20 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of the Commitment of M.E. v. Department of Veterans Affairsgreen2 sentences2018In M.E. , the patient was able to function independently, ate properly, lived alone in his rented apartment and was able to clothe himself, and the petitioning hospital's reliance on M.E.'s past behavior could not be utilized at the time of the commitment hearing to establish grave disability. 64 N.E.3d at 862 -63 . 2018Relying on its recent precedent, the panel held that, for competency reasons, "[a] respondent for a civil commitment hearing cannot voluntarily waive his right *610 to be present at a commitment hearing." A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC , 81 N.E.3d 629 , 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing M.E. v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs (In re Commitment of M.E.) , 64 N.E.3d 855 , 860-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) ). | 2 | 4 |
Cheek v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Cheek v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). [7] A respondent for a civil commitment hearing cannot voluntarily waive his right to be present at a commitment hearing. 2016M.E.’s counsel had to request the documents filed by the VA; on April 11, the VA’s counsel faxed the pleadings to M.E.’s counsel. [15] M.E. argues that he was not served with any of these documents, evidenced by the fact that none contained a certificate of service, and he testified at the commitment hearing that he first learned of the allegations supporting his emergency detention and the sought-after commitment from his counsel, despite the fact that M.E. was represented by counsel beginning in 2015 and was represented by counsel when he was involuntarily committed on March 31, 2016. *860 [ | 2 | 2 |
North v. Stategreen2 sentences1980North v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 657, 662 (notice was given to the attorney of an incarcerated defendant, but there was no order for the defendant to be present, concerning a hearing at which he would either be sentenced or committed as a criminal sexual deviant.) Although a considerable part of the record of F. J.’s February 4 hearing was directed to her right to legal representation, we deem the comments made to her to have been largely misinformation and confusing, and thus not an “effective” advisement within the meaning of Vitek v. Jones, supra. Thus, F. J. was at no time told 1980North v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 657, 662 (notice was given to the attorney of an incarcerated defendant, but there was no order for the defendant to be present, concerning a hearing at which he would either be sentenced or committed as a criminal sexual deviant.) Although a considerable part of the record of F.J.'s February 4 hearing was directed to her right to legal representation, we deem the comments made to her to have been largely misinformation and confusing, and thus not an "effective" advisement within the meaning of Vitek v. Jones, supra . | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2026I.C. § 12-26-2-2(b)(4); see also Jones v. State, 477 N.E.2d 353, 356-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that individuals alleged to be mentally ill have a “right to effective counsel” in a commitment Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-1881 | March 23, 2026 Page 11 of 17 proceeding and that “the commitment hearing itself is designed, in part, to be an adversarial proceeding”), reh’g denied, trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Commitment of M.E. v. V.A. Medical Centergreen1 sentence2025Medical Ctr., 957 N.E.2d 637, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). [29] First, T.M. argues that the trial court erred when it held the commitment hearing remotely. | 1 | 1 |
Ray Clifton v. Ruby McCammackgreen1 sentence2016That refusal simply reflects this Court’s commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis — that “a rule which has been deliberately declared should not be disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation of error.” Clifton v. McCammack, 43 N.E.3d 213, 220 (Ind.2015) (quoting Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 776 (Ind. 2011)). | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Kinggreen1 sentence2016That refusal simply reflects this Court’s commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis — that “a rule which has been deliberately declared should not be disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation of error.” Clifton v. McCammack, 43 N.E.3d 213, 220 (Ind.2015) (quoting Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 776 (Ind. 2011)). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Jackson v. State, 253 Ind. 487 , 255 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1970) (De-Bruler J., dissenting.) On certiorari, the Supreme Court adopted Justice DeBru-ler’s dissent and held that the defendant had been deprived of equal protection because the statutes subjected criminal defendants to a more lenient commitment standard and a more stringent release standard than persons not charged with crimes. 2008Jackson v. State, 253 Ind. 487 , 255 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1970) (De-Bruler J., dissenting.) On certiorari, the Supreme Court adopted Justice DeBru-ler’s dissent and held that the defendant had been deprived of equal protection because the statutes subjected criminal defendants to a more lenient commitment standard and a more stringent release standard than persons not charged with crimes. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Commitment of Healdgreen1 sentence2005See In re Heald, 785 N.E.2d 605 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs
green
2 sentences2019Id. [17] Here, during the commitment hearing, the Hospital set forth to meet its burden of proving the involuntary commitment elements through the testimony of Dr. Hasan, whom B.N. stipulated was an expert in psychiatry. 2018And stringently safeguarding the right to *615 appear at a commitment hearing surely "has the function of reducing the chance of inappropriate commitments." T.K. , 27 N.E.3d at 273 (quoting J.B. v. Midtown Mental Health Ctr. ( In re Commitment of J.B. ), 581 N.E.2d 448 , 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied ). | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Jackson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences2013Further, the defendant’s long-term commitment under the competency statute subjected him “to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses....” Id. at 730 , 92 S.Ct. at 1854 . 2013Further, the defendant’s long-term commitment under the competency statute subjected him “to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses....” Id. at 730 , 92 S.Ct. at 1854 . | 2 | 2008–2013 |
In Re the Commitment of Golub v. Giles
green
1 sentence2020Golub appealed and with respect to the condition prohibiting him from consuming alcohol or drugs, we noted the record was “devoid of any evidence showing that Golub used or abused alcohol or drugs” nor was “the subject of alcohol and drug use . . . at Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MH-2523 | April 29, 2020 Page 5 of 9 issue at any time during the hearing[.]” Id. at 1041 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In the Matter of Commitment of Cj v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty.
