has adopted rule in Oklahoma

1982This Court has adopted the rule stated in Lamb v. Vansyckle, 205 Ky. 597 , 266 S.W. 253, 254 (1924) in Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 , 219: "Nor are we willing to adopt the rule that a lease which is to continue for a definite period, and so long as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, ipso facto terminates whenever production or development ceases for a brief period of time.

1982This Court has adopted the rule stated in Lamb v. Vansyckle, 205 Ky. 597 , 266 S.W. 253, 254 (1924) in Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 , 219: “Nor are we willing to adopt the rule that a lease which is to continue for a definite period, and so long as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, ipso facto terminates whenever production or development ceases for a brief period of time.

1948Morris v. State, 9 Okla.

1944Morris v. State, 9 Okla.

1982On the contrary, we have reached the conclusion that the only fair and just rule is to hold that the lease continues in force unless the period of cessation, viewed in the light of all the circumstances is for an unreasonable time." "The burden of proof showing failure of reasonable diligence in operation is upon the lessor and proof of failure must be clear." Durkee v. Hazan, supra, 814 .

1982On the contrary, we have reached the conclusion that the only fair and just rule is to hold that the lease continues in force unless the period of cessation, viewed in the light of all the circumstances is for an unreasonable time.” “The burden of proofvshowing failure of reasonable diligence in operation is upon the lessor and proof of failure must be clear.” Durkee v. Hazan, supra, 814 .

1953Cr. 136 , 152 P. 2d 284, 289 , involving a thirteen year old girl, we said: “Erom an early date this court has adopted the rule that one may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix. * * * But we have limited this rule with an exception which is as well established as the. rule itself.

1948Cr. 136 , 152 P. 2d 284 , 289: “ 'From an early date this court has adopted the rule that one may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.

2004The court has adopted the rule that "until a resale tax deed, valid on its face, has been issued and delivered, the landowner has the right to redeem from the tax sale and tax resale." Petrovics v. Brown, 235 P.2d 708 , 709 (Okla. 1951). ¶ 3 The policy in favor of redemption is not limited to the actual owner but can extend to the equitable owner too.

2004"The law does not limit the right of redemption to the record owner, but extends that right to the equitable owner as well." Burnett v. McGrath, 293 P. 1102 , 1103 (Okla. 1930).

2000In areas of novel scientific evidence, this Court has adopted the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

2000In areas of novel scientific evidence, this Court has adopted the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

1999Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597 , 168 P.2d 105 (1946) and as to statements made preliminary to proceedings.

1999Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597 , 168 P.2d 105 (1946) and as to statements made preliminary to proceedings.

1967On the contrary, we have reached the conclusion that the only fair and just rule is to hold that the lease continues in force unless the period of cessation, viewed in the light of all the circumstances is for an unreasonable time.” Cotner v. Warren, Okl., 330 P.2d 217 ; Kerr v. Hillenberg et al., Okl., 373 P.2d 66 .

1967While a motor vehicle is generally not regarded as an inherently dangerous instrumentality, and the owner thereof is not generally liable for its negligent use by another to whom it is entrusted, liability may arise if the owner permits operation of his motor vehicle by one whom he knows or should know to be so incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless as to make the vehicle a dangerous instrumentality when operated by such person.” It is asserted that this Court has adopted such rule, as evidenced by our decisions in Coker v. Moose, 180 Old. 234, 68 P.2d 504 ; Berg v. Bryant, etc., Okl., 305 P.

1967While a motor vehicle is generally not regarded as an inherently dangerous instrumentality, and the owner thereof is not generally liable for its negligent use by another to whom it is entrusted, liability may arise if the owner permits operation of his motor vehicle by one whom he knows or should know to be so incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless as to make the vehicle a dangerous instrumentality when operated by such person.” It is asserted that this Court has adopted such rule, as evidenced by our decisions in Coker v. Moose, 180 Old. 234, 68 P.2d 504 ; Berg v. Bryant, etc., Okl., 305 P.

1967While a motor vehicle is generally not regarded as an inherently dangerous instrumentality, and the owner thereof is not generally liable for its negligent use by another to whom it is entrusted, liability may arise if the owner permits operation of his motor vehicle by one whom he knows or should know to be so incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless as to make the vehicle a dangerous instrumentality when operated by such person.” It is asserted that this Court has adopted such rule, as evidenced by our decisions in Coker v. Moose, 180 Old. 234, 68 P.2d 504 ; Berg v. Bryant, etc., Okl., 305 P.

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958The Attorney General cites in his brief the case of McGilvery v. State, 50 Okl.Cr. 376 , 298 P. 312 , wherein this court said: “Where the defendant pleads to the merits of a criminal action, he waives all objections to the illegality of his arrest.” Though this court does not agree that this is the rule in every instance, as stated in Shirey v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 981 , we are in accord, that, if the matter is not raised by motion to suppress or by timely objection during course of trial it is waived and cannot be heard for the first time upon appeal.

