commitment hearing in Wisconsin

2025STAT.] § 51.20(1)(a)2.” The D.J.W. decision, however, was driven by the fact that “[i]t was not clear at either the initial commitment hearing or the extension hearing on which subdivision paragraph of … § 51.20(1)(a)2. the commitment was based.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶36 .

2021See Milwaukee Cnty. v. T.L.R., 2019 WI App 5, ¶15 , 385 Wis. 2d 515 , 925 N.W.2d 790 (2018) (holding that no statutory requirement exists that the County must specify which of the dangerousness standards is to be alleged at a final commitment hearing, and that a list of potential dangerousness standards is constitutionally sufficient). ¶16 Brian cites Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 , which was decided after the hearing at issue in this case, for the proposition that particularized notice must be given to ensure due process.

2021See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1092 . 4 The federal court held in Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.

2021See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1092 . 4 The federal court held in Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.

1990Id. at 370 , 379 N.W.2d at 882 (citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972)).

1990Id. at 370 , 379 N.W.2d at 882 (citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972)).

2025Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 325, 328-30 , 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that the failure to conduct a final commitment hearing within 14 days of detention pursuant to WIS.

2025Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 325, 328-30 , 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that the failure to conduct a final commitment hearing within 14 days of detention pursuant to WIS.

2022And, as noted above, the circuit court’s dangerousness finding at the initial commitment hearing was based on speculation as to future events, rather than on evidence that the probability of serious physical harm is “much more likely than 27 Nos. 2021AP1955 2022AP102 not.” See D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶35 .

2022And, as noted above, the circuit court’s dangerousness finding at the initial commitment hearing was based on speculation as to future events, rather than on evidence that the probability of serious physical harm is “much more likely than 27 Nos. 2021AP1955 2022AP102 not.” See D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶35 .

2020Outagamie Cty. v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶94-97 , 349 Wis. 2d 148 , 833 N.W.2d 607 ; see also Marathon Cty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶¶53-54 , 390 Wis. 2d 50 , 937 N.W.2d 901 (applying these principles to expert testimony in an initial commitment hearing).

2020Outagamie Cty. v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶94-97 , 349 Wis. 2d 148 , 833 N.W.2d 607 ; see also Marathon Cty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶¶53-54 , 390 Wis. 2d 50 , 937 N.W.2d 901 (applying these principles to expert testimony in an initial commitment hearing).

2021“Although protecting people from harm [resulting from untreated mental health issues] is important, so is due process,” which the time limits are “intended to provide.” Ryan E.M., 252 Wis. 2d 490, ¶11 . 6 No. 2020AP814 ¶10 In recognition of the significant liberty interest at stake when an individual is detained, this court has determined that a circuit court loses competency if the final commitment hearing is not held within the statutory time limits, provided that the delay is caused by the county.

2020See Ryan E.M., 252 Wis. 2d 490, ¶11 ; Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d at 330 . ¶11 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(10)(c) is clear that “in every stage of the action,” the circuit court must (“shall”) “disregard any error or defect in the 8 In In re K.E.K., No. 2018AP1887, unpublished slip op.

2021Milwaukee Cnty. v. Edward S., 2001 WI App 169, ¶9 , 247 Wis. 2d 87 , 633 N.W.2d 241 .

2021Milwaukee Cnty. v. Edward S., 2001 WI App 169, ¶9 , 247 Wis. 2d 87 , 633 N.W.2d 241 .

1994See § 51.61(l)(g)4, Stats. *11 As a direct result of this court's holding in Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 733-35 , 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987), the legislature created subsections 3 and 4 of § 51.61(l)(g), granting a patient subject to a final commitment order the same right to refuse medication as a patient detained pending a final commitment hearing. 6 Contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, the court of appeals concluded that sub. 4 of § 51.61(l)(g) is merely illustrative of one way by which a court may determine that á patient is not competent.

