of paraphilia not otherwise specified (nonconsent), as applied by Sullivan, is not valid.

2011Here, whether L.T. waived attendance at his hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-15 is a question of law, which we review de novo. [¶ 8] Section 25-03.1-15, N.D.C.C., provides, “The respondent must be present at all hearings unless the respondent waives the right to be present either orally or in writing.” The United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized “that due process for a commitment hearing, ‘requires that [the respondent] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of

2011Here, whether L.T. waived attendance at his hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-15 is a question of law, which we review de novo. [¶ 8] Section 25-03.1-15, N.D.C.C., provides, “The respondent must be present at all hearings unless the respondent waives the right to be present either orally or in writing.” The United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized “that due process for a commitment hearing, ‘requires that [the respondent] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of

2006Id. at 533. [¶22] B.V.’s letter requesting a change in counsel came after B.V.’s several successful attempts to continually delay the commitment hearing.

2006Id. at 533 . [¶ 22] B.V.’s letter requesting a change in counsel came after B.V.’s several successful attempts to continually delay the commitment hearing.

2024See id.; see also Interest of Skorick, 2020 ND 162, ¶ 10 , 946 N.W.2d 513 (the court abused its discretion when it considered an expert report the State did not offer into evidence at the commitment hearing); Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190, ¶ 23 , 705 N.W.2d 836 (petitions for protective orders and affidavits are inadmissible hearsay under N.D.R.Ev. 801(c)).

2024In re Skorick, 2020 ND 162, ¶ 10 , 946 N.W.2d 513 (the court abused its discretion when it considered an expert report the State did not offer into evidence at the commitment hearing); Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190, ¶ 23 , 705 N.W.2d 836 (petitions for protective orders and affidavits are inadmissible hearsay under N.D.R.Ev. 801(c)).

2023See Nelson, 2017 ND 152, ¶ 7 .

2023See Nelson, at ¶ 7 (finding two instances of sexual misconduct that occurred 23 years prior to the commitment hearing were “far too remote”); see also Matter of Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶¶ 14, 19 , 777 N.W.2d 62 (finding two inappropriate instances with female professionals occurring within three years of a commitment hearing were sufficient); Matter of Vantreece, 2009 ND 152 , ¶¶ 17, 19, 771 N.W.2d 585 (finding instances of uncontrolled anger and compulsive masturbation within two years of a commitment hearing were sufficient). [¶7] Civil commitment should not be based solely on whether an indiv

2023See Nelson, at ¶ 7 (finding two instances of sexual misconduct that occurred 23 years prior to the commitment hearing were “far too remote”); see also Matter of Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶¶ 14, 19 , 777 N.W.2d 62 (finding two inappropriate instances with female professionals occurring within three years of a commitment hearing were sufficient); Matter of Vantreece, 2009 ND 152 , ¶¶ 17, 19, 771 N.W.2d 585 (finding instances of uncontrolled anger and compulsive masturbation within two years of a commitment hearing were sufficient). [¶7] Civil commitment should not be based solely on whether an indiv

2023See Nelson, at ¶ 7 (finding two instances of sexual misconduct that occurred 23 years prior to the commitment hearing were “far too remote”); see also Matter of Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶¶ 14, 19 , 777 N.W.2d 62 (finding two inappropriate instances with female professionals occurring within three years of a commitment hearing were sufficient); Matter of Vantreece, 2009 ND 152 , ¶¶ 17, 19, 771 N.W.2d 585 (finding instances of uncontrolled anger and compulsive masturbation within two years of a commitment hearing were sufficient). [¶7] Civil commitment should not be based solely on whether an indiv

2023See Nelson, at ¶ 7 (finding two instances of sexual misconduct that occurred 23 years prior to the commitment hearing were “far too remote”); see also Matter of Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶¶ 14, 19 , 777 N.W.2d 62 (finding two inappropriate instances with female professionals occurring within three years of a commitment hearing were sufficient); Matter of Vantreece, 2009 ND 152 , ¶¶ 17, 19, 771 N.W.2d 585 (finding instances of uncontrolled anger and compulsive masturbation within two years of a commitment hearing were sufficient). [¶7] Civil commitment should not be based solely on whether an indiv

2010See In re Barrera, 2008 ND 25, ¶ 6 , 744 N.W.2d 744 (respondent’s conviction for gross sexual imposition against a seven-year-old female satisfied the first prong of the commitment analysis).

2010See In re Barrera, 2008 ND 25, ¶ 6 , 744 N.W.2d 744 (respondent’s conviction for gross sexual imposition against a seven-year-old female satisfied the first prong of the commitment analysis).

2010See Dosland v. Netland, 424 N.W.2d 141, 142 (N.D.1988) (allowing review of issues likely to arise on remand).

2008While there were some conflicts between the reports and the testimony, this Court has repeatedly held that “[e]valuation of credibility where evidence is conflicting is solely a trial court function.” Alumni Ass’n v. Hart Agency, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 119, 121 (N.D.1979); see also Estate of Nelson, 553 N.W.2d 771, 774 (N.D.1996) (“The trial court was in the best position to weigh the conflicting evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses.

2008While there were some conflicts between the reports and the testimony, this Court has repeatedly held that “[e]valuation of credibility where evidence is conflicting is solely a trial court function.” Alumni Ass’n v. Hart Agency, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 119, 121 (N.D.1979); see also Estate of Nelson, 553 N.W.2d 771, 774 (N.D.1996) (“The trial court was in the best position to weigh the conflicting evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses.

2007Interest of Nyflot , 340 N.W.2d 178, 182-83 (N.D. 1983).