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958This court said in McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409 , 247 P.2d 295 , 297: “The privilege of immunity against an illegal search and seizure is personal to the accused and is one which will be considered waived unless timely objection to the introduction of evidence is interposed, and supported by proof.” The court has adopted the rule as laid down in Kelso v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 215 , 260 P.2d 864 : “An objection to evidence as obtained by illegal search and seizure must be interposed at first opportunity and should be made either at beginning of trial by motion to suppress evidence or in course

1958The Attorney General cites in his brief the case of McGilvery v. State, 50 Okl.Cr. 376 , 298 P. 312 , wherein this court said: “Where the defendant pleads to the merits of a criminal action, he waives all objections to the illegality of his arrest.” Though this court does not agree that this is the rule in every instance, as stated in Shirey v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 981 , we are in accord, that, if the matter is not raised by motion to suppress or by timely objection during course of trial it is waived and cannot be heard for the first time upon appeal.

1958The Attorney General cites in his brief the case of McGilvery v. State, 50 Okl.Cr. 376 , 298 P. 312 , wherein this court said: “Where the defendant pleads to the merits of a criminal action, he waives all objections to the illegality of his arrest.” Though this court does not agree that this is the rule in every instance, as stated in Shirey v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 981 , we are in accord, that, if the matter is not raised by motion to suppress or by timely objection during course of trial it is waived and cannot be heard for the first time upon appeal.

1948Ex parte Matthews, 85 Okla.

1948DeWitt v. State, 79 Okla.

1939See Sneed v. Tippett, 114 Okla. 173 , 245 P. 40 ; Little v. Excise Board of Marshall County, 161 Okla. 40 , 16 P.2d 1080 .

1939See Sneed v. Tippett, 114 Okla. 173 , 245 P. 40 ; Little v. Excise Board of Marshall County, 161 Okla. 40 , 16 P.2d 1080 .

1935In the case of the Security National Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 126 Okla. 202 , 259 P. 572 ; Baldwin & Baker v. Saunders-Gibson Co., 148 Okla. 290 , 298 P. 600 ; Milliken et al. v. Smith, 120 Okla. 211 , 251 P. 84 ; Westlake v. Cooper, 69 Okla. 212 , 171 P. 859 , and many other cases, this court has adopted the rule as settled law in this jurisdiction that on appeal a case must be presented upon the same theory upon which it was presented to the trial court, and that a party litigant will not be allowed, after lodging his appeal in this court, to change the theory of his case and present other and

1935In the case of the Security National Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 126 Okla. 202 , 259 P. 572 ; Baldwin & Baker v. Saunders-Gibson Co., 148 Okla. 290 , 298 P. 600 ; Milliken et al. v. Smith, 120 Okla. 211 , 251 P. 84 ; Westlake v. Cooper, 69 Okla. 212 , 171 P. 859 , and many other cases, this court has adopted the rule as settled law in this jurisdiction that on appeal a case must be presented upon the same theory upon which it was presented to the trial court, and that a party litigant will not be allowed, after lodging his appeal in this court, to change the theory of his case and present other and

1935In the case of the Security National Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 126 Okla. 202 , 259 P. 572 ; Baldwin & Baker v. Saunders-Gibson Co., 148 Okla. 290 , 298 P. 600 ; Milliken et al. v. Smith, 120 Okla. 211 , 251 P. 84 ; Westlake v. Cooper, 69 Okla. 212 , 171 P. 859 , and many other cases, this court has adopted the rule as settled law in this jurisdiction that on appeal a case must be presented upon the same theory upon which it was presented to the trial court, and that a party litigant will not be allowed, after lodging his appeal in this court, to change the theory of his case and present other and

1935In the case of the Security National Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 126 Okla. 202 , 259 P. 572 ; Baldwin & Baker v. Saunders-Gibson Co., 148 Okla. 290 , 298 P. 600 ; Milliken et al. v. Smith, 120 Okla. 211 , 251 P. 84 ; Westlake v. Cooper, 69 Okla. 212 , 171 P. 859 , and many other cases, this court has adopted the rule as settled law in this jurisdiction that on appeal a case must be presented upon the same theory upon which it was presented to the trial court, and that a party litigant will not be allowed, after lodging his appeal in this court, to change the theory of his case and present other and

1935In the case of the Security National Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 126 Okla. 202 , 259 P. 572 ; Baldwin & Baker v. Saunders-Gibson Co., 148 Okla. 290 , 298 P. 600 ; Milliken et al. v. Smith, 120 Okla. 211 , 251 P. 84 ; Westlake v. Cooper, 69 Okla. 212 , 171 P. 859 , and many other cases, this court has adopted the rule as settled law in this jurisdiction that on appeal a case must be presented upon the same theory upon which it was presented to the trial court, and that a party litigant will not be allowed, after lodging his appeal in this court, to change the theory of his case and present other and