1994See § 51.61(l)(g)4, Stats. *11 As a direct result of this court's holding in Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 733-35 , 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987), the legislature created subsections 3 and 4 of § 51.61(l)(g), granting a patient subject to a final commitment order the same right to refuse medication as a patient detained pending a final commitment hearing. 6 Contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, the court of appeals concluded that sub. 4 of § 51.61(l)(g) is merely illustrative of one way by which a court may determine that á patient is not competent.

2024"The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty." Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶43 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)). 25 No. 2023AP533 "Administration of psychotropic drugs is no small matter." D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231 , ¶43 n.7. ¶60 And like summary judgment, default judgment undermines the hearing mandate.

2024Our court of appeals said that summary judgment would render the commitment hearing requirement "meaningless." Id. ¶59 Like criminal cases and commitment proceedings, involuntary medication hearings implicate liberty interests.

2024Shirley J.C. v. Walworth County, 172 Wis. 2d 371, 378 , 493 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1992) ("If we were to allow summary judgment, the hearing requirement in [§ 51.20(10)(c)] would be meaningless.").

2023See State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88 , ¶¶90-92 & n.9, 328 Wis. 2d 42 , 786 N.W.2d 144 (holding that circuit court erred in determining seriousness of offense in juvenile waiver proceeding “based on the purported ‘facts’ of the offense” as described by doctor who lacked personal knowledge of them). ¶28 This court has repeatedly held that such use of hearsay testimony in a commitment hearing constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.

2023See State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88 , ¶¶90-92 & n.9, 328 Wis. 2d 42 , 786 N.W.2d 144 (holding that circuit court erred in determining seriousness of offense in juvenile waiver proceeding “based on the purported ‘facts’ of the offense” as described by doctor who lacked personal knowledge of them). ¶28 This court has repeatedly held that such use of hearsay testimony in a commitment hearing constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.

2021See Milwaukee Cnty. v. T.L.R., 2019 WI App 5, ¶15 , 385 Wis. 2d 515 , 925 N.W.2d 790 (2018) (holding that no statutory requirement exists that the County must specify which of the dangerousness standards is to be alleged at a final commitment hearing, and that a list of potential dangerousness standards is constitutionally sufficient). ¶16 Brian cites Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 , which was decided after the hearing at issue in this case, for the proposition that particularized notice must be given to ensure due process.

2021See Milwaukee Cnty. v. T.L.R., 2019 WI App 5, ¶15 , 385 Wis. 2d 515 , 925 N.W.2d 790 (2018) (holding that no statutory requirement exists that the County must specify which of the dangerousness standards is to be alleged at a final commitment hearing, and that a list of potential dangerousness standards is constitutionally sufficient). ¶16 Brian cites Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 , which was decided after the hearing at issue in this case, for the proposition that particularized notice must be given to ensure due process.

2021See Milwaukee Cnty. v. T.L.R., 2019 WI App 5, ¶15 , 385 Wis. 2d 515 , 925 N.W.2d 790 (2018) (holding that no statutory requirement exists that the County must specify which of the dangerousness standards is to be alleged at a final commitment hearing, and that a list of potential dangerousness standards is constitutionally sufficient). ¶16 Brian cites Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 , which was decided after the hearing at issue in this case, for the proposition that particularized notice must be given to ensure due process.

2021See State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 421 , 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999). ¶15 Based on the evidence introduced at the final commitment hearing, the circuit court properly determined that Matthew was dangerous under WIS.

2021See State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 421 , 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999). ¶15 Based on the evidence introduced at the final commitment hearing, the circuit court properly determined that Matthew was dangerous under WIS.

2020See L.K. v. B.B., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 448 , 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983). ¶12 First, D.J.’s assertion that he was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the commitment hearing is conclusory, and D.J. does not identify any facts that would support such a conclusion.

2020See L.K. v. B.B., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 448 , 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983). ¶12 First, D.J.’s assertion that he was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the commitment hearing is conclusory, and D.J. does not identify any facts that would support such a conclusion.