green
1 sentence2019Corp. of Marion Cty. , 842 N.E.2d 407 , 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a commitment where the trial court found C.J. dangerous to himself or other based, in part, on C.J.'s threat to kill his family and himself). 3 [15] Here, the evidence at B.D.'s commitment hearing showed that B.D. has Bipolar Type 1 Disorder with psychotic features. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commitment of M.M. v. Clarian Health Partners
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 94-95 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commitment of GPH v. Giles
green
2 sentences2018Cf. GPH v. Giles (In re Commitment of GPH) , 578 N.E.2d 729 , 736-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (clarifying waiver of a respondent's codified due process right to counsel at a commitment hearing when the statute recognized the right but was silent on personal waiver), trans. denied . 2018Cf. GPH v. Giles (In re Commitment of GPH) , 578 N.E.2d 729 , 736-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (clarifying waiver of a respondent's codified due process right to counsel at a commitment hearing when the statute recognized the right but was silent on personal waiver), trans. denied . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commitment of K.F. v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center
green
1 sentence2018Finally, in K.F. , the petitioning hospital presented only the doctor's equivocal testimony concerning whether the patient was able to function independently, there was no concern about her ability to care for her basic needs, and K.F.'s husband and son testified that she could function independently. 909 N.E.2d at 1066 -67 . [26] In contrast, A.M. is admittedly transient and does not have a stable income or shelter. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC
green
1 sentence2018Relying on its recent precedent, the panel held that, for competency reasons, "[a] respondent for a civil commitment hearing cannot voluntarily waive his right *610 to be present at a commitment hearing." A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC , 81 N.E.3d 629 , 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing M.E. v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs (In re Commitment of M.E.) , 64 N.E.3d 855 , 860-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commitment of J.B. v. Midtown Mental Health Center
green
1 sentence2018And stringently safeguarding the right to *615 appear at a commitment hearing surely "has the function of reducing the chance of inappropriate commitments." T.K. , 27 N.E.3d at 273 (quoting J.B. v. Midtown Mental Health Ctr. ( In re Commitment of J.B. ), 581 N.E.2d 448 , 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re the Commitment of Tedesco
green
1 sentence2017Id. [25] Unlike in Tedesco, in the instant matter, K.J. makes no challenge to the initial commitment hearing which was conducted in 2013. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Georgopolus v. State
green
1 sentence2013First, as the Court explained in Georgopu-los, when a defendant so requests the trial court is required to provide an appropriate instruction or instructions on the penal consequences of verdicts of guilty but mentally ill and not guilty by reason of insanity, Georgopulos, 735 N.E.2d at 1143 , not solely the consequence that the defendant believes is the most likely outcome of a commitment hearing. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re the Commitment of Turner
green
1 sentence1985Turner, supra. Even though the ultimate goal of civil commitment is a beneficent one of providing aid to the mentally ill, the commitment hearing itself is designed, in part, to be an adversarial proceeding. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Morgan v. State
green
2 sentences1974In Morgan v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 300 , 101 N. E. 6 , this Court found a statute which provided that males were automatically committed to an institution for the criminally insane when they were found not guilty of a violent crime by reason of insanity, while females similarly acquitted were afforded a commitment hearing, to be a classification repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause. 1974In Morgan v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 300 , 101 N. E. 6 , this Court found a statute which provided that males were automatically committed to an institution for the criminally insane when they were found not guilty of a violent crime by reason of insanity, while females similarly acquitted were afforded a commitment hearing, to be a classification repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.