has adopted test in Montana

2025Hughes v. Hughes, 2013 MT 176, ¶ 30 , 370 Mont. 499 , 305 P.3d 772 .

2025Hughes v. Hughes, 2013 MT 176, ¶ 30 , 370 Mont. 499 , 305 P.3d 772 .

1997In determining whether a criminal defendant has received a speedy trial, this Court has adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 .

1997In determining whether a criminal defendant has received a speedy trial, this Court has adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 .

2013State v. Wooster, 2001 MT 4, ¶ 18 , 304 Mont. 56 , 16 P.3d 409 .

2013State v. Wooster, 2001 MT 4, ¶ 18 , 304 Mont. 56 , 16 P.3d 409 .

2013State v. Wooster, 2001 MT 4, ¶ 18 , 304 Mont. 56 , 16 P.3d 409 .

2013The doctrine provides that where findings of fact “are general in terms, any findings not specifically made, but necessary to the [determination], are deemed to have been implied, if supported by the evidence.” Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC, 2012 MT 321, ¶ 41 , 368 Mont. 101 , 293 P.3d 817 (quoting In re Transfer of Location for Mont.

2013The doctrine provides that where findings of fact “are general in terms, any findings not specifically made, but necessary to the [determination], are deemed to have been implied, if supported by the evidence.” Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC, 2012 MT 321, ¶ 41 , 368 Mont. 101 , 293 P.3d 817 (quoting In re Transfer of Location for Mont.

2012This Court has adopted the doctrine of implied findings for the purpose of reviewing findings of fact. 19 The doctrine provides that where findings of fact “ ‘are general in terms, any findings not specifically made, but necessary to the [determination], are deemed to have been implied, if supported by the evidence.’ ” In re Whyte, 2012 MT 45, ¶ 41 , 364 Mont. 219 , 272 P.3d 102 (quoting In re Transfer of Location for Mont.

2012This Court has adopted the doctrine of implied findings for the purpose of reviewing findings of fact. 19 The doctrine provides that where findings of fact “ ‘are general in terms, any findings not specifically made, but necessary to the [determination], are deemed to have been implied, if supported by the evidence.’ ” In re Whyte, 2012 MT 45, ¶ 41 , 364 Mont. 219 , 272 P.3d 102 (quoting In re Transfer of Location for Mont.

2009This Court has adopted a standard under which “contractual provisions that indemnify a party for its own negligence must be ‘clear and unequivocal’ to be enforceable.” Slater, 275 Mont. at 270 , 912 P.2d at 782 (citing Sweet v. Colborn Sch.

2009This Court has adopted a standard under which “contractual provisions that indemnify a party for its own negligence must be ‘clear and unequivocal’ to be enforceable.” Slater, 275 Mont. at 270 , 912 P.2d at 782 (citing Sweet v. Colborn Sch.

2009To determine whether a plea was voluntarily made, we look at "case specific considerations" such as the "adequacy of the district court's interrogation, the benefits obtained from a plea bargain, the withdrawal's timeliness, and other considerations that may affect the credibility of the claims presented." McFarlane , ¶ 17. ¶16 In State v. Sanders, 1999 MT 136 , 294 Mont. 539 , 982 P.2d 1015 (overruled on other grounds) and State v. Rave, 2005 MT 78 , 326 Mont. 398 , 109 P.3d 753 , we determined that "good cause" existed when there was doubt in the record about whether the defendants had been

2009To determine whether a plea was voluntarily made, we look at "case specific considerations" such as the "adequacy of the district court's interrogation, the benefits obtained from a plea bargain, the withdrawal's timeliness, and other considerations that may affect the credibility of the claims presented." McFarlane , ¶ 17. ¶16 In State v. Sanders, 1999 MT 136 , 294 Mont. 539 , 982 P.2d 1015 (overruled on other grounds) and State v. Rave, 2005 MT 78 , 326 Mont. 398 , 109 P.3d 753 , we determined that "good cause" existed when there was doubt in the record about whether the defendants had been

2009To determine whether a plea was voluntarily made, we look at "case specific considerations" such as the "adequacy of the district court's interrogation, the benefits obtained from a plea bargain, the withdrawal's timeliness, and other considerations that may affect the credibility of the claims presented." McFarlane , ¶ 17. ¶16 In State v. Sanders, 1999 MT 136 , 294 Mont. 539 , 982 P.2d 1015 (overruled on other grounds) and State v. Rave, 2005 MT 78 , 326 Mont. 398 , 109 P.3d 753 , we determined that "good cause" existed when there was doubt in the record about whether the defendants had been

2009To determine whether a plea was voluntarily made, we look at "case specific considerations" such as the "adequacy of the district court's interrogation, the benefits obtained from a plea bargain, the withdrawal's timeliness, and other considerations that may affect the credibility of the claims presented." McFarlane , ¶ 17. ¶16 In State v. Sanders, 1999 MT 136 , 294 Mont. 539 , 982 P.2d 1015 (overruled on other grounds) and State v. Rave, 2005 MT 78 , 326 Mont. 398 , 109 P.3d 753 , we determined that "good cause" existed when there was doubt in the record about whether the defendants had been

2009This Court has adopted the standard for voluntariness set forth in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 , 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472 (1970), which considers a guilty plea voluntary "only when the defendant is `fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel . . . .'" State v. Lone Elk, 2005 MT 56, ¶ 21 , 326 Mont. 214 , 108 P.3d 500 .

