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11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marino v. Favagreen2 sentences2017See Schanne, 121 A.3d at 949 (“[T]he judicial privilege operates by incentivizing individuals to speak freely within a judicial (or quasi-judicial) context—or more to the point here, to speak freely in seeking to initiate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.”) (emphasis in original); Marino, 915 A.2d at 124 (concluding that “statements [the defendant] made in the application to commit [the plaintiff], and the statements he later made at the commitment hearing, are' absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for a defamation action against [the defendant].”); Milliner, 709 A.2d at 420 ( 2012See also Marino v. Fava, 915 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa.Super.2006), appeal denied, 592 Pa. 782 , 926 A.2d 975 (2007) (holding that statements an uncle made in an application to have his nephew involuntarily committed along with those he later made at the commitment hearing were absolutely privileged and could not form the basis for a defamation action). | 2 | 2 |
Pawlowski v. Smortogreen2 sentences2017See Schanne, 121 A.3d at 949 (“[T]he judicial privilege operates by incentivizing individuals to speak freely within a judicial (or quasi-judicial) context—or more to the point here, to speak freely in seeking to initiate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.”) (emphasis in original); Marino, 915 A.2d at 124 (concluding that “statements [the defendant] made in the application to commit [the plaintiff], and the statements he later made at the commitment hearing, are' absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for a defamation action against [the defendant].”); Milliner, 709 A.2d at 420 ( 2006Rather, Judge Wettick granted summary judgment based on his determination that Fava’s statements in the application to commit Marino, and Fava’s testimony at the commitment hearing, were absolutely privileged under this Court’s decision in Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa.Super. 71 , 588 A.2d 36 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Countermangreen1 sentence2020I begin by expressing my complete agreement with the majority’s discussion of the purpose of Section 5944, as well as the policy considerations at stake in a juvenile commitment proceeding under Act 21.1 As the majority observes, the Section 5944 privilege “is based upon a strong public policy that confidential communications made by a patient to a psychiatrist or psychologist should be protected from disclosure, absent consent or waiver.” Majority Opinion at 11 (quoting Commonwealth v. Counterman, 719 A.2d 284, 295 (Pa. 1998)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Petition for Involuntary Commitment of Barbourgreen1 sentence2017At the commitment hearing, any evidence presented by the County must be received in “strict compl[iance] with the rules of evidence generally applicable to other proceedings which may result in an extended deprivation of an individual’s liberty.” 9 In re Involuntary Commitment of Barbour, 733 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa.Super. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Millergreen1 sentence2017See Schanne, 121 A.3d at 949 (“[T]he judicial privilege operates by incentivizing individuals to speak freely within a judicial (or quasi-judicial) context—or more to the point here, to speak freely in seeking to initiate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.”) (emphasis in original); Marino, 915 A.2d at 124 (concluding that “statements [the defendant] made in the application to commit [the plaintiff], and the statements he later made at the commitment hearing, are' absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for a defamation action against [the defendant].”); Milliner, 709 A.2d at 420 ( | 1 | 1 |
Milliner v. Enckgreen1 sentence2017See Schanne, 121 A.3d at 949 (“[T]he judicial privilege operates by incentivizing individuals to speak freely within a judicial (or quasi-judicial) context—or more to the point here, to speak freely in seeking to initiate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.”) (emphasis in original); Marino, 915 A.2d at 124 (concluding that “statements [the defendant] made in the application to commit [the plaintiff], and the statements he later made at the commitment hearing, are' absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for a defamation action against [the defendant].”); Milliner, 709 A.2d at 420 ( | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Witherspoongreen2 sentences1982See Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 481 Pa. 321 , 392 A.2d 1313 (1978). 1982See Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 481 Pa. 321 , 392 A.2d 1313 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Alabamagreen2 sentences1970See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 , 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970). 1970See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 , 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Specht v. Pattersongreen2 sentences1969See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 , 87 S. Ct. 1209 (1967); Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F. 2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Dooley, supra; Commonwealth v. Pifer, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 , 256 A. 2d 878 (1969) (dissenting opinion). 1969See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 , 87 S. Ct. 1209 (1967); Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F. 2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Dooley, supra; Commonwealth v. Pifer, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 , 256 A. 2d 878 (1969) (dissenting opinion). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In RE: S.M. Appeal Of: S.M.
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 939 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
McClure v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
green
1 sentence1985Gundy v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 618, 478 A.2d 139 , (1984); McClure v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 176, 461 A.2d 645 (1983). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gundy v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1985Gundy v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 618, 478 A.2d 139 , (1984); McClure v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 176, 461 A.2d 645 (1983). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Pifer
neutral
2 sentences1969See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 , 87 S. Ct. 1209 (1967); Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F. 2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Dooley, supra; Commonwealth v. Pifer, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 , 256 A. 2d 878 (1969) (dissenting opinion). 1969See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 , 87 S. Ct. 1209 (1967); Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F. 2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Dooley, supra; Commonwealth v. Pifer, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 , 256 A. 2d 878 (1969) (dissenting opinion). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Carl G. Gerchman v. James F. Maroney, Superintendent State Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence1969See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 , 87 S. Ct. 1209 (1967); Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F. 2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Dooley, supra; Commonwealth v. Pifer, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 , 256 A. 2d 878 (1969) (dissenting opinion). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Ferree v. Douglas
neutral
2 sentences1953Nor does the Insolvency Act apply to a commitment for violation of a city ordinance: Ferree v. Douglas, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 447 , 21 A. 2d 472 . 1953Nor does the Insolvency Act apply to a commitment for violation of a city ordinance: Ferree v. Douglas, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 447 , 21 A. 2d 472 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Davis's Appeal
neutral
1 sentence1953The final paragraph of §733 of The Penal Code of 1939, 18 P.S. 4733, under which appellant was prosecuted, reads as follows: “Whenever the court of quarter sessions of any county in the Commonwealth commits the person complained of to the county prison, there to remain until he complies with their order or give security, etc., the court may at any time after three (3) months, if it shall be satisfied of the inability of such person to comply with the said order and give such security, to discharge him from imprisonment.” This language was taken from the Act of 1869, P. L. 75, under which it wa | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.