commitment hearing in Florida

2024Indeed, whether one is “[m]anifestly dangerous . . . is a mixed question of ‘(t)he likelihood of future misconduct, the type of misconduct to be expected, and its probable frequency. . . .’” Id. at 196 (quoting Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 , 595 n.17 (D.C.

2004The State disagrees, and points to Hill v. State, 358 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), for support.

1992These criteria were set forth in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), in which it was held to be a denial of equal protection to subject a criminal defendant to a more lenient commitment standard than would be applied to one not charged with a crime.

1992These criteria were set forth in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), in which it was held to be a denial of equal protection to subject a criminal defendant to a more lenient commitment standard than would be applied to one not charged with a crime.

2024In making its determination, the trial court properly considers, inter alia, “the evidence obtained at trial and prior reports of psychologists, as well as any relevant evidence presented at the commitment hearing.” Tavares, 871 So. 2d at 976 (citing State v. Vigil, 410 So. 2d 528, 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)).

2024Indeed, whether one is “[m]anifestly dangerous . . . is a mixed question of ‘(t)he likelihood of future misconduct, the type of misconduct to be expected, and its probable frequency. . . .’” Id. at 196 (quoting Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 , 595 n.17 (D.C.

2007Register v. State, 946 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Brown v. State, 953 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

2007Register v. State, 946 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Brown v. State, 953 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

1997We recently held in Joehnk v. State, 689 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), that in a Baker Act commitment proceeding the defendant “has a fundamental right to be present at the commitment proceeding [and] ... while a defendant may waive his or her rights to be personally present and be constructively present through counsel, the court must certify through proper inquiry that the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” Id. (citations omitted).

1997We recently held in Joehnk v. State, 689 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), that in a Baker Act commitment proceeding the defendant “has a fundamental right to be present at the commitment proceeding [and] ... while a defendant may waive his or her rights to be personally present and be constructively present through counsel, the court must certify through proper inquiry that the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” Id. (citations omitted).

1985(Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 14, 1985); In the Interest of L.T., 464 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); In the Interest of A.B., 444 So.2d 981 . [5] While the original dependency adjudication is the predicate for the court's continuing jurisdiction over the children, and may be relevant to the issue of permanent commitment, the *1163 question of dependency at the time of the commitment hearing is a critical element which must be revisited under the more demanding burden of proof applicable in permanent commitment proceedings.

1985(Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 14, 1985); In the Interest of L.T., 464 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); In the Interest of A.B., 444 So.2d 981 . [5] While the original dependency adjudication is the predicate for the court's continuing jurisdiction over the children, and may be relevant to the issue of permanent commitment, the *1163 question of dependency at the time of the commitment hearing is a critical element which must be revisited under the more demanding burden of proof applicable in permanent commitment proceedings.

1969No authority cited by Petitioner nor relied on by the majority opinion herein, including In re Lyon's Estate (Fla. 1955), 90 So.2d 39 , 64 A.L.R.2d 1 , can reasonably be construed as abrogating or dispelling the commitment to this principle in our jurisdiction.