2009This Court has adopted the standard for voluntariness set forth in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 , 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472 (1970), which considers a guilty plea voluntary "only when the defendant is `fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel . . . .'" State v. Lone Elk, 2005 MT 56, ¶ 21 , 326 Mont. 214 , 108 P.3d 500 .

1997See State v. Thompson (1993), 263 Mont. 17 , 865 P.2d 1125 ; State v. Stewart (1994), 266 Mont. 525 , 881 P.2d 629 .

1997See State v. Thompson (1993), 263 Mont. 17 , 865 P.2d 1125 ; State v. Stewart (1994), 266 Mont. 525 , 881 P.2d 629 .

1996As recognized by the majority, this Court has adopted the test articulated in McDonnell Douglas and further developed in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 , for analyzing discrimination cases.

1996As recognized by the majority, this Court has adopted the test articulated in McDonnell Douglas and further developed in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 , for analyzing discrimination cases.

1996See Kenyon, 835 P.2d 742; Taliaferro v. State (1988), 235 Mont. 23 , 764 P.2d 860 ; European Health Spa v. Human Rights Comm’n (1984), 212 Mont. 319 , 687 P.2d 1029 ; Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dept. (1981), 192 Mont. 42 , 626 P.2d 242 .

1996See Kenyon, 835 P.2d 742; Taliaferro v. State (1988), 235 Mont. 23 , 764 P.2d 860 ; European Health Spa v. Human Rights Comm’n (1984), 212 Mont. 319 , 687 P.2d 1029 ; Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dept. (1981), 192 Mont. 42 , 626 P.2d 242 .

1996See Kenyon, 835 P.2d 742; Taliaferro v. State (1988), 235 Mont. 23 , 764 P.2d 860 ; European Health Spa v. Human Rights Comm’n (1984), 212 Mont. 319 , 687 P.2d 1029 ; Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dept. (1981), 192 Mont. 42 , 626 P.2d 242 .

1996See Kenyon, 835 P.2d 742; Taliaferro v. State (1988), 235 Mont. 23 , 764 P.2d 860 ; European Health Spa v. Human Rights Comm’n (1984), 212 Mont. 319 , 687 P.2d 1029 ; Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dept. (1981), 192 Mont. 42 , 626 P.2d 242 .

1996See Kenyon, 835 P.2d 742; Taliaferro v. State (1988), 235 Mont. 23 , 764 P.2d 860 ; European Health Spa v. Human Rights Comm’n (1984), 212 Mont. 319 , 687 P.2d 1029 ; Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dept. (1981), 192 Mont. 42 , 626 P.2d 242 .

1996See Kenyon, 835 P.2d 742; Taliaferro v. State (1988), 235 Mont. 23 , 764 P.2d 860 ; European Health Spa v. Human Rights Comm’n (1984), 212 Mont. 319 , 687 P.2d 1029 ; Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dept. (1981), 192 Mont. 42 , 626 P.2d 242 .

1996See State v. Weeks, (1995), 270 Mont. 63 , 891 P.2d 477 ; State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20 , 885 P.2d 457 .

1996See State v. Weeks, (1995), 270 Mont. 63 , 891 P.2d 477 ; State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20 , 885 P.2d 457 .

1996The State acknowledges that this Court has adopted the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), _ U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , in determining whether to allow expert testimony concerning novel scientific evidence.

1996The State acknowledges that this Court has adopted the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), _ U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , in determining whether to allow expert testimony concerning novel scientific evidence.

1990In making a determination of effective assistance of counsel, this Court has adopted the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 .

1990In making a determination of effective assistance of counsel, this Court has adopted the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 .

1982The Court will not make an independent analysis of whether the State carried its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant contends that the District Court erred by the above analysis and that, at least since State v. Rodriguez, supra, this Court has adopted the standard set down in Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 .

1982The Court will not make an independent analysis of whether the State carried its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant contends that the District Court erred by the above analysis and that, at least since State v. Rodriguez, supra, this Court has adopted the standard set down in Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 .

1982The Court will not make an independent analysis of whether the State carried its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant contends that the District Court erred by the above analysis and that, at least since State v. Rodriguez, supra, this Court has adopted the standard set down in Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 .

1980State v. Knapp (1977), 174 Mont. 373 , 570 P.2d 1138 .

1980State v. Knapp (1977), 174 Mont. 373 , 570 P.2d 1138 .

1980This Court has adopted the rule expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Townsend v. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 736 , 68 S.Ct. 1252 , 92 L.3d 1690, that a defendant is entitled to have his sentence predicated on substantially correct information.

1980This Court has adopted the rule expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Townsend v. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 736 , 68 S.Ct. 1252 , 92 L.3d 1690, that a defendant is entitled to have his sentence predicated on substantially